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PIARA SINGH versus STATE OF PUNJAB

Citation: [1969] 3 S.C.R. 236 · Decided: 08-01-1969 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: J.C. SHAH · Disposal: Dismissed

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Judgment (excerpt)

PIARA SINGH 
v. 
STATE OF PUNJAB 
January 8, 1969 
A 
(J. C. SHAH, V. RAMASWAM! AND A. N, GROVER, JJ,J 
B 
Evidence-Pri11ciple of 
i.B·tte·estoppel-Approver's 
evidence, 
value 
Of. 
The appellant and S were charged for an olfen.ce under s. 302 I.P.C. 
anti under the Explosive Substances Act. 
The prosecution relied 
upon 
the evidence of the approver. The approver's statement was corrobow 
rntcd, (a) by the rec0very of a piece of cloth which was part of the 
same cloth used in the crime, (b) by the evidence of that the box was 
made for the appellant, and ( c) by the evidence regarding despatch of 
thL~ parcel by the appellant.· The Sessions Judge convicted the appellant 
~1nJ S, against which both appealed. 
1'he conviction of the appellant 
was upheld by the High Court, as it considered that the statement of 
the- approver was corroborated by the evidence of other witnesses so far 
the appellant was concerned. 
But the High Court acquitted S being of 
the view that there Y.'as no independent corroboration of the approver's 
C\ idcnce Y.1hich lead to the inference that S was instrumental in 
the 
con1mission of the crime. In appeal· to this Court, the appellant con-
tcr..Jcd that (i) the affect of acquittal of S was to weaken, if not to 
dc,troy, the approver's evidence so far as it 
concerned the appellant, 
rd ting on the principles of issue-estoppel; and (ii) there was no corrobo-
ration of the approver's evidence so far as the appellant was concerned. 
Di~.missing the appeal, 
HELD: (i) For 
the principle of issuc·cstoppel to arise, there must 
ha\..: been distinctly raised and inevitably decided the same issue in the 
earlier proceedings between the .same parties. 
But the principle cannot 
he invoked in the present case because the parties are djfferent and the 
decision. upon any Jssue as between State and s. in the same litigation 
c~1nnot operate as binding upon the State with regard to the present 
appellant. [242 D·E] 
Prita1n Singh v. State of Punjab, A.LR. 1956 S.C, 415, and Manipur 
Adntinistration v. Thokchoni Bira Singh, [1964] 7 S.C.R.' 123, fo1Jowed. 
c 
D 
E 
F 
Sa1nh(;sir(I1J1 v. Puh/ic Prosecutor, Federation of Malaya, [1950] A.C. 
4'~· Kin!! v. Wilkes. 77 C.L.R. 511 at pp. 518·5!9, Marz v. The Queen. 
( 1~56) 96 C.L.R. 62, Again in Brown v. Robinson, (1960) SR, (N.S.W.) 
297. 301, applied. 
G 
(ii) The application of approver's evidence has to satisfy a double 
tC'>L His evidence rnu-;t show that he is a reliable witness and that is a 
test 
1Nhich is common to afl the \Vitncsses. 
If this test is satisfied the 
second test which still remains to be applied is that the approver's e\·idence 
nlUSl receive sufficient corroboration. It would not however. be right 
to expect that such independent corroboration shciuld cover the 
\vhole 
of the prosecution case. 
In the 
present case, the High 
Court 
had 
H 
rightly applied this principle and reached the conclusion that the appro-
Yc:"s evidence was materiatly corroborated so far as the appel'lan.t v.1a·; 
concerned. [243 A-Cl 
PIARA SINGH v. PUNJAB (Ramaswami, J.) 
237 
A 
Sarwa11 Singh v. StMe of Punjab, A.LR. 1957 S.C. 637, followed. 
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeals No. 
158 and 197 of 1968. 
Appeals by certificate/special leave from the judgment and 
order dated November 3, 1967 of the Punjab and Haryana High 
B 
Court in Criminal Appeal No. 602 of 1967 and Murder Refer-
ence No. 45 of 1967. 
D 
E 
F 
G 
H 
J. P. Mitter, J. C. Talwar and R. L. Kohli, for the appellant 
(in both the appeals). 
Kartar Singh Chawla and R. N. Sachthey, for the respondent 
(in both the appeals). 
The Judgme~t of the Court was delivered by 
Ramaswami, J. The appellant Piara Singh and one Nand Lal 
Sehgal were tried together by the Sessions Judge of Kapurthala, 
who by his judgment dated 1st July, 1967 convicted the appellant 
under section 302, LP .C. and sentenced him to death. The 
appellant was also convicted and sentenced to 5 years' rigorous 
imprisonment under section 3 of the Explosive Substances Act 
and to 5 years' rigorous imprisonment under section 326 of the 
Indian Penal Code. Nand Lal Sehgal was sentenced to life im-
prisonment under section 302 read with sections 109 and 113, 
I.P .C. and to 5 years' rigorous imprisonment under section 4 of 
the Explosive Substances Act. Both the convicted persons filed 
appeals in the Punjab and Haryana High Court, viz. 
Criminal 
Appeal No. 602 of 1967 and 601 of 1967. The State of Punjab 
also fi

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