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PUSHPA DEVI versus COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX, NEW DELHI

Citation: [1978] 1 S.C.R. 329 · Decided: 30-08-1977 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: Y.V. CHANDRACHUD · Disposal: Case Partly allowed

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Judgment (excerpt)

> ; 
, 
PUSHPA DEVI 
v. 
COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX, NEW DELHI 
August 30, 1977 
[Y. V. CHANDRACHUD AND P. S. KAILASAM, JJ.J 
329 
Doctrine of blending unt}er the Hindu Law-Whether a Hindu female who 
is a member of an undivided family can impress an a,bsolute self-acquired pro-
perty lrith a character of joint fatnily prope"rty-Dottrine of blending, explained. 
The appellant, a member of the joint Hindu family, in her ihdividual capa-
city and with the aid of her personal assets entered into a partnership with 
her father-in-law in the name and style of "Gur Narain Jagat Narain & Co." 
Her minor son, Ravi Narain Khanna was admitted to the benefits 
of that 
partnership. 
Thi~ partnership firm owned two cinema houses-Nishat Talkies, 
Kanpur and Novelty "falkies, Lucknow. 
On August 31, 
1961, 
a 
sum 
o:fi 
Rs. 67,284.57 stood to the Credit of the appellant in the books of Nishat Talkies 
being her individual share of the income from that Talkies. On September 1, 
1961, the appellant made a sworn de.claration stating that she was 
the sole 
and absolute owner of the amounts standing to her credit in the 
books of 
Nishat Talkies and of her share in that business and declaring unequivocally 
her intention to treat both the capital and her share in the business of Nishat 
Talkies as the joint family property of the Hindu undivided family of which 
she was a mem'ber. 
By clause (6) of the declaration, the appellant 
stated 
that she had abLndoned for ever her separate interest. and ownership over the 
capital investment of Rs. 67,284.57, her one-third share in the net profits and 
l /3rd share in the net losses in the business of Nishat Talkies in favour of the 
joint Hindu family to be solely and exclusively enjoyed by it. 
A<i such, in her 
t3.x return for the assessment year 1963-64 for which the previous accounting 
year ended on .. August 31, 1962, she omitted a sum of Rs. 20,865/-
being 
l /3rd share of the income from the business of Nishat Talkies for the year in 
question on the ,ground that the said sum was credited to the account of the 
joint Hindu fam~ly in the books of the firm as per 
the declaration dated 
September 1, 1961 and the HindΒ΅ undivided family has also paid advance t3.x 
on the said amount. The Income Tax Officer in his assessment order held 
that the individual share of the income is exigible to tax since throwing the 
capital amount into the family stock Was of no avail as the sine qua non of the 
matter \vas that "Β·_he Karta should become partner in consequence of investment." 
On appeal, the J\ppellate Assistant Commissioner affirmed the order of the 
I.T.O. and held (i) the appellant, not being a coparcener, it \Vas not open to 
her to impress ht'.r personal property with a character of joint family Property; 
and (ii) as the joint family did not possess any joint family 
property there 
was no joint family stock in which the appellant could throw her separate 
property. But, in further appeal, the Appellate Tribunal accepted the appellant"s 
contention and held that there was no justification for discriminating against a 
Hindu female on the groulld of sex and that there was no reason why a Hindu 
female who was a. member of an uridivided family could not by an unequivocal 
expression of inll!ntion impress her separate property with the character 
of 
joirit family property, so long as she was.not trying to enlarge her rights under 
the Hindu law or to improve her status under that law by abandoning 
her 
exclusive right in the self-acquired property. On a reference, the Delhi High 
Court disagreed \Vith the Tribunal and answered the question in favour of tile 
Revenue on the ground that the right of blending could be exercised only by 
a coparcener and since the appellant, though a member of the joint family was 
not a coparcener she could not throw her separate property into joint family 
stock. The High Court, however, rejected the contention of the Revenue that 
since the jofnt farnily did not possess any property no member thereof could 
blend his separate property with joint family property. In appeal bv certificate 
granted by the High Court under s. 261 of the Income Tax Act. 1961. bv a 
judgment dated S,,pternber 24. 1976, this Cou:rt dirocted the Tribunal to send 
a supplementary statement in the ca-se on the question "\"\'hether there was a 
gift of the appellant's capital investment and her share in the business of Nishat 
10-768SCI/77 
A 
B 
c 
D 
E 
F 
G 
H 
330 
SUPREME CO

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