LexPARRIPATI CHANDRASEKHARRAO AND SONS versus ALAPATI JALAIAH
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. j PARRIPATI CHANDRASEKHARRAO AND SONS A v. -· ~ ALAPATI JALAIAH APRIL 26, 1995 [P.B. SAWANT AND S.B. MAJMUDAR, JJ.) B Andhra Pradesh Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Ac4 ..,, 1960: ..... Tenant-Applications for direction to deposit rent in court and fixation c of standard rent--Govt. Notification during pendency of applications-Ex- emption from provisions of Act to premises in questiorHfeld in view of the notification Rent Controller has no jurisdiction to entertain the applica- tions-Rights of tenant to claim relief against the landlord were not vested li,ghts-Such rights got extinguished with the coming into force of the notifica- D ti on. The respondent-tenant filed three applications on 4th/13th February, 1983 for directions (i) to permit him to deposit rent in the court; (ii) fixation of standard rent; and (iii) to prevent inconvenience. In the E meanwhile the State Government by its notification dated 29th December, 1983 exempted with effect from 26th October, 1983 all buildings whose monthly rent exceeded Rs. 1,000 p.m. from the provisions of the Andhra Pradesh Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1960 as a result of which the suit premises stood exempted from the operation of the Act. Consequently, the Rent Controller by his order dated 6.4.1985 Jlismissed F the tenant's application on the ground that with the coming into force of the Government notification it had no jnrisdiction to entertain and decide the applications. The appellate conrt npheld the decision of the Rent Controller. However, the High Court allowed the tenant's revision and held that the Rent Controller had jurisdiction to entertain and decide the G applications since the notification in question did not apply· to pending proceedings. In· appeals to this conrt it was contended on behalf of the appellant-landlord that with the coming into operation of the government + notification from 26th October, 1983, the protection given to the tenant stood withdrawn and therefore, whatever rights he had nnder the provisions of the Act, stood extingnished on and from the said date. H 817 818 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1995) 3 S.C.R. A On behalf of the tenant-respondent it was contended that the tenant had acquired vested rights under the Act and they were alive when the applications were made and he could not be divested of the same by the notification which came into operation from a subsequent date. B Allowing the appeals and setting aside the decision of the High Court, this Court HELD : 1. The tenant who undoubtedly bad the rights and remedies under the Act to claim reliefs against the landlord, lost the same the ... moment the protection was taken away, the rights and remedies being not >.- C vested once. The view taken both by the Rent Controller and the Appellate Court was right and the decision of the High Court was not correct. As a result, the applications filed by the respondent-tenant before the Rent Controller will stand dismissed. [827-A·B] D 2. There is a material difference between the rights which accrue to a landlord under the common law and the protection which is afforded to the tenant by such legislation as the Act. In the former case the rights and remedies of the landlord and tenant are governed by the law of contract and the law governing the property relations. These rights and remedies continue to govern their relationship unless they are regulated by such E protective legislation as the present Act in which case the said rights and remedies remain suspended till the protective legislation continues in operation. Hence while it can legitimately be said that the landlords' normal rights vested in by the general law continue to exist till and so long as they are not abridged by a special protective legislation, in the case of p the tenant, the protective shield extended to him survives only so long as and to the extent the special legislation operates. In the case of the tenant therefore the protection does not create any ves!ed right which can operate beyond the period of protection or during the period the protection is not in existence. When the protection does not exist, the normal relations of the landlord and tenant come into operation. Hence the theory of the G vested right which may validly be pleaded to support the landlord's case is not available to the tenant. [826-B-E] D. C. Bhatia & Ors. v. Union of India & Anr., (
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