POWAI PANCHSHEEL CO-OP HSG. SOCIETY & ANR. versus MAHARASHTRA HOUSING AREA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY (MHADA) & ORS.

Citation: [2018] 13 S.C.R. 999 · Decided: 12-10-2018 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE · Disposal: Appeal(s) allowed

Judgment (excerpt)

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POWAI PANCHSHEEL CO-OP HSG. SOCIETY & ANR.
v.
MAHARASHTRA HOUSING AREA DEVELOPMENT
AUTHORITY (MHADA) & ORS.
(Civil Appeal No. 7608 of 2009)
OCTOBER 12, 2018
[ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE AND S. ABDUL NAZEER, JJ.]
Public allotment: State largesse – Disposal of, amongst the
citizens – On facts, State Housing Board, by a resolution accepted
the offers of the three societies for purchase of flats of the Project,
however excluded appellant No.1’s offer – Justification of – Held:
Government, is not and should not be as free as an individual in
selecting the recipients for its largesse – Government would be
subject to restraints, in its position in a democratic society – In view
thereof, the Board was not justified in considering only the offers
made by the three societies without considering appellant No.1’s
offer on its merit – Board was under a legal obligation to consider
all the four offers (appellant No.1 and three societies) with a view
to decide as to which one out of these was the best one for its
acceptance – Exclusion of appellant No.1’s offer and keeping
appellant no.1 out from the zone of consideration by the Board in
its meetings and only confining the consideration of the offers made
by the three societies vitiates the entire decision of the Board –
Reason given by the Board for non-consideration of appellant
No.1’s offer that appellant No.1’s letter was not an offer, thus, was
not considered, had no basis – Resolution of the Board as regards
its decision for sale/disposal of flats of the Project in favour of
three societies is quashed.
Allowing the appeal, the Court
HELD: 1.1 The Government, is not and should not be as
free as an individual in selecting the recipients for its largesse.
Whatever its activity, the Government is still the Government
and will be subject to restraints, in its position in a democratic
society.  A democratic Government cannot lay down arbitrary and
capricious standards for the choice of persons with whom alone
it will deal. The Board was not justified in considering only the
[2018] 13  S.C.R. 999
999
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2018] 13  S.C.R.
offers made by the three societies without considering appellant
No.1’s offer on its merit. The Board was under a legal obligation
to consider also appellant No.1’s offer which appellant No.1 had
made to the Board through M/s. K Constructions for purchase
of the flats of the Project along with the other offers made by the
three societies in their meetings. [Para 24][1009-G]
R. D. Shetty v. International Airport Authority (1979) 3
SCC 497 – relied on.
1.2 M/s. K Constructions was the authorized agent
appointed by the Board itself for sale and disposal of the flats of
the Project. M/s. K Constructions on receipt of appellant No.1’s
offer rightly forwarded it to the Board on the same date for its
consideration. The appellant’s offer was, therefore, very much
available to the Board for its consideration prior to the meetings
held on 14.05.2003.  In other words, the date on which the Board
was considering the offers of the three societies in its meeting
the offer of appellant No.1 was with the Board for its consideration.
The very fact that M/s K Constructions entertained appellant
No.1’s offer and forwarded it to the Board was indicative of the
fact that offer to purchase the flats of the Project could be made
by any party either to the Board or to M/s. K Constructions and
had to be considered as being a valid offer made to the Board
only. Reading of appellant No.1’s letter to M/s. K Constructions
would clearly indicate that it was essentially an offer made by
appellant No.1 to the Board for purchase of 110 flats for Rs.17
crores.  In other words, it could not be treated as letter for
soliciting some information from the Board as contended by the
Board for its consideration. Keeping in view these factors, the
Board was under a legal obligation to consider all the four offers
(appellant No.1 and the three societies) in their meetings held
on 10/14.05.2003 with a view to decide as to which one out of the
four offers was the best one for its acceptance. Exclusion of
appellant No.1’s offer dated 03.03.2003 and keeping appellant
no.1 out from the zone of consideration by the Board in its
meetings held on 10/14.05.2003 and only confining the
consideration of the offers made by the three societies
vitiates the entire decision of the Board taken on 10/14.05.2003.
[Para 25- 29][1009-G-H; 1010-A-F]
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1.3 Appel

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