PAWAN KUMAR versus STATE OF HARYANA AND ANR.

Citation: [1996] SUPP. 2 S.C.R. 392 · Decided: 07-05-1996 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: M.M. PUNCHHI · Disposal: Appeal(s) allowed

Judgment (excerpt)

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PAWAN KUMAR 
v. 
STATE OF HARYANA AND ANR. 
MAY 7, 1996 
[M.M. PUNCHHI AND K.S. PARIPOORNAN, JJ.] 
SeTVice Law: 
Tennination of service-Ground for-Summary trial of employee for 
offence under S. 294 !PC-Employee pleaded guilty-Sentenced to fine of Rs. 
2!>-Copy of summary register neither disclosed substance of allegations nor 
the words in which plea of guilt was entere~Policy decision of State Govern-
ment laid down tests for detennination of moral turpitude-Held : Mere 
conviction Jlnder S.294 per se does not anzount to n1oral turpitude without 
satisfying the tests laid down in the policy decision-Provision need to be 
D made that punishment of fine up to a certain limit, say up to Rs. 2,000 or so, 
011 summary/ordinary conviction shall not be treated as conviction at all for 
any purpose, especially for entry into and retention in Govemntent ser-
vice-Courts should be sensitive to changing moral standards of 
society-Penal Code 1860, S. 294-Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, S. 264. 
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Criminal Law : 
Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 : Section 264. 
Summary Triaf--Accused pleading guilty-Held: Magistrate not obliged 
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to write a judgment containing a brief statement of reasons, but he must 
record the substance of the evidence-When substance of a/legations is not 
put to the accused, his entering any kind of plea is no plea legally. 
Penal Code, 1860 : 
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Section 294-lngredients-Explained. 
Words and Phrases: "Moral turpitude''--!lfeaning of-In the context of 
Indian Penal Code, 1860, Section 294. 
The appellant was appointed in a Class IV post on ad hoc basis. 
H While in senice, the appellant came to be convicted in a summary trial for 
392 
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PAWANKUMAR v.STATE 
393 
an offence under Section 294 of the Indian Penal Code, I 860 for which he A 
was ordered to pay a fine of Rs. 20, which line he paid there and then. 
\Vhen steps \Vere afoot to regularise his services, papers \\'ere moved to the 
office of the Superintendent of Police to verily about the character and 
antecedents of the appellant. The ollice of the Superintendent of Police 
reported back the factum of conviction of the appellant under Section 294 B 
lPC, but otherwise verified that the appellant was of a good character. The 
services of the appellant were terrninated as no longer required. The 
appellant challenged the aforesaid order of termination before the civil 
court, which decided the case against the appellant. Tiie appellate court 
and the High Court in second appeal affirmed the same. Hence this appeal. c 
Allowing the appeal, this Court 
HELD: 1.1. "Moral turpitude" is an expression, which is used in legal 
as also societal parlance to describe conduct which is inherently base, vile, 
depraved or having any connection sho\\'ing depravity. The State Govern- ·D 
n1ent while considering the question of rehabiHtation of ex-convicts took a 
policy decision that ex-con-Viets who were convicted for oll'ences involving 
n1oral turpitude should not, however be taken in Government service. 
Significantly Section 294 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 is not found 
enlisted in the list of offences constituting moral turpitude. [398-E-F] 
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1.2. The copy of the summary register neither discloses the substance 
of the allegations put to the appellant, nor the words in which the plea of 
guilt was entered. It is of no significance that the appellant treats himself 
a convict as he had pleaded guilty. Assuming that the conviction is not 
open to challenge at the present juncture, one cannot but deprecate the 
action of the respondents in having proceeded to adversely certify the 
character and antecedents of the appellant on the basis of the conviction 
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per se, opining to have involved moral turpitude, without satist)ring the 
tests laid down in the policy decision of the Government. All the three 
courts below, even when invited to judge the matter in the said perspective, G 
went on to hold that the acl/s involved in conviction uncier ~ection 294 IPC 
per se established moral turpitude. Tliey should have been sensitive to the . 
changing perspectives and concepts of morality_ to appreciate the effect of 
Section 294 IPC on today's society and its standards, and its changing view 
of obscenity. [399-F-H, 400-A-BJ 
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996] SUPP. 2 S.C.R. 
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1.3. The attention of the Parliament is drawn to step iu and perceive 
the large many cases which per law and public policy are tried summarily, 
involving thousands and thou

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