PRAG ICE & OIL MILLS & ANR. ETC versus UNION OF INDIA
Open in Lexace · Ask the AI about this caseJudgment (excerpt)
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293
PRAG ICE & OIL MILLS & ANR. ETC.
v.
UNION OF INDIA
February 21, 1978 & May 5, 1978
IM. H. BEG, C.J., Y. V. CHANDRACHUD, P. N. BUAGWATI, S. MuRTAZA
FAZAL AI.I, P. N. SHINGHAL, JASWANT SINGH AND D. A. DESAI, JJ.)
Constitutton of India, 1950, Art. 31B read with Ninth
Schedule-Scope
and ambit of-Whether Art. 31B affords protection only to the :fcts. and '[{egu-
latiOns specified in Ninth Schedule, or also to orders and, not1ficat1ons issued
under those Acts and Regulations.
A
B
Constitulion of
India,
1950, Art 32 "Locus Sta11d1" of
'dealers' to in-
C
voke the 1urisdiction of the Supreme Court under Art. 32 and challenge the
provisions of tlze Price Control Order as of}endint.: fundamental ri?hts under
Arts. 14, 19(1) (/) and (g).
Mustard
Oil Price
Control
Order
1977
constitutional
validity a/-
Whether it violates Arts. 14 and 19 (1) (f) and (g)-Whether it is open to
such a challenge at all-Applicability of the doctrire of derivative protection.
Distinction between (a) "n1erely regulatory 0 1·der and
those
of
price
fixation or price control Order'' under s. 3(2) (c) of the Essential Commo-
dities Act, and (b) "protection to a 111ere grant of powers" and "exercise of
that pOl-rer", explained.
Prite f1xativ11, tests of-Courts cannot interff!re
with ccono111ic
policies
.of the Government in cases of beneficial legislation ..
Sub-st:ction (1) of section 3 of the Essential
Commodities Act, 1955
which is placed in the Ninth Schedule of the Constitution, empowers the Cent-
ral Govt. to provide by an order for regulating or prohibiting the production,
supply and distribution of an essential co1nmodity or trade or commerce there-
in, if it is of the opinion, that it is necessary or expedient so to do for main-
taining or increasing supplies of any essential cornmcxlity or for securing its
equitable distribution and availability at a fair price. In exercise of the power
CO'nferred by s. 3 of the Essential Commodities Act, 10 of 1955, the Clovern-
ment of India in its Ministry of Civil Supplies and
Cooperation issued on
September 30, 1977 the Mustard Oil (Price Control) Order, 1977.
The Price
Control Order provided by Clause (3) that no dealer \Vas either by hi1nself or
by any person on his behalf to sell or offer to sell any mustard oil at a retail
price exceeding Rs. 10 per Kg. exclusively of the cost of container but in-
clusive of taxes.
Clause 2 defines a dealer to mean a person eng<1ged in the
business cf purchase, sale, or storage for sale of mustard oil.
D
E
F
The Price Control Order was challenged in this Court by sevcrnl dealer.s
on the ground mainly, that it violated Articles 14
19(1)(f) and J9(l)(g)
G
of the Constitution.
Art. 301 w<1s ~ited but 1.1ot arg1;ed npo:1 with any 'ierious-
ness.
lipholding the validity of the impugned Price Control Order n-nd dismiss-
ing the appeals the Court,
HELD, : Per maiority
The Mustard Oil (Price Control Order.
1977)
is
con~t:tutionall'I valid.
H
The: iinpugned Price Control Order is not an act of hosfle disc··1minallon
against the traders.
Jt does not violate their right to property or their right
to trade o' business.
[319C; 331G]
294
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1978] 3 s.c.R.
A
Per Chand1achud, J. [as he 1hen was] (On behalf of
Bhagwati,
Murtaza-
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
Fazal Ali, Shinghal, Jaswant Singh, JJ. and !!ilnself).
I. On a pla.in reading of Art. 3 I A it ca•anot be said that the protective
umbrella of the Ninth Schedule takes in not only the acts anci regulations
specified therein but also orders and notifications issued under those acts and
regulations. !320 CJ
(a) Art. 31-B constitutes a grave encroachment on fundamental rights. and
though it is inspired by a radiant social philosophy, it must be construed as
strictly as one 1nay, for the simple reason that the guarantee of fundamental
rights cannot be permitted to be diluted by implications and inferences. The
Constitution which prescribes the extent to \Vhich a challenge to the consti-
tutionality of a la\v is excluded, must be construed as demarcating the far-
thest 1imit of exclusion.
Considering the nature of the subject-matter whicb
article 31-B deals with, there is no justification for extending by judicial inter-
pretation the frontierfi of the field which is declared by that article to be
immune from challenge on the ground of violation or abridgement of funda-
mental rights; tJ20 D-Ef
(b) The article affordsExcerpt shown. Read the full judgment & AI analysis in Lexace.
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