PUSHKAR MUKHERJEE & ORS. versus THE STATE OF WEST BENGAL

Citation: [1969] 2 S.C.R. 635 · Decided: 07-11-1968 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: J.C. SHAH · Disposal: Dismissed

Cited by 15 judgment(s) · cites 1 · see the full citation network in Lexace

Judgment (excerpt)

• 
A 
PUSHKAR MUKHERJEE & ORS. 
v • 
THE STATE OF WEST BENGAL 
November 7, 1968 
635 
B 
[J. C. SHAH, V. RAMASWAMI AND A. N. GROVER, JJ.] 
c 
D 
E 
F 
Preventive Detention Act, s. 3(1)-"Public order'', 
meaning of-
Whether takes in assau!t on solitary individuals-One of the grounds ir-
relevant or vague-If detention sustainable. 
Jn petitions for the writ of habeas corpus under Art. 32 of the Consti-
tution for release from detention under orders passed under s. 3(2) of 
the Prevention of Detention Act, 
HELD : The reasonableness of the satisfaction of the detaining autho-
rity cannot be questioned in a Court of law; the adequacy of the mate-
rial on which the said satisfaction purports to rest also cannot 
be 
examined in a Court of law. 
But if any of the grounds furnished to 
the detenu are found to be irrelevant while considering the application 
of els. (i) to (iii) of s. 3(1) (a) of the Act and in that sense are foreign 
to the Act, the satisfaction of the detaining 
authority on which the 
order of detention is based is open to challenge and the detention order 
liable to be quashed. [640 H-641 CJ 
Even if any one of the grounds or reasons that led to the satisfaction 
was irrelevant, the order of detention would be invalid even if there 
were other relevant grounds, because it could never be certain to what 
extent the 
bad reasons operated on the mind of the authority 
concerned 
or whether 
the 
detention 
order would 
have 
been 
made at all if only one or two good reasons had been before them. 
Similarly, if some of the ground supplied to the detenu are so vague 
that they 
would 
virtually deprive 
the 
detenu of his statutory 
nght of making a representation, that again may make the order 
of 
detention invalid. 
If, however, the. grounds on which the order 
of 
detention proceeds are relevant and germane. to the matters which fall 
to be considered under s. 3 (I)( a) of the Act, it would not be open to 
the detenu to challenge the order of detention by arguing that the satis-
faction of the detainjng authority is not reasonably based on any of the 
said grounds. Though the satisfaction of the detaining authority con-
templated by s. 3(1)(a) is the subjective satisfaction of the said autho-
rity, cases may arise, where the detenu may challenge the validity of his 
detention on the ground of ma/a fides. [641 B-F, 644 C--D] 
• 
In the present case, (1) with respect to some of the petitioners three 
G 
of the grounds of detention related to cases of assanlt on solitary indivi-
• 
duals either by knife or by using crackers. It could not be held that these 
grounds had any relevance or proximate connection with the maintenance 
of public order. Therefore the orders of detention of these 
petitioners 
were illegal and ultra vires. 
,. 
1 
The expression "public order" in s. 3(1) of the Act does not take 
in every kind of infraction of law. When two people quarrel and fight 
H 
and assault each other inside a house or in a street, it may be said that 
there is disorder but not public disorder. Such cases are dealt 
with 
under the powers vested in the executive authorities under the provisions 
of ordinary criminal law but the culprits cannot be detained on 
the 
636 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
(1969] 2 s.c. 
ground that they were. disturbing public order. The contravention of 
any law always affects orde.r but before it can be said to affect public 
order, it must affect the community or the public at large. A line of 
demarcation between serious and aggravated forms of disorder 
which 
directly affect the community or injure the public interest must 
be 
drawn and the relatively minor breaches of peace of a purely 
local 
significance which primarily injure 
specific individuals 
and only in a 
secon.dary sense public interest. A m~re disturbance of law and order 
leading to disorder is thus not necessarily sufficient for action under the 
Preventive Detention Act but a 
disturbance which will afiect 
public 
order comes within the scope of the Act. A 
District 
Magistrate 
is 
therefore entitled to take action under s, 3 (1) of the Act to prevent sub-
version of public order but not in aid of maintenance of law and order 
under ordinary circumstances. The difference between the concepts of 
'public order' and 'law and order' is similar to the distinction between 
'public' and 'private' crimes in the realm of jurisprudence. In considering 
the material. elements of crime, the historic tests which each community 

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