LexR.L.ARORA versus STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH AND OTHER
Open in Lexace · Ask the AI about this caseJudgment (excerpt)
1961 & M. Karim •• Bibi Sakinri Hidayatullah J. 1961 February 14. SUPREME COURT REPORTS suggestion that Syed Aulad Ali ever aserted any hostile title against him or thitt a dispute with regard to ownership and possession had ever arisen. Adverse possession must be adequate in continuity, in publicity and extent and a plea is required at the least to show when possession becomes adverse so that the starting point of limitation against the party affected can be found. There is no evidence here when possession became adverse, if it at all did, and a mere suggestion in the relief clause that there was an uninter- rupted possession for "several 12 years" or that the plaintiff had acquired "an absolute title" was not enough to raise such a plea. Long possession is not necessarily adverse possession and the prayer clause is not a substitute for a plea. The cited cases need hardly be considered, because each case must be determined upon the allegations in the plaint in tl1at case. It is sufficient to point out that in Bishun Dayal v. Kesho Prasad and another [A.I.R. 1940 P.C. 202], the Judicial Committee did not accept an alternative case based on possession after purchase without a proper plea. Reading the plaint as a whole, we agree with the High Court that a case based on possession after the purchase was not stated in the plaint and the decision of the High Court in the circumstances of this case was therefore proper. The appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed. R. L. ARORA v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH AND OTHERS (P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, C.J., K. N. WANCHOO, K. C. DAS GUPTA, J. C. SHAH AND N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR, JJ.) Land Acquisition Act-Acquisition for company engaged in industry for public purpose-Provision if hit by Ari. 31(2) and Art. 19(1) of the Constitution-lnterprttation-Disthiction made be.tween Government companies, Public companies and Prtvatt companie1 6 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REfORTS If hit by Art. 14-Conitltution of India, ATll. 14, 19(1), 31(2)- Land Acqui1itloit (Amtndmtnl) Act, 1962 (Act 31 of 1962), 1t. 1, 40 and 41. IHI It. I.. A,.,,. '· The petitioner i.o the owner of certain land in Kanpur, U.P. On 81•1• 01 Ull• a previous occasion land acquisition proceedings were taken regardin1 ,,,__,, this land for acquiring it for an industrialist. The petitioner ques.~oned the validity of these proceedings and this Comt by its judgment reported as R. L. Arora v. State of U.P., (1962) Supp. 2 S.C.R. J49, quashed the notification made under s. 6 of Land Acquisition Act, 1894. There- after certain amendments were made to ss. 40 and 41 of that Act by the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1961. The petitioner there- upon filed before this Co\Jrt a petition under Art. 32 of the Constitution challenging the validity of the amended ss. 40, 41 and s. 7 ol Ille amending Act The petitioner contended that the said sections violated Art. 31(2) and Art. 19(l)(f) of the Constitution inasmuch as cl. (aa) ol the amended s. 40 provided that ail acquisitions made for a company for construction of some building arc permissible even though the building may not be for a public purpose. The validity ol s. 7 of tile amending Act was challenged on the ground' that it contravened Art. 31(2) inasmuch as it makes acquisition for a company before !uly 20, 1962 as being for a public purpose even though it may not be so ill fact. Section 7 was also challenged on the ground that it contravenes Art. 14 inasmuch as it makes an unreasonable discrimination in the matter of acquisition for a company before July 2n. 1962 and after that date insofar as the former acquisitions are validated on thl basis of their being deemed to be for a public purpose while the latter acquisitions are not so deemed and have to satisfy the test of public purpose. Held (ptr P. B. GAJENDRAOADKAR, CJ., K. N. WANCHOO, K. C. Du GuPTA and J. C. SHAH JI.): (i) If the language of a provision of law is capable of only one construction and if according to that construction the provision contravenes a constitutional provision it must be struck down. A literal interpretation is not always the only interpretation of a provision in a statute and the court has to loot at the setting in which the words arc used and the circumstances in wlti~ the law came to be passed to decide whether there is something implicit behind the words actually used which would control the lit
Excerpt shown. Read the full judgment & AI analysis in Lexace.