PUBLIC PROSECUTOR, MADRAS versus R. RAJU & ANR. ETC.

Citation: [1973] 1 S.C.R. 812 · Decided: 08-08-1972 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: S.M. SIKRI · Disposal: Dismissed

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Judgment (excerpt)

8!2 
PUBLIC PROSECUTOR, MADRAS 
A 
v. 
R. RAJU & ANR. ETC. 
August 8, 1972 
[S. M. S!KR!, C.J., A. N. RAY, P. JAGANMOHAN REDDY. 
K. K. MATHEW, JJ.] 
B 
Central Excises and Sall Act, 1944, s. 40(2)-Bar of limitation on 
certain su1'ts1 proceedings, prcsecution..~•, ·when c.pplicable-Whether applies 
h case of Government servants onl,v-Whether nor applicable when acts 
complained of are malicious-Words "anything done or ordered to be 
done'' in section whether include acts in violation of t11e Act. 
Se~tion 40(2) of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944 provides that 
no smt prosecution or other legal proceeding shal•l be instituted or any-
thmg done or ordered to be done under the Act after the expiration of six 
months from the accrual of the cause of action or from the date of the 
act or order com;:ilained of. The respondents in the present appeals were 
prosecuted for violations of Central Excise Rules, punishable under s. 
9(b) and (d) of the Act and also un<ler s. 420 read with section 511 of 
the Indian Penal Code and Section 109 of the Inuian Penal Code. The 
High Court found that ~he prosecution in both the cases was barred by 
the rule of limitation in section 40 of the Act because the prosecutions 
were instituted subsequent to the expi1y of sL'< months fror · the date of 
the nl!eged offences. 
c 
D 
In appeals before this Court by special leave it was contended on behalf 
of the·appellant that (i) the section applies only to government servants; 
(ii) the protection given to Government servants under the sectk>n is for 
E 
actio~s done inadvertently or mistake[\l~ buu not for acts done de!._ 
berateh· and maliciously; and (iii) the words "anything done or ordered 
to be 0une" under this Act in- the secrion do not mean anv act in viola-
tion of the provi;ions of the Act. 
· 
HELD : ( i l The provisions contained in section 40 of the Act show 
that the first sub-section speaks of bar of suits against the Central Govern-
F 
ment or any officer of the Central Government in respect of orders passed 
(=
in good faith or net in good faith done or orderecl to be done. The second 
sub-section of section 40 provides bar of limitation of ·rime in respect of 
suits, pro·secutions or other legal proceedings without any qualifying words 
as to persons against whorn suit proceeding and prosecution shall be 
instituted. The contention of the appellant tha.t sub~section (2) is confined 
only against the Government officers is not warranted by the words of the 
statute and is repelled by reference to other comparable statutes which 
G 
have indic~ateJ in clear words when the statute contemplates bar of suits, 
proceedings or prosecution against Government servants on1y. 
The words 
in section 40(2) of the Act in the present case are of wide amplitude to 
apply to the prosecution which was commenced against respondents in 
the present case. [817H-818B] 
(ii) Tbe cpntention that "anything t:one" would not include a ~alicious 
act or an act done in bad faith could not be accepted. Sub..,ect1on (2) 
H 
of section 40 does not introduce the test of good faith in relation to act 
,'-
done. 
Good faith is one of the aspects in section 40(1). The present 
appeals did not turn on sub-i;ection. (I) of sectfon 40. [8180-E] 
A 
B 
PUBLIC PROSECUTOR V. R. RAJU (Ray, ,/,) 
d.J 
(iii) The decisions of this Court in the light of the definition of the 
'word "act" in the General Clauses Act establish that non-compliance witll 
the provisions of the statute by omitting to do what the Act enjoins will 
be "anything done or ordered to be done" under the Act. The complaint 
against the respondents was that they wanted to evade payment of duty. 
Evasion was by using and affixing cut and torn banderols, 
Books of 
account were not correctly maintained. There was shortage of ·vanderol 
in stocks: Unbanderolled matches were found. These were all infraction 
of the provisions in respect of things done or ordered to be done under 
the Act. [820B] 
The High Court was therefore right in its conciusion that the prosecu· 
lion was barred. by the provisions of section 40 of the Act. [821D] 
!';'tam Singh v. State of Haryana, 
[1971] 
1 S.C.C. 
653, Mau/ad 
Ahmad v. State of Uctar Pradesh, [1963] Supp, 2 S.C.R. 38, Sitaram v. 
C 
State of Madhya Pradesh, [1962] Supp, 3 S.C.R. 21 and Amalgamated 
Electricity Co. v. Municipal Committee Ajmer, [1969] 1 S.C.R. 430, relied 
on and applied. 
D 
E 
F 
G 
H 
CRIMINAL ,APPELLATE JURISDICTION : 
Criminal 
Appeals 

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