LexPHULIA TUDU AND ANR. versus THE STATE OF BIHAR (NOW JHARKHAND)
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PHULIA TUDU AND ANR. A v. THE ST ATE OF BIHAR (NOW JHARKHAND) SEPTEMBER 14, 2007 (DR.ARIJITPASAYAT ANDD.l(.JAIN,JJ.) B I J Penal Code, 1860-s. 304 (Part I) r!w s. 34-Prosecutionfor murder- Deceased attacked with lathi blow resulting in her death-Conviction under s. 302 rlw s. 34 and sentenced to life imprisonment-Justification of-Held: c On facts, one blow was given with a small stick, and place where assault took place was dimly lit-In light of the facts of the case and legal principles laid down in s. 299 ands. 300, conviction altered to one under s. 304 (Part I) r/w s. 34 and custodial sentence of ten years awarded. According to the prosecution case, appellants were nurturing grievance D against BM. On the fateful day, appellants chased BM and BM took refuge in the house of BS. Appellant-first accused assaulted BM with lathi which resulted in her death. When BS tried to intervene she was threatened with her life. Thereafter, accused fled away. FIR was lodged. Investigation was carried out. Trial court convicted the appellants under section 302 r/w section 34 and imposed life imprisonment. Appellants filed appeal. It was contended E that second accused held hands of the deceased while first accused inflicted only one lathi blow which could not have caused fatal injuries thus, section 302 was not applicable. High Court upheld the order of trial court. Hence the present appeal. Partly allowing the appeal, the Court F HELD: 1.1. In the scheme of the IPC, culpable homicide is genus and 'murder' its specie. All 'murder' is 'culpable homicide' but not vice-versa. Speaking generally, 'culpable homicide' sans 'special characteristics of murder is culpable homicide not amounting to murder'. For the purpose of G fixing punishment, proportionate to the gravity of the generic offence, the IPC practically recognizes three degrees of culpable homicide. The first is, .1, 'culpable homicide of the first degree'. This is the gravest form of culpable homicide, which is defined in Section 300 as 'murder'. The second is 'culpable homicide of the second degree'. This is punishable under the first part of 997 H .. ~ A B c D E 998 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2007] 9 S.C.R Section 304. Then is 'c11lpable homicide of the third degree'. This is the lowest type of culpable homicide and the punishment provided for it is also the lowest among the punishments provided for the three grades. It is punishable under the second part of Section 304. (Para 7) (1001-F, G; 1002-Al 1.2. Gause (b) of Section 299 corresponds with clauses (2) and (3) of Section 300. The distinguishing feature of the mens rea requisite under clause (2) is the knowledge possessed by the offender regarding the particular victim being in such a peculiar condition or state of health that the internal harm caused to him is likely to be fatal, notwithstanding the fact that such harm would not in the ordinary way of nature be sufficient to cause death of a person in.normal health or condition. The 'intention to cause death' is not an essential requirement of clause (2). Only the intention of causing the bodily injury coupled with the offender's knowledge of the likelihood of such injury causing the death of the particular victim, is sufficient to bring the killing within the ambit of this clause. This aspect of clause (2) is borne out by illustration (b) appended to Section 300. (Para 9] (1003-A-C] 1.3. Clause (b) of Section 299 does not postulate.any such knowledge on the part of the offender. Instances of cases falling under clause (2) of Section 300 can be where the assailant causes death by a fist blow intentionally given knowing that the victim is suffering from an enlarged liver, or.enlarged spleen or diseased .heart and such blow is .likely to cause death of that particular person as a.result of the rupture of the liver; or spleen or the failure of the heart, as the case may be. If the assailant had no such knowledge about the disease or special .frailty of the victim, nor an intention to cause death or bodily injury:sufficient in.the ordinary course ofnature to cause death, the offence will not be murder, even if the injury which caused the death, was F intentionally given. In clause (3) of Section 300, instead of the words 'likely to cause death' occurring in the corresponding clause (b) of Section 299, the words "sufficient in the ordinary course of nature" have been used. Obviously, the distinction l
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