PRATAP SINGH versus RAJINDER SINGH & ANR.

Citation: [1975] 3 S.C.R. 584 · Decided: 20-02-1975 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: M. HAMEEDULLAH BEG · Disposal: Appeal(s) allowed

Judgment (excerpt)

584 
PRATAP SINGH 
A 
v. 
RAJINDER SINGI'l & ANR. 
February 20, 1975 
[M. H. BEG, Y. v. Cf-V\NDRACHUD AND A. c. GUPTA, JJ.] 
Representation of the People Act, 1951-s. 123(5)-Corrupt praclice-
B 
When the Supreme Court appreciates oral evidence-Whether oral testimony , 
could not be accevted unless corroborated in material particulars-A witness ,,' 
need not be proved to be a perju;er before his evidence is discarded--How a 
court should evaluate evidence in a case of corrupt practice. 
The respondent, in his election petition before the High Court, alleged a 
number of ':orrupt practices hit by ,s. 123(4), (5) and (6) of the Representation 
of the People Act, 1951 against the appellant. who was the duly elected candidate 
to the State Assembly. 
The High Court allowed the petition and set aside the 
C 
e1ection. , On appeal to this Court it was contended that the High Court over-
looked the_ well established principle that the charge of corrupt practice must 
be treated as quasi-criminal in character which has to be proved beyond rea-
sonable doubt. 
Allowing the appeal and remitting the case to the High (:ourt, 
HELD : (I )(a) The judgment of the High Court rests largely on appreciation 
of 'oral evidence. It could not, therefore, be easily, disturbed by this OJ,urt even 
D 
in first appeal on facts in election cases. 
[587B] 
(b) But if the High Court overlooks serious infirmities in the 
1~vidence 
adduced to support the case accepted by it or misreads evidence or igr1ores tht: 
principle that a charge of corrupt practice, in the course of an election, is a 
grave one which, if established, casts a serious reflection and impose's a ois-
ability upon the candidate l)eld guilty of it, so that the Court must be satisfied 
beyond reasonable doubt about its 
veracity, this Court will not 
hesitate to 
E 
interfere. 
[587C] 
In the instant case, the High Court did nothing more than to rather mechani-
cally accept the oral_and documentary evidence given to support the cliarge of 
corrupt practice. 
There was no consideration or discussion of a number of 
infirmities' both in the oral and docum~ntary evidence to support the charge. 
This is so be1;ause the High Court has held the view that a mere consideration 
of probabilities, withou,t applying a strict standard of proof beyond reasonable' 
doubt to a charge of corrupt practice was enough. There is no· indication any-
F 
where in the judgment that the stricter standard of proof, which is applicable 
to such charges, was kept in view by the High Court. 
[588G-H] 
, 
Rahim Khan 
v. 
Khurshid Ahmed & Ors. [1974] 2 S.C.C. 660 @? 666, 
followed. 
2(a) It is difficult to accept the contention of the appellant that oral testi-
mony could not be accepted in an allegation of corrupt practice unless it is 
G 
corroborated by other kinds of evidence in material particulars. 
There is 'no 
such general inflexible rule of Jaw or practice which could justify a wholesale 
condemnation or rejection of a species of evidence which i~ legally ac!missible 
and can be acted upon under the provisions of the Evidence Act in every type 
of case. if it is, after pr.oper scrutiny,. found to b~ reliable or wprthy of aC<'.eptance. 
There 1s no presumpt10n that a witness deposing on oa:th m the witni~ss box 
is -untruthful unless he is shown to be speaking the truth. The ordinary presump-
tion is, that a witness deposing solemnly on oath before a judicial tribunal is a 
Witness of truth unless the contrary is shown. 
The evidence in an election 
ff 
petition cannot be equated with that of an accomplice in a criminal case~ whose 
testimony has, according to a rule of practice, though not of law, to be corro-
borated in material particulars before it is relied upon. 
[589D-E & FJ 
A 
B 
c 
D 
E 
F 
.G 
PRATAP SINGH v, RAJINDl!R SINGH (Beg, J.) 
58 5 
(b) It is not required by our law of evidence that a witness must' be proved 
lo b~ a perjurer before h'B evidence is discarded. It rp.ay be enough, if his evi-
dence appears to be quite improbable or to spring '.from such tainted or biased or 
dubious a source as to be unsafe to be acted upon without corroboration from 
evidence other than that of the witness himself. [589F] 
(c) There are no golden rules for i!f.Praising hnman te&timony. The extrac-
tion of what should constitute 11'.e credible foundation of judicially sound judg-
ment i~ an art which nothing except S(IUDd common sense and prudence combined 
with ·:xperience can tea·:h. 
(5890] 
· 
(d 

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