PRAKASH CHAND versus STATE OF H.P.

Citation: [2004] SUPP. 3 S.C.R. 389 · Decided: 09-08-2004 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: ARIJIT PASAYAT · Disposal: Case Partly allowed

Judgment (excerpt)

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PRAKASH CHAND 
A 
v. 
STATE OF H.P. 
AUGUST 9, 2004 
[ARIJIT PASAYAT AND C.K. THAKKER, JJ.] 
B 
Penal Code, 1860 : 
Exceptions I, 2 & 3 to Sections 300, 302 and 304 Part I : 
Accused committed fratricide-Exception 4 to Section JOO-Applica- c 
bility of-Trial Court convicted the accused under Section 302 and 
sentenced him to life imprisonment-Affirmed by High Court-On appeal, 
Held: Exception 4 to Section. 300 covers acts done in a sudden fight-It 
more appropriately covers a case not covered by Exception I-Quarrel D 
whether sudden or not must necessarily depend upon the proved facts of 
the case-When accused in a sudden quarrel committed homicide without 
premeditation and has not taken undue advantage/acted in a cruel manner, 
Exception 4 become applicable-In the facts and circumstances of the 
case, Exception 4 to Section 300 clearly applicable-Accordingly, custodial 
sentence altered to I 0 years. 
E 
Exception I and 4 to Section JOO-Distinction between-Discussed. 
Words and Phrases : 
'sudden fight/quarrel ' and 'undue advantage '-Meaning of in the 
context of Exception 4 to Section 300 !PC. 
There was a quarrel between two brothers, the deceased and the 
accused-appellant as the dogs of accused had entered into the kitchen 
F 
of the deceased. Accused took out his gun and fired gunshot at the G 
deceased from a distance of about 35 feet. Deceased succumbed to gun 
shot injuries'. Trial Court found the accused guilty, convicted him 
under Section 302 IPC and sentenced him to imprisonment for life. In 
appeal, conviction and sentence were upheld by the High Court. Hence 
the present appeal. 
H 
389 
390 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2004] SUPP. 3 S.C.R. 
A 
Accused-appellant contended that the incident had occurred 
during he course of sudc .en quarrel; and that the Exception 4 to Section 
300 IPC is applicable. 
Partly allowing th~ appeal, the Court 
B 
HELD: 1.1. The Frnrth Exception of Section 300 IPC covers acts 
done in a sudden fight. fhe exception deals with a case of prosecution 
not covered by the first exception, after which its place would have 
been more appropriat• '· The exception is founded upon the same 
principle, for in both 0 ere is absence of premeditation. But, while in 
C the case of Exception l 1 here is total deprivation of self-contro~ in case 
of Exception 4 there is only that heat of passing which clouds men's 
sober reasons and urges them to deeds which they would not otherwise 
do. (392-G, H; 393-A) 
1.2. A 'sudden fig 1t' implies mutual provocation and blows on 
D each side. The homicide committed is then clearly not traceable to 
unilateral provocation, nor in such cases could the whole blame be 
placed on one side. For fit were so, the Exception more appropriately 
applicable would be Ex· :eption 1. There is no previous deliberation or 
determination to fight. A fight suddenly takes place, for which both 
E parties are more or less to be blamed. It may be that one of them starts 
it, but if the other had 11ot aggravated it by his own conduct it would 
not have taken the serio11s turn it did. There is then mutual provocation 
and aggravation, and it is difficult to 9pportion the share of blame 
which attaches to each ighter. To bring a case within Exception 4 all 
F the ingredients mentior ed in it must be found. [393-B-E) 
1.3. For the application of Exception 4, it is not sufficient to show 
that there was a sudde 1 quarrel and there was no premeditation. It 
must further be shown ti 1at the offender has not taken undue advantage 
or acted in cruel or onus ual manner. The expression 'undue advantage' 
G as used in the provision means 'unfair advantage'. In the present case, 
when the factual scenario is considered in the light of legal principles, 
the inevitable conclusic n is that Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC is 
clearly applicable. Addi:ionally the shot was fired from a distance of 35 
feet. Though the distanc•' is always not determinative abontthe intention 
H or knowledge of accusec I, the factual background has to be considered 
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PRAKASH CHAND v. STATE OF H.P. [PASAYAT, J.] 
391 
taking into account the nature of injuries sustained, the weapon used A 
and such other relevant factors. [393-F, G, H; 394-A] 
Dhirajbhai Gorakhbhai Nayak v. State of Gujarat, (2003) 5 Supreme 
223 and Virsa Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR (1958) SC 465, relied on. 
2. For cases to fall within clause thirdly of Section 300, it is not B 
necessary that the offender intended to cause death,' so long as

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