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PARTAP SINGH versus UNION OF INDIA & ORS

Citation: [1985] SUPP. 2 S.C.R. 773 · Decided: 06-09-1985 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: E.S. VENKATARAMIAH

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Judgment (excerpt)

. PARTAP SINGH 
v. 
UNION OF INDIA & ORS• 
SEPTEMBER 6, 1985 
[E.S. VENJ<ATARAMIAH AND R.B. MISRA, JJ ·] 
Constitution of India, Articles 14 and 15 
. 
Hindu Succession Act, 1956's. 14(1) -:- Compromise 
order -
Property allotted to widow in lieu of her -right to . maintenance -
Whether becomes absolute estate ·On the coming into force of the 
Act -
Provision contained in s. 14(1) whether vague, discrimi-
natory and ultra vires. 
Amar Siugh was the owner of certain agricultural lands. He 
died leaving behind him two widows. by. name Jagir Kaur and Har 
Kaur and the petitioner as his adopted son. Under an arrangement 
eacn of the two widows had been given one Third share in the 
lands in lieu of their right of illaintenance. Har Kaur surreruiered 
ber one third share in favour of the petitioner and it was 
mutated in his favour. The petitioner filed a suit against Jagir 
Kaur for obtaining a declaration that she had no right, title or 
interest of any sort in the lands belonging to the deceased. A 
compromise decree was passed on July 18, 1945 under which Jagir 
Kaur could retain tJ,e one third share in the lands .in question J.n 
lieu of her.maintenance and on her death the petitioner could get 
possession of the same. Later on Jagir Kaur by a· will dated 
January 25, 1971 bequeathed the said one third share in favour of 
Hardam Singh, respondent in the S.L.P. She died within a few days 
thereafter. 
The petitioner filed another suit claimi11& that Jagir Kaur 
had acquired one-third share in the lands of Amar Singh for the 
\ 
. 
first time uniier the compromise decree which conferred on her 
only a limited estate and . that on her death he should get 
possesstion of the same. The interest of Jagir Kaur in the lands 
allotted to her for maintenance under the compromise decree did 
not become an absolute estate in her hands under s. 14(1) of the 
Hindu Succession Act 1956. The Trial Court dismissing the suit 
held that since Jagir .Kaur had a pre-existing right · to claim 
maintenance from the estate of Amar Singh, her interest in the 
lands allotted to her had became enlarged into an absolute estate 
A 
B 
c 
D 
E 
F 
G 
H 
774 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[1985] SUPP.2 s.c.R. 
A 
on the coming into force of the Hindu Succession Act in 1956 and, 
therefore, the petitioner could not claim the lands in question 
after her death on the basis of compromise decree. 
B 
c 
D 
ll 
F 
G 
H 
Appeals to the District Judge as well as the High Court also 
failed. 
The petitioner filed Special Leave Petition as well as a 
Writ Petition under Article 32 questioning the constitutional 
validity of s. 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act 1956 contending: 
(1) that the prpvision contained in s. 14(1) was vague and 
uncertain and in view of the observations made by this Court in 
V. '.l'nla- 6' Ors. y, V. Sesba llecldi (dead.) by L.Bs. 1977 (3) 
s.c.a. 266-267 the section could not be relied upon any longer, 
and (2) that it was violative of Articles 14 and 15(1) as it had 
attempted to favour only one section of the comnunity that was 
Hindu women on the ground of sex to the prejudice of the male 
members of that comnunity. 
Dismissing the Writ Petition as well as the S.L.P., 
BELO: l. Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act 1956 is 
not vague and is capable of implementation. This Court gave 
effect to that provision in n1tae-e's case. The observations 
were made only with a view to bringing to the notice of 
Parliament that the provisions of s. 14 required to be recast in 
order to avoid any possible litigation arising on account of the 
clumsy language used therein. The Court, however, did not find 
any difficulty in construing and applying s. 14 and in declaring 
that the property which had been allotted to the appellant No. l 
under the compromise in lieu or satisfaction of right of 
maintenance became her absolute property on the coming into force 
Qf the Act. The doubt, if any, about the meaning of that section 
was set at rest by the said decision. In the instant case, the 
position of Jagir Kaur was in no way different from the position 
of Appellant No. l in 1\Jl•""'"'R's caae. [778 B-E) 
2. Section 14(1) of the Act was enacted to remedy to some 
extent the plight of a Hindu woman who could not claim absolute 
interest in the properties inherited by her from her husband but 
who could only enjoy them with all the restrictions attached to a 
widow's estate under the Hindu Law. There is no justification for 
the 'males belonging to

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