R. BANERJEE AND ORS. versus H.D. DUBEY AND ORS
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R. BANERJEE AND ORS. A v. H.D. DUBEY AND ORS .. MARCH 13, 1992 [AM. AHMADI AND K. RAMASWAMY, JJ.] B --<, Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954: Section 17-Prosecution--Launching of-Against Directors/Managers of Public Limited Companies-Nomination made under sub-section c ..-... "'--- (2)-Validity of nomination-Prosecution only against the nominated per- son-Not against others-lmpleading others as co- accused-When arise~Applicability of sub-section (4). ,1__ The Respondent Food Inspector visited the godown of a company and lifted samples of orange drink manufactured by the company, as also D Vanaspati ghee manufactured by the said company as also by another company. He found that the label atraxed to the oran1~e drink carried the date of manufacture as June, 1988. Since the date of expiry was stated to be six months from the date of manufacture he found that the products was mis-branded or adulterated as six months had already expired on the E date of inspection. He forwarded the samples so collected to the public Analyst. The report of the Public Analyst was to the emict that all the three __...__ samples were adulterated, as they did not conform to the standard prescribed by law. The respondent then filed three separate complaints against the respective companies, as well as the Direc1ors, Managers and officers of the companies, for the commission of offences punishable under F Section 7/16 read with section 17 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954. The appellants' contention that in view of the nominations made • by the companies, only the persons nominated to be incharge of and >- responsible for the conduct of the business could be prosecuted and not the other Directors/Managers/Officers. G I'- Having been unsuccessful before the Trial Court as also before the High Court, the appellants have preferred the present appeals by special leave. ,.,... Allowing the appeals on the question whether it was permissible to H 221 222 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1992) 2 S.C.R. A launch a prosecution under section 17 (1) of the Prevention of Food Adul- teration Act, 1954 against the Directors and Managers of Public Limited Companies notwithstanding the nomination made by the companies as required by section 17 (2) of the Act, this Court, B c HELD: 1. It is clear from the scheme of section 17 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 that where a company has committed an offence under the Act, the person nominated under sub-section (2) to be in charge of, and responsible to, the company for the conduct of its business shall be proceeded against unless it is shown that the offence was committed with the consent/connivance/negligence of any other Director, Manager, Secretary or Officer of the Company in which case the said person can also _be proceeded against and punished for the commission of the said offence. It is only where no person has been nominated under sub-section (2) of section 17 that every person, who at the time of the commission of the offence was in charge of and was responsible to the D company for the conduct of its business can be proceeded against and punished under the law. [227G, H; 228A,B] 2. In the present cases, on a careful perusal of the complaints lodged by the Food Inspector under the Act it is evident that intimation regarding the nomination had been communicated to the Food Inspector before the E complaints came to be lodged. This is evident from the averments made in the respective complaints. The nomination was, however, not acted upon by the complainant on the ground that it was incomplete. It was, therefore, said that in the absence of a valid nomination from the concerned company the Directors of the company were liable to be proceeded against and F punished on proof of the charge levelled against them in the complaint. Thus there is no allegation in the complaint which would bring the case within the mischief of section 17 ( 4) of the Act. There is no allegation in the complaint that the offence was committed with the consent/con- nivance/negligence of the Directors, other than the nominated person, who were impleaded as co-accused. Therefore, the allegations in the complaint G do not make out a case under sub-section(4) of section 17 of the Act. That being so, the inclusion of the co-accused other than the company and the nominated person as the persons liable to be proceeded against and punished
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