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R.M.D.CHAMARBAUGWALLA versus THE UNION OF INDIA

Citation: [1957] 1 S.C.R. 930 · Decided: 09-04-1957 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: SUDHI RANJAN DAS · Disposal: Dismissed

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Judgment (excerpt)

1957 
April !I 
930 
SUFREME COURT REPORTS 
R.M.D.CHAMARBAUGWALLA 
"ยท 
THE UNION OF INDIA 
(with connected petitions) 
[1957] 
(S. R. 
DAS C.J., VENKATARAMA AYYAR, B. P. SINHA, 
S. K. DAs and P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR JJ.) 
Prize 
Competition-Definition-Construction-If 
includes 
competition other than of a gamOling nalure-Validity of enactment 
-Principle of setJerability-Application-Prize Competitions Act, 
( 42 Of J955), SS. 2(J), 4, 5, TT. Jl, J2. 
The petitioners, who were promoting and conducting prize 
compet1tJ.ons 
in the different 
States of India, challenged 
the 
constitutionality of ss. 4 and 5 of the Prize Competitions Act ( 42 
of 1955) and rr. II and 12 framed under s. 20 of the Act. Their 
contention was that 'prize competition' as defined in s. 2( d) of the 
Act included not merely competitions that were of a gambling 
nature but also those in which succ.css depended to a substantial 
degree on skill ยทand the sections 
a~d the 
rules 
violated 
their 
fundamental right to carry on business, and were unsupportable 
under Art. 19(6) of the Constitution, that they constituted a single 
inseverable enactment and, consequently, must fail entirely. 
On 
behalf of the Union of India this was controverted and it was 
contended that the 
definition, 
properly 
construed, 
meant and 
included only such competitions as were of a gambling nature, and 
even if that was not so, the impugned provisions, being severable 
in their application, were valid as regards gambling competitions. 
Held, that the validity of the restrictions imposed by ss. 4 
and 5 and rr. 11 and 12 of the Act as regards gambling competi-
tions was no longer open to challenge under Art. 19( 6) of the 
Constitution in view of the decision of this Court that gambling 
did not fall within the purview of Art. 19(1)(g) of the Consti-
tution. 
The S!Ote of Bombay v. R. M. D. Chamarbaugwala, (1957) 
S.C.R. 87 4, followed. 
On a proper construction there could be no doubt that the 
Prize Competitions Act ( 42 of 1955), in defining the word 'prize 
competition' as it did in s. 2(d), had in view only such competi-
tions as were of a gambling nature and no others. 
In interpreting an enactment the Court should ascertain the 
intention of the legislature not merely from a literal meaning of 
the words used but also from such matters as the history of the 
legislation, its purpose and the mischief it seeks to suppress. 
The Bengal Immunity Company Limited v. The State of Bihar 
and others. (1955) 2 S.C.R. 603, referred to. 
S.C.R. 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
931 
Even assuming that. prize competition as defined by s. 2( d) 
1937 
of the Act included not merely gambling competitions but also R.M. D. CharMโ€ข 
others in which success depended to a considerable degree on skill, 
baugwal/a 
the restrictions imposed by ss. 4 and 5 and rr. 11 and 12 of the 
v. 
Act were clearly severable in their application to the two distinct The Union 1if fndi.l 
and separate categories of competitions and, consequently, could 
not be void as regards gambling competitions. 
The principle of severability is applicable to laws enacted by 
legislatures with limited powers of legislation, such as those in a 
Federal Union, which fall partly within and partly outside their 
legislative competence, where 
the question arises as to whether 
the valid can be separated from the invalid parts and that is a 
question which has to be decided by the Court on a consideration 
of 
the entire 
provisions of the Act. 
There is, however, no 
basis for the contention that the principle applies only when the 
legislature 
exceeds its powers as regards the 
subject-matter of 
legislation 
and 
not 
when 
it 
contravenes 
any 
constitutional 
prohibitions. 
Jn re Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act, (1941) F.C.R. 12, 
The State of Bombay and another v. F. N. Balsara, (1951) S.C.R. 682, 
and The State of Bombay and another v. The' United Motors (India) 
Ltd. and others, (1953) S.C.R. 1069, relied on. 
Punjab Province v. Daulat Singh and others, (1946) F.C.R. 1, 
Ramesh Thappar v. State of Madras, (1950) S.C.R. 594 and Chintaman 
Rao v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (1950) S.C.R. 759, distinguished. 
ORIGINAL 
JuRISDICTION : 
Writ Petitions Nos. 78-80, 
93 and 152 of 1956. 
Petitions under Article 32 of the Constitution of 
India for the enforcement of Fundamental Rights. 
Sir N. P. Engineer, N. A. Palkhivala, R. A. Gagrat 
and G. Gopalakrishnan, for the petitioners in Petitions 
Nos. 78, 79 and 80 of 1956. 
Ganp

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