PUNJAB LAND DEVELOPMENT AND RECLAMATION CORPORATION LTD., CHANDIGARH ETC. versus PRESIDING OFFICER, LABOUR COURT, CHANDIGARH ETC.

Citation: [1990] 3 S.C.R. 111 · Decided: 04-05-1990 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: SABYASACHI MUKHERJI · Disposal: Disposed off

Cited by 10 judgment(s) · cites 13 · see the full citation network in Lexace

Judgment (excerpt)

r 
PUNJAB LAND DEVELOPMENT AND 
RECLAMATION CORPORATION LTD., 
CHANDIGARH ETC. 
v. 
PRESIDING OFFICER, LABOUR COURT, 
CHANDIGARH ETC. 
:JAY 4, 1990 
[SABYASACHI MUKHARJI, CJ., B.C. RAY, M.H. KANIA, 
K.N. SAIKIA AND S.C. AGARWAL, JJ.] 
Industrial Disputes Act 1947: 
Section 
2(00)-"Retrenchment"-lnterpretation of-Whether 
termination by the employer of the services of a workman by employer 
for any reason whatsoever or termination by the employer of the 
~- ·services of a workman for any reason whatsoever otherwise than as a 
punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action-Whether to be 
understood in its narrow, natural and contextual meaning or in its wider 
literal meaning. 
Precedent-Ratio decidendi of the earlier decision-How to 
ascertain-Major premise, minor premise and decision in a cas~ 
Whether may be narrowed or widened by the subsequent decision. 
Constitution of India, 1950--Article 141-Supreme Court is not 
bound by its earlier decision-Stare decisis-doctrine of. 
Decision per incuriam-meaning and effect of non reference to an 
earlier larger bench decision of Supreme Court-Subsequent decision of 
Supreme Court will be per incuriam only if the ratio of the earlier 
;... 
decision is in conflict with it. 
-~ 
Interpretation of Statutes-Wider literal construction--When pre-
ferable to narrower, natural and contextual construction-Definition 
clause using the word means 'instead' of 'includes'-Shows that no 
other meaning can be assigned. 
This batch· of eighteen appeals by special leave involves a common 
.--1 
question of law, regarding the scope and ambit of the word 'retrench-
A 
B 
c 
D 
E 
F 
G 
ment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Di~pute Act, 1947. 
H 
111 
112 
3UPREME COURT REPORTS 
I 19901 3 S.C.R. 
A 
One of the appeals is by the workmen against the order of the 
High Court affirming the award of the Labour Court refusing to 
interfere with the order of termination of their services by the employer 
for their trade union•activities, while the rest are by the employers/ 
managements against the orders of High Courts/Industrial Tribunal/ 
l:;abour Court setting aside the orders of termination of the services of 
B the illegal for non-compliance of the provisions of Section 25F of the 
Act. 
.'J 
While the employers' contention is that the word "retrenchment" 
.., 
as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Act means termination of service of a 
workman only by way of surplus labour for any reason whatsoever, the 
c workinen contend that "retrenchment" means termination of the 
service of a workman for any reason whatsoever, other than those 
expressly excluded by the definition in Section 2(oo) of the Act. 
Disposing of the appeals, this Court, 
D 
HELD: (1) Definition of 'retrenchment' in Section 2(oo) means 
termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reason 
whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of discipli-
nary action and those expressly excluded by the definition. This is the 
wider literal interpretation as distinguished from the narrow. natural 
and contextual interpretation of the word to mean termination by the 
E employer of the service of a workman as surplus labour for any reason 
whatsoever. [156C; BIB] 
B.N. Muttov. T.K. Nandi, [1979] 2SCR409;Juga/KishoreSaraf 
v. Raw Cotton Co. Ltd., [1955] I SCR 1369; Sussex Peerage Case, 
[1844] II CI & Fin 85: 8 ER 1034 (UL); Thompson v. Goold & Co., 26 
F 
TLR 526; Ea/sing L.B.C. v. Race Relations Board, [1972] I All ER 105; 
Whiteley v. Chappell, [1868] LR 4; Prince Ernest of Hanoverv.Attorney 
General, ll956] Ch D 188 and Muir v. Keay, 44 MJMC 143, referred 
to. 
(2) Difficulty was created by defining 'retrenchment' to mean 
G something wider than what it naturally and ordinarily meant. Such a 
definition created complexity as the draftsman himself in drafting the 
other sections using the definition may slip into the ordinary meaning 
instead of the defined meaning. However, a judge facing such a problem 
of interpretation cannot simply fold his hands and blame the 
draftsman. [149A-B; F] 
H 
P.L.D. CORPORATION LTD. v. PRESIDING OFFICER 
113 
(3) The definition has used the word 'means'. When a statute says 
that a word or phrase shall 'mean'-not merely that it shall 'include'-
certain things or acts, "the definition is a hard-and-fast definition, and 
no other meaning can be assigned to the expression than is put down in 
definition." I 150F-G I 
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