PRAMOD SURYABHAN PAWAR versus THE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA & ANR.

Citation: [2019] 11 S.C.R. 423 · Decided: 21-08-2019 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: D.Y. CHANDRACHUD · Disposal: Appeal(s) allowed

Cited by 9 judgment(s) · cites 4 · see the full citation network in Lexace

Judgment (excerpt)

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PRAMOD SURYABHAN PAWAR
v.
THE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA & ANR.
(Criminal Appeal No. 1165 of 2019)
AUGUST 21, 2019
[DR. DHANANJAYA Y. CHANDRACHUD AND
INDIRA BANERJEE, JJ.]
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973: s.482 – Inherent powers
of court – Scope of exercise – Held: Under s.482, the inherent
jurisdiction of the court can be exercised (i) to give effect to an
order under the CrPC; (ii) to prevent the abuse of the process of the
court; and (iii) to otherwise secure the ends of justice – The court
should be guarded in the use of its extraordinary jurisdiction to
quash an FIR or criminal proceeding as it denies the prosecution
the opportunity to establish its case through investigation and
evidence – In deciding whether to exercise its jurisdiction under
s.482, the Court does not adjudicate upon the veracity of the facts
alleged or enter into an appreciation of competing evidence
presented – The limited question is whether on the face of the FIR,
the allegations constitute a cognizable offence.
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973: s.482 – Petition for
quashing FIR filed under ss.376, 417, 504, and 506(2) IPC against
the appellant that he engaged in sexual relations with the complainant
against her will on the false promise of marrying her – Plea of
complainant that her “consent” premised on a “misconception of
fact” (the promise to marry) stood vitiated – High Court rejected
the plea and dismissed the petition – Held: The “misconception of
fact” alleged by the complainant is the appellant’s promise to marry
her – There is a distinction between a false promise given on the
understanding by the maker that it will be broken, and the breach
of a promise which is made in good faith but subsequently not
fulfilled – Where the promise to marry is false and the intention of
the maker at the time of making the promise itself was not to abide
by it  but to deceive the woman to convince her to engage in sexual
relations, there is a “misconception of fact” that vitiates the woman’s
   [2019] 11 S.C.R. 423
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2019] 11 S.C.R.
“consent” –  The “consent” of a woman under s.375 is vitiated on
the ground of a “misconception of fact” where such misconception
was the basis for her choosing to engage in the said act – In the
instant case, the allegations in the FIR did not on their face indicate
that the promise by the appellant was false, or that the complainant
engaged in sexual relations on the basis of this promise – There
was no allegation in the FIR that when the appellant promised to
marry the complainant, it was done in bad faith or with the intention
to deceive her – The appellant’s failure in 2016 to fulfil his promise
made in 2008 cannot be construed to mean the promise itself was
false – The allegations in the FIR indicated that the complainant
was aware that there existed obstacles to marrying the appellant
since 2008, and that she and the appellant continued to engage in
sexual relations long after their getting married had become a
disputed matter – Even thereafter, the complainant travelled to visit
and reside with the appellant at his postings and allowed him to
spend his weekends at her residence – Therefore, offence under
s.375 IPC against the appellant was not made out – FIR is quashed
– Penal Code, 1860 – ss.375, 376, 417, 504, and 506(2).
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973: s.482 – Petition for
quashing FIR filed under ss.3(1) (u), (w) and 3(2) (vii) of the SC/ST
Act against the appellant that he sent her certain Whatsapp messages
which were insulting and attacked her on the grounds of her caste
– High Court dismissed the petition – On appeal, held: The
WhatsApp messages were alleged to have been sent by the appellant
to the complainant on 27 and 28 August 2015 and 22 October 2015
–  At that time, ss.3(1) (u), (w) and 3(2) (vii) of the SC/ST Act as it
stood today had not been enacted into the statute – These provisions
were inserted by the (Prevention of Atrocities) Amendment Act 2015
which came into force on 26 January 2016 – None of the offences
as stood then were made out – The messages were not in public
view, no assault occurred, nor was the appellant in such a position
so as to dominate the will of the complainant.  Therefore, even if the
allegations set out by the complainant with respect to the WhatsApp
messages and words uttered were accepted on their face, no offence
was made out under SC/ST Act (as it then stood) – FIR is quashed –
Scheduled Castes and Sched

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