PRAHLAD RAUT versus ALL INDIA INSTITUTE OF MEDICAL SCIENCES

Citation: [2019] 11 S.C.R. 809 · Decided: 27-08-2019 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: R. BANUMATHI · Disposal: Dismissed

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Judgment (excerpt)

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PRAHLAD RAUT
v.
ALL INDIA INSTITUTE OF MEDICAL SCIENCES
(Civil Appeal No. 6640 of 2019)
AUGUST 27, 2019
[R. BANUMATHI AND INDIRA BANERJEE, JJ.]
Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985: s. 21 – Limitation –
Suspension of appellant-Steward on charges of embezzlement and
misappropriation – Registration of FIR – Thereafter, appellant
committed theft in public place and registration of second FIR and
conviction u/s. 379 IPC – Issuance of Memorandum removing
appellant from service from the date of his conviction and direction
to refund the subsistence allowance received by him – After a decade
on account of compromise between the appellant and respondent,
first FIR quashed by the High Court – Representation moved by
appellant demanding retiral benefits – After 13 years from the date
of Memorandum, application filed by appellant challenging the
Memorandum – Tribunal set aside the memorandum and granted
all benefits to the appellant – Writ petition by the respondent –
Allowed by the High Court – On appeal, held: Sub-Section (3) of
Section 21 is attracted when there is sufficient cause for the delay
in filing an appeal beyond the period of limitation – Finding of the
tribunal that the application had been filed within limitation, is
patently erroneous and was rightly not accepted by the High Court
– Successive representations do not save limitation and does not
justify delay of about thirteen years in approaching the tribunal –
Memorandum had to be challenged before the tribunal within the
period of limitation as prescribed in s. 21(1)(b), which would start
running from the date of expiry of six months from the date of filing
of appeal or alternatively the appellant would have to show
sufficient cause for the delay in filing the application beyond the
period prescribed by limitation – It cannot be said that the quashing
of the first FIR gave rise to afresh cause of action – Forfeiture of
pensionary benefits by reason of a punitive order of termination is
not a continuing cause of action – First FIR was not quashed on
the ground that the same did not disclose any offence or was
   [2019] 11 S.C.R. 809
809
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2019] 11 S.C.R.
otherwise frivolous, vexatious or harassive – Also it cannot be said
that absolute penury led the appellant  to commit the offence u/s.
379 – Any sympathy for the appellant would be completely misplaced
– Thus, the order of the High Court is upheld – Central Civil Services
(Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965 – r. 19(1).
Limitation: Object of – Held: Law of limitation is founded on
public policy – Object of limitation is to put a quietus on stale and
dead disputes – Person ought not to be allowed to agitate his claim
after a long delay – When retiral benefits are withheld without cause,
there would be a continuing cause of action – However, when
retirement benefits are withheld by way of disciplinary action, the
order would necessarily have to be challenged within the period of
limitation or alternatively there would have to be sufficient cause
for the delay.
Dismissing the appeal, the Court
HELD: 1.1 Sub–Section (3) of Section 21 of the
Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 is attracted when there is
sufficient cause for the delay in filing an appeal beyond the period
of limitation. The finding of the tribunal that the Original
Application had been filed within limitation, is patently erroneous
and has rightly not been accepted by the High Court. It is well
settled that successive representations do not save limitation
and certainly does not justify delay of about thirteen years in
approaching the tribunal. [Para 27, 28][821-A, C]
1.2 Removal under Rule 19(i) of the Central Civil Services
(Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965 entails the
consequence of forfeiture of retiral benefits such as pension. The
order of 6.01.2000 necessarily had to be challenged before the
Tribunal within the period of limitation or alternatively the
appellant would have to show sufficient cause for the delay in
filing the Original Application beyond the period prescribed by
limitation. The question of entitlement, if at all, of the appellant
to gratuity and provident fund, notwithstanding his removal by
the Memorandum dated 6.01.2000 was neither raised before nor
considered by the Tribunal. Nor was the question considered by
the High Court. The question cannot be raised at the stage of
this appeal. [Para 32][823-E, F]
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1.3 The High Court

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