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PUNJAB RAO versus D. P. MESHRAM & OTIIERS

Citation: [1965] 1 S.C.R. 849 · Decided: 26-10-1964 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: P.B. GAJENDRAGADKAR · Disposal: Appeal(s) allowed

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Judgment (excerpt)

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PUNJAB RAO 
v. 
D. P. MESHRAM & OTIIERS 
October 26, 1964 
(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, C.J., K. N. WANCHOO, 
M. HIDAYATULLAH, RAGHUBAR DAYAL AND 
1. R. MUDHOLKAR JJ.) 
Constitution (Scheduled Castes) Order, 1950 Para 3-"Profess", mean-
ing of-Hindu-If includes Buddhist. 
The appellant challenged the election of the !st respondent to the 
Legislative Assembly on the ground that the latter had embraced Buddhism 
and had ceased to be a member of a Scheduled caste within the meaning 
of the Constitution (Scheduled Castes) Order, 1950, and was thus disentitled 
from being a candidate for the particular seat. 
The Election Tribunal 
upheld the contention and set aside the election. 
On appeal, the High 
Court held that the conversion of the !st respondent to Buddhism had not 
been established by evidence and upheld his election. 
On appeal to the 
Supreme Court, 
HELD : (i) The word "profess" in the Order means "to declare one's 
belief in". 
A declaration of one's belief must necessarily menn a decla-
ration in such a way that it would be known to those whom it rnny interest. 
Therefore, if a public declaration is made by a person that he has ceased 
to belong to his old religion and has accepted another religion he v.·ill be 
taken as professing the other religion. 
It is unnecessary to enquire further 
as to whether the conversion to another religion was efficacious. f859 A-D] 
(ii) No doubt the definition of "Hindu" contained in the Explanation 
to Article 25 is expanded but that is only for the purposes of sub-cl. (2) 
of cl. (2) of that Article and for no other. 
The mention of Sikh religion 
in Para 3 of the Order clearly shows that the word "Hindu" in the order 
is used in the narrower sense of orthodox Hindu religion which recognises 
castes and contains injunctions based on caste distinctions. 
It is not com-
prehensive enough to include Buddhism. [859 H; 860 B-Cl 
Karwade v. Shambhakar, I.LR. 1959 Born. 229 over-ruled. 
CML APPELLA1"E JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 562 of 
1964. 
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated 
February 7, 8, 1963, of the Bombay High Court (Nagpur Bench) 
at Nagpur in Appeal No. 115 of 1962. 
M. C. Seta/vad, N. L. Belekar, H. D. Awade and A. G. Rat-
naparkhi, for the appellant. 
N. C. Chatterjee, V. S. Sawhney, S. S. Khanduja, S. K. Man· 
chanda and Ganpat Rai, for respondent No. 1. 
850 
SUPREME COURT 
REPORTS 
[ 1965) I S.C.R. 
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by 
Mudholkar J. 
The question which arises for consideration 
in this appeal by special leave from the judgment of the Bombay 
High Court is whether respondent No. I Dr. D. P. Meshram was 
entitled to be a candidate for election to the Maharashtra Legisla-
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tive Assembly from constituency No. 190 of Nagpur Ill, a con-
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stituency reserved for candidates from scheduled castes. 
The appellant and respondents I to 4 were candidates duly 
nominated for election to the Assembly from the aforesaid consti-
tuency. 
The poll was taken on February 27, 1962 and respon-
dent No. I who had polled the highest number of votes 
was 
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declared elected. 
The appellant thereupon preferred an election 
petition before the Election Commission, the main allegations in 
which were (a) that respondent No. I having embraced Bud-
dhism on March 17, 1957 had ceased to be a member of a Sche-
duled Caste within the mooning of the Constitution (Scheduled 
Castes) Order, 1950 and was thus disentitled from being a candi-
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date for the particular seat and (b) that respondent No. I was 
guilty of several corrupt practices. 
The Tribunal held that the 
corrupt practices alleged against respondent No. 1 were not estal>-
lished. It, however, came to the conclusion that respondent No. I 
had embraced Buddhism as alleged by the appellant and was, 
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therefore, not eligible for being a candidate for election from the 
reserved constituency. 
Upon this ground the Tribunal set aside 
the election of respondent No. I. It may be mentioned that the 
appellant had made a further prayer to the effect that he should 
be declared elected to the seat; out this prayer was not granted 
by the Tribunal on the ground that he was not the only other F 
candidate for election and, therefore, it cannot be said how the 
votes which respondent No. 1 had secured would have been distri· 
buted among the remaining candidates. 
Aggrieved by the deci-
sion of the Tribunal respondent No. I preferred an appeal before 
the High Court of Bomb

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