PREM SINGH AND ORS. versus BIRBAL AND ORS.

Citation: [2006] SUPP. 1 S.C.R. 692 · Decided: 02-05-2006 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: S.B. SINHA · Disposal: Appeal(s) allowed

Judgment (excerpt)

A 
PREM SINGH AND ORS. 
v. 
BIRBAL AND ORS. 
MAY 2, 2006 
B 
[S.B. SINHA AND P.K. BALASUBRAMANYAN, JJ.] 
Transfer of Property Act/limitation Act; Articles 27, 30 and 59: 
Execution of sale deed in respect of the land in dispute allegedly by 
C a minor by showing him as major-Filing of suit later for declaration and 
partition of the land claiming himself to be a co-sharer in the property-Suit 
dismissed by trial Court as time-barred-Appeal allowed by the Appellate 
Court holding the sale deed void ab initio as it got executed by playing fraud 
on the vendor when he was a minor-Affirmed by the High Court-On 
D appeal, Held: Though the limitation Act bars a remedy but it does not 
extinguish a right ji>r filing a suit for possession of the property-The Act 
prescribes provisions that upon lapse of the prescribed period, the institution 
of suit shall be barred-Presumption about a registered document is that it 
is validly executed-The onus of proof would be on a person who leads 
evidence to rebut the presumption-Vendor failed to rebut the presumption 
E since he did not file the suit against execution of the sale deed within the 
prescribed period of limitation-Hence, the suit was rightly held to be barred 
by /imitation, by the trial Court-Specific Relief Act-Section 31. 
The question which arose for determination in this appeal was as to 
F whether the provision of Article 59 of the Limitation Act, 1963 would be 
attracted in a suit filed for setting aside a Deed of Sale executed by a minor. 
The Appellants ~ontended that respondent No.I filed a suit on 24.9.1979 
for setting aside the Sale Deed dated 1.12.1961, which was clearly barred by 
limitation; that the period of limitation for setting aside the Deed of Sale, 
G started running from the date he attained majority; that even assuming that 
the findings of the Appellate Court were correct that the Respondent No.I 
was aged about 12 years in 1961 and he attained majority in the year 1969, 
he was required to file the suit within three years thereafter; and that the 
Appellate Court as also the High Court failed to take into consideration the 
documentary evidence which clearly established that Respondent No. I was a 
H 
692 
PREM SINGH v. BIRBAL 
693 
major on the date of execution of the Deed of sale. 
Respondents submitted that on the date of execution of the deed of sale, 
Respondent No. I being a minor, Article 59 of the Limitation Act would have 
no application; and that when a transaction is void, a suit can be filed at any 
time and the provisions of the Limitation Act are not attracted. 
Allowing the appeal, the Court 
A 
B 
HELD: I. I. Limitation is a statute ofrepose. It ordinarily bars a remedy, 
but, does not extinguish a right. The only exception to the said rule is to be 
found in Section 27 of the Limitation Act, 1963 which provides that at the 
determination of the period prescribed thereby, limited to any person for C 
instituting a suit for possession of any property, his right to such property 
shall be extinguished. 1696-H; 697-AI 
1.2. Article 59 of the Limitation Act applies specially when a relief is 
claimed on the ground of fraud or mistake. It only encompasses within its D 
fold fraudulent transactions which are voidable transactions. 1697-C) 
1.3. When a document is valid, no question arises of its cancellation. 
When a document is void ab initio, a decree for setting aside the same would 
not be necessary as the same is non-est in the eye of law, as it would be a 
nullity. Once, however, a suit is filed by a plaintiff for cancellation of a E 
transaction, it would be governed by Article 59 . .Even if Article 59 is not 
attracted, the residuary Article would be. 1697-G-H; 698-AJ 
1.4. Article 59 would be attracted when coercion, undue influence, 
misappropriation or fraud which the plaintiff asserts is required to be proved. 
Article 59 would apply to the case of such instruments. It would, therefore, F 
apply where a document is prima facie valid. It would not apply only to 
instruments which are presumptively invalid. 1698-BJ 
Unni & Anr. v. Kunchi Amma & Ors., (1891) ILR XIV Mad. 26 and Sheo 
Shankar Gir v. Ram Shewak Chowdhri & Ors., (1897) ILR XXIV Cal. 77, 
referred to. 
1.5. If the plaintiff is in possession of a property, he may file a suit for 
declaration that the deed is not binding upon him but if he is not in possession 
thereof, even under a void transaction, the right by way of adverse possession 
may be claimed. Thus, i

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