PUSHPA DEVI BHAGAT (D) TH. LR. SMT. SADHNA RAI versus RAJINDER SINGH AND ORS.

Citation: [2006] SUPP. 3 S.C.R. 370 · Decided: 11-07-2006 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: B.P. SINGH, R.V. RAVEENDRAN · Disposal: Dismissed

Judgment (excerpt)

A 
PUSHPA DEVI BHAGAT (D) TH. LR. SMT. SADHNA RAI 
B 
v. 
RAJINDER SINGH AND ORS. 
JULY 11, 2006 
[B.P. SINGH AND R.V. RA VEENDRAN, JJ.] 
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908-Section 96-0rder XX!ll, Rule 3-
landlord-tenant dispute-Compromise resulting in consent decree-Appeal 
C against--Maintainability of-Held: No appeal is maintainable against a consent 
decree in view of the bar created by s.96-0nly remedy available to a party 
to a consent decree is to approach the Court which recorded the compromise 
and made a decree in terms of it and establish that there was no compromise. 
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908-0rder XX/JI, Rule 3-Compromise of 
D suits-Difference between first and second parts of Rule 3-Explained-Suit 
by landlord for recovery of possession-Tenant-defendant agreed to vacate 
suit premises-Court recorded statements of counsels on both sides and passed 
consent decree-Held: The decree fell under the first part of Rule 3-landlord 
could recover possession in execution of such decree in the event of tenant-
defendant failing to vacate the premises within the time agreed-Attempts of · 
E the tenant to protract litigation by raising frivolous and vexatious contentions 
regarding the compromise and going back on the solemn undertaking given 
to Court, deprecated. 
Constitution of India-Art. I 36-Pleadings-New plea-Held: Supreme 
F Court does not normally permit a new plea to be raised-But it can entertain 
any new plea which does not involve airy question of fact or amendment of 
pleading and is purely one of law, particularly relating to jurisdictio11 of the 
appellate court. 
Landlords filed suit for recovery of possession of property. When 
G the matter finally came up for hearing, the tenants-defendants made 
statement undertaking to vacate the suit premises. Statements of counsels 
for both the parties were recorded on oath and signed whereupon the 
Court passed a consent decree. Subsequently, one tenant i.e. the second 
defendant filed an applieation before the Trial Court for setting aside the 
H 
370 
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PUSHPADEVI BHAGAT(D)TH. LR. SMT SADHNARAI "· RAJINDERSINGH 
3 7 J 
consent decree alleging that she had not instructed her counsel to enter A 
into any compromise on her behalf. However, the second defendant did 
not pursue the application and filed an appeal against the consent decree. 
The Appellate Court set aside the decree on the ground that there was no 
agreement or compromise reduced to writing and signed by the parties. 
High Court however held that the consent decree in question did not B 
fall under the first part of Rule 3 of Order 23 (requiring an agreement or 
compromise between the parties to be in writing signed by the parties) 
but fell under the second part of Rule 3 of Order 23 (relating to 
satisfication of the claim of the plaintiff, which did not require any 
document in writing signed by the parties), and that there was a valid C 
compromise under Order 23, Rule 3 CPC and the second defendant "could 
not repudiate the consensus by attempting to challenge their satisfication". 
From the fact that the second defendant did not pursue the application 
before the Trial Court, and from the fact that she did not challenge the 
integrity of her counsel (who entered into the compromise) either before 
the Appellate Court or before it, the High Court drew an inference that D 
second defendant's counsel had the authority on her behalf to make the 
statement leading to the consent decree. Hence the present appeal by the 
second defendant's legal representative. 
The. question which arose for consideration in the present appeal is E 
whether an appeal filed under Section 96, CPC against the consent decree 
was maintainable and whether the compromise rec:orded by the Court 
resulting in a consent decree was a valid compromise under Order 23, Rule 
3, CPC. 
Dismissing the appeal, the Court 
F 
HELD: I. The landlords did not contend either before the first 
appellate court or before the High Court that the appeal against the 
consent decree was not maintainable. This contention is urged for the first 
time in this Court. Such a plea does not require any evidence. Further, 
being a contention relating to the jurisdiction of the appellate court, it does G 
not require any 'pleading'. Though this Court will not normally permit a 
new plea to be raised at the hearing of the special leave petition or an 
appeal under Article 136, where such plea does not involve any question 
of fact or amendment of ple

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