R. JANAKIAMMAL versus S.K. KUMARASAMY(DECEASED) THROUGH LEGAL REPRESENTATIVES AND OTHERS
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A B C D E F G H 333 R. JANAKIAMMAL v. S.K. KUMARASAMY(DECEASED) THROUGH LEGAL REPRESENTATIVES AND OTHERS (Civil Appeal No. 1537 of 2016) JUNE 30, 2021 [ASHOK BHUSHAN AND R. SUBHASH REDDY, JJ.] Code of Civil Procedure, 1908: Or.XXIII r.3 β Compromise decree β r.3 of Or. XXIII provides that where it is proved to the satisfaction of the Court that a suit has been adjusted wholly or in part by any lawful agreement or compromise, the Court shall order such agreement or compromise to be recorded and pass a decree in accordance therewith β r.3 uses the expression βlawful agreement or compromiseβ β A conjoint reading of ss.10, 13 and 14 of Indian Contract Act indicates that when consent is obtained by coercion, undue influence, fraud, misrepresentation or mistake, such consent is not free consent and the contract becomes voidable at the option of the party whose consent was caused due to coercion, fraud or misrepresentation β An agreement, which is void or voidable under the Indian Contract Act, shall not be deemed to be lawful as is provided by Explanation to r.3 of Or.XXIII β Contract Act, 1872. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908: Or.XXIII r.3A β In the plaint, plaintiff pleaded that compromise recorded on 06.08.1984 was not lawful compromise having been obtained by fraud and misrepresentation β Plaintiffβs case was that they were represented by D1 that the compromise was entered only to save the family property since the plaintiff has given personal guarantee to the Bank for obtaining loan for business β Pleadings clearly made out the case of the plaintiff that the consent which he gave for compromise by signing the compromise deed was not free consent β The compromise, thus, became voidable at the instance of the plaintiff β Thus, bar under r.3A shall be attracted. Consent decree: Challenge against β A party to a consent decree based on a compromise to challenge the compromise decree on the ground that the decree was not lawful, i.e., it was void or voidable has to approach the same court, which recorded the [2021] 6 S.C.R. 333 333 A B C D E F G H 334 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 6 S.C.R. compromise and a separate suit challenging the consent decree has been held to be not maintainable. Hindu law: Joint Hindu Family β Under Hindu Law, any member of the joint family can separate himself from joint family β The intention of the parties to terminate the status of joint family is a relevant factor to determine the status of Hindu Undivided Family β In the instant case, real intendment of three branches to partition their properties was not that they did not want Hindu Undivided Family to continue rather the said partition was with object to get away from application of Land Ceiling Act, 1961 β Partition Deed dated 07.11.1960 being a registered Partition Deed between three branches, the same cannot be ignored β Properties admittedly were divided in three branches by the said partition β However even after 07.11.1960, the family continued as a Joint Family β There was reunion between three brothers to revert to the status of Joint Hindu Family, which is amply proved from the acts and conducts of the parties subsequent to 07.11.1960 β The purchase of various immovable properties in the names of the three branches clearly indicated the intention that all the three branches were joint and they were purchasing the properties in the name of all the three branches β Plaintiff never admitted the agreement dated 08.03.1981 or alleged partition of 08.03.1981 β It is, thus, clear that parties remained joint and properties standing in the names of three branches remained joint till the consent decree was passed on 06.08.1984 β Thus, in the year 1979 when residential property of Tatabad was obtained in the name of defendant No.1, all three branches were part of the joint Hindu family and the house property purchased in the name of one member of joint Hindu family was for the benefit of all β Both the Courts below although accepted the partition dated 18.03.1981 as pleaded by D-1 but erred in not considering the consequence of such pleading β When partition of all immovable and movable properties is claimed on 08.03.1981, the conclusion is irresistible that the family was joined till then β Thus, the theory set up by D-1 that all the three branches were separate after 07.11.1960 is denied/belied by claim of partition on 08.03.1981. Partly allowing the appeals, the Court HELD: 1.1 Order XXIII Rule 3 provides for compromise of suit. In Rule 3 am
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