PRAKASH H. JAIN versus M/S. MARIE FERNANDES

Citation: [2003] SUPP. 3 S.C.R. 1011 · Decided: 23-09-2003 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: DORAISWAMY RAJU · Disposal: Dismissed

Judgment (excerpt)

PRAKASH H. JAIN 
A 
v. 
MS. MARIE FERNANDES 
SEPTEMBER 23, 2003 
[DORAISWAMY RAJU AND ARIJIT PASAYAT, JJ.] 
B 
Rent and Eviction : 
Maharashtra Rent Control Act, 1999-Section 43(4)(a)-Chapter 
VIII-Eviction proceedings under-Application by licensee seeking leave C 
to contest-Not filed within stipulated period-Competent authority 
condoning the delay and granting the leave-Held, provisions of Chapter 
VIII of the Act indicate that competent authority constituted thereunder is 
not a 'court' for the purpose of making the provisions of Limitation Act 
attracted to the proceedings before it-In the event of an application/ D 
affidavit with grounds of defence and leave to contest not having been 
filed within the stipulated period, competent authority is to pass orders 
of eviction as envisaged by Section 43(4)(a)-Limitation Act, 1963-
Section 5. 
Respondent-landlord entered into a licence deed with appellant E 
and thereby allowed appellant to use property in question as a licencee 
for a period of one year from date of the deed. On expiry of the said 
licence deed, respondent filed an application before the Competent 
Authority under the Maharashtra Rent Control Act, 1999 for eviction 
of appellant and for compensation on ground that the leave/licence had F 
expired by efflux of time. Summons having been served on the 
appellant, he entered appearance and filed an application to summon 
for a document. At a later stage the appellant filed an application 
seeking leave to contest along with an application for condoning the 
delay in filing the said application. The Competent Authority condoned G 
the delay and granted the leave. Aggrieved, respondent approached the 
High Court which set aside the orders passed by the Competent 
Authority. Hence, the present appeal. 
On behalf of appellant, it was contended that the Competent 
Authority is a 'court' in the eye of law and consequently possesses H 
JOll 
1012 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003] SUPP. 3 S.C.R. 
A inherent power to condone the delay as is available to any other Court 
under the Civil Procedure Code; that appearance within 30 days would 
be sufficient compliance and it is not necessary that the application 
itself seeking for leave to defend also should be filed within that period. 
B 
On behalf of respondent, it was contended that Competent 
Authority is neither a 'court' in the eye of law as would denote a court 
of ordinary jurisdiction nor the provisions of the Limitation Act or the 
principles enshrined therein could be invoked or exercised by the said 
Authority in relation to any of the proceedings arising under the Act. 
c 
Dismissing the appeal, this Court 
HELD : 1.1. The various provisions under Chapter VIII of the 
Maharashtra Rent Control Act, 1999 unmistakably indicate that the 
competent authority constituted thereunder is not 'court' and the mere 
D fact that such authority is deemed to be court only for limited and 
specific purposes, cannot make it a court for all or any other purpose 
and at any rate for the purpose of either making the provisions of the 
Limitation Act, 1963 attracted to proceedings before such Competent 
Authority or clothe such authority with any power to be exercised 
E 
under the Limitation Act. The Competent Authority constituted under 
and for the purposes of the provisions contained in Chapter VIII is 
merely and at best a statutory authority created for a definite purpose 
and to exercise powers in a quasi-judicial manner but its powers are 
strictly circumscribed by the very statutory provisions which conferred 
upon it those powers. [1019-G, H, 1020-A, D, E) 
F 
Gurditta Mal v. Bal Swarup, AIR (1980) Delhi 216; Mukri Gopa/an 
v. Cheppilat Puthanpuravil Aboobacker, [1995) 5 SCC 5; P. Sarathy v. 
State Bank of India, [2000) 5 SCC 355; Thakur Jugal Kishore Sinha v. 
The Sitamarhi Central Co-operative Bank Ltd and Anr., [1967) 3 SCR 
G 
162; Sakuru v. Tanaii, [1985) 3 SCC 590; Bir/a Cement Works v. G.M 
Western Railways and Another, [1995] 2 SCC 493; and France B. Martins 
v. Mafaida Maria Teresa Rodrigues, AIR (1999) SC 3243, referred to. 
1.2. When a statute enacts that anything shall be deemed to be 
some other thing the only meaning possible is that the said thing is not 
H in reality that something, the legislative enactment requires it to be 
...
·~ 
P.H. JAIN v. MARIE FERNANDES [RAJU, J.] 
1013 
treated as if it is so. Similarly, though full effect m•1st be given to the A 
legal fiction, it should not be extended be

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