PUKHRAJ JAIN versus MRS. PADMA KASHYAP AND ANR.

Citation: [1990] 2 S.C.R. 25 · Decided: 20-03-1990 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: K. JAGANNATHA SHETTY · Disposal: Dismissed

Judgment (excerpt)

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PUKHRAJ JAIN 
V, 
MRS, PADMA KASHYAP AND ANR. 
MARCH 20, 1990 
[K, JAGANNATHA SHETTY AND R.M, SAHA!, JJ.] 
Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958: Section 21-Recovery of posses-
sion by landlord from tenant-Whether legal representatives of landlord 
can initiate and continue proceedings for recovery. 
The petitioner-tenant was let out the demised premises by the 
landlord for a period of three years, with permission of Controller 
under section 21 of the Delhi Rent Control Act, the landlord died before 
the expiry of period 9f tenancy. After the expiry of the period, his legal 
representatives made an application for recovery of possession. This 
application was resisted by the tenant on the ground that proceedings 
for recovery of possession under section 21 could not be initiated and 
continued by legal representatives of the landlord who had obtained 
permission. 
Having failed before the High Court, the petitioner has filed peti-
tion for special leave. Hwas contended on his behalf that 'landlord' in 
second part of section 21, entitling him to claim vacant possession, 
should be confined to the person who had obtained permission on the 
premise that he "does not require the whole or any part of the premises 
for a particular period." 
Dismissing tile special leave petition, this Court, 
HELD: (1) Section 21 is a self contained code. The purpose and 
objective of its enactment as provision of short duration tenancy or 
periodical tenancy in Rent Control Act of Delhi is unique amongst such 
legislations. What was unique of it was not short duration tenancy but a 
fresh look on evtction. [27G; 28G I 
Shiv Chand Kapoor v. Amar Bose, [1990) 1 SCC 234, referred to. 
(2) Since section 21 is an exception to section 14 and it mandates 
restoration of possession, "notwithstanding any other law" it has to be 
construed strictly and against any attempt to frustrate it. [28G] 
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[1990] 2 S.C.R. 
(3) Recovery of possession under section 21 is not hedged, hy any 
inquiry or opportunity, if permission is not challenged on any of the 
exceptions which have been carved out by courts, obviously to uphold 
fairness and honesty the core of our jurisprudence. Right to get vacant 
possession is thus absolute. [29D] 
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S.B. Noronah v. Prem Kumari Khanna, [1980] 1 SCC 52; V.S. 
Rahe v. Smt. Rem Chamben, [1984] 1 SCC 612; Shiv Chand Kapoor v. 
Amar Bose, [1990] 1SCC234, referred to. 
(4) The expression "for the time being" in section 2(e) makes it 
clear that landlord has to be understood in presenti. That is anyone 
entitled to receive rent is the landlord. It does not visualise, past or 
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future landlord. Therefore, the word "landlord" on plain reading of 
Section 21 does not warrant construction of the word in any other 
manner. [29G] 
( 5) Constructionally, Section 21 is in two parts: one creation of 
D short term tenancy and other its execution after expiry of time. Both 
stand on their own and operate independently. Non-requirement of 
premises for time being furnishes basis for entering into agreement for 
periodical tenancy. Trnth of it or its genuineness are relevant con-
siderations for granting permission. And the permission granted 
continues unabated, unaffected irrespective ef variation in . require-
E ment. [30D-E] 
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(6) Vacation is not linked with landlord but with time. Expiry of 
it obliges tenant to vacate. If he does not then whosoever is the landlord 
at the time of affiux of tenancy may approach Controller for putt-
ing him in vacant possession. Death of landlord does not either shorten 
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or enlarge period nor the consequences envisaged are altered or 
affected. l30F] 
(7) The doctrine of actio personalies moritur cum personna does 
not apply to Rent Control Acts. Its applicability was generally confined 
to actions for damages for defamation, seduction, inducing a spouse to 
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remain apart from the other and adultery. [3 lD-C I 
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Supreme Bank v. P.A. Tindulcar, AIR 1973 SC 1104; Shanti Lal 
Thakur Das & Ors. v. Chaman Lal Magan Lal Lala, [1977] I S.C.R. 313: 
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Phool Rani v. Naubat Rai, [1973] 3 S.C.R. 769, referred to. 
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(8) An action for eviction abates only if the cause of action does 
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PUKHRAJ v. MRS. PADMA [SAHAJ, J.] 
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not snrvive. The canse of action for granting permission was the non-
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reqnirement by the landlord of the premises for the time mentioned in 
the agreement whereas cause of action for evict

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