LexaceLexace Ask the AI ›
⚖️ Ask the AI about your situation:🚗 Car Accident💼 Work / Job🏠 Housing / Eviction👪 Family / Divorce📋 Contract Dispute💰 Money Owed

R.B. SETH JESSARAM FATEHCHAND versus OM NARAIN TANKHA & ANR.

Citation: [1967] 2 S.C.R. 429 · Decided: 19-01-1967 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: K.N. WANCHOO · Disposal: Dismissed

Open in Lexace · Ask the AI about this case

Judgment (excerpt)

A 
c 
D 
E 
F 
G 
H 
R. B. SETH JESSARAM FATEHCHAND 
v. 
OM NARAIN TANKHA & ANR. 
January 19, 1967 
(K. N. WANCHOO, R. S. BACHAWAT AND J.M. SHELAT, JJ.] 
Trust-Security deposited with co1npany 
by sole selling agent-In-
terest payable by company-Deposit allowed to be mixed with other funds 
-Deposit whether held by company as trustee-Matters to be taken into 
consideration. 
The appellant firm was appointed sole selling agent of a sugar manu-
facturing company and deposited Rs. 50,000 as security for due perfor-
mance of the contract; this amount wao to carry interest at 6 per cent 
per annum. There was no restriction on the use of the said depoS1t by the 
company. According to cl. (9) of the agreement the security and mter-
est were to be refunded at the termination of the apency; in default of such 
payment the appellant firm was entitled to a commission as if agency 
had not terminated. 
The clause further said that "as lon,g as security 
with interest is not refunded and commission due is not pt.id this agree---
ment will not be terminated." The company was ordered to be wound up 
befote the period of agency came to an end. Consequent on the winding 
up the appellant made an application praying for refund of its security 
deposit along with interest. It was contended that as the company held 
the amount of deposit as a trustee the appellant was entitled to priority 
among the creditors. On behalf of the liquidators it was denied that the 
amount deposited was in the nature of a trust entitled to preference over 
other debts. The company judge held that the amount was an ordinary 
debt. The Division Bench of the High Court also deci<ied against the 
appellant. 
In appeal by special leave to this Court. 
HELD: 
The deposit did not amount to a trust. 
The question whether the security deposit in a particular case can be 
said to be impfessed with ·a trust will have to be decided on the basis of 
the terms of the agreement and the facts and circumstances of each case 
without any leaning one way or the other on the fact that the money 
was given as a security dePosit. [434 CJ 
If a trust can clearly be spelled out from the terms of the agreement 
that ends the matter. But if the trust cannot be spelled out clearly the 
fact that there was no segregation provided for, and the fact that interest 
was paid, would go a long way to show that the deposit was not impressed 
with the character of a trust particularly when the person with whom the 
deposit was mape could mix it· with his own money and could use it for 
himself. 
In such a case the inference would be that the relationship bet-
ween the parties was that of a debtor and creditor. Further besides these 
circumstances, if there is any other term which suggests one kin<l of rela-
tionship rathe·r than the other that will also have to be taken into account. 
[436 B-C] 
In the present case the company was free to use the money for its 
own purpose and had to pay interest on it. 
Further, in cl. (9) of the 
agreement the security was put on a par with the commission which was 
nothing but a debt. 
The courts below had therefore rightly treated the 
security deposit as an ordinary debt. [436 Fl 
Peter Donahf Macpherson v. Dugald Mckechine and Ors. 
XXVIII 
(1923-24) Cal. W.N. 721. In the matter of Travancore Natfonal and 
430 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[1967) 2 s.c.a. 
Qui/011 Be111k Li11Jitecl, Official Liquidators and A1101her App/ican1s, A.J.R. 
1939 ~-fad. 337, Jn re Mn11<'kji Petit Man14fac1urif!g Compc,ny Ltd. A.LR. 
1932 Born. 31 l, Ma/ie.'ihir11ri Brothers v. Official Liquidalors, l.l.R. ( 1942) 
All. 242. Kesh<tra Mo/ia,, Das v. D. C. Basu, I.LR. [1943] 1 Cal. 313. 
Gee v. Liddell, (1866) 55 E.R. 1038, K1u11chhull v. Hallett, (1879-80) 
XIII Ch. D. 696. /11 re llnlle// & Co., [1894] 2 Q.B.D. 237 and 
Frank 
M. Mckey v. Maurcie Paraclixe, 81 L. Ed. 75. referred to. 
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 891 of 1964 
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and decree dated 
October JO, 1961 of the Allahabad High Court in Letters Patent 
Appeal No. 83 of 1951. 
N. C. Clral/erjee, B. C. Mishra, B. R. G. K. Achar and M. V 
Gos ... ami, for the ;ippellant. 
C/Jaman Lal Pandlri and S. L Pandhi, for the respondents. 
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by 
Wancboo, J. This is an appeal by special leave 
ag~;nst 
the judgment and decree of the Allahabad High Court. The 
appellant is a registered partnership carrying on business at Kanpur. 
It entered into a

Excerpt shown. Read the full judgment & AI analysis in Lexace.