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PARBATI DEVI & ORS. versus MAHADEO PRASAD TIBREWALLA

Citation: [1980] 1 S.C.R. 156 · Decided: 31-07-1979 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: N.L. UNTWALIA · Disposal: Dismissed

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Judgment (excerpt)

A 
B 
c 
D 
E 
F 
B 
156 
PARBATI DEVI & ORS. 
v. 
MAHADEO PRASAD TIBREW ALLA 
July 31, 1979 
[N. L. UNTWALIA AND A. P. SEN, JJ.] 
Limitation Act 1908, Art. 183, Lin1itation Act 1963, Art. 136 & Code of 
Ciril Procedure 1908 (V of 1908), S. 48-Money suit based on 
n1ortgage-
Consent decree by Court-Part payments n1ade-Legal representative substi-
tuted on death of ;udgn1ent-debtor-Consent 
order 011 basis of 
settlement 
passed by Court-Execution filed-If ti1ne-barred, 
In a suit for recovery of n1oney on the basis of 
a mortgage, a consent 
decree was passed. 
When the judgment-debtors failed to pay the a.mount the 
mortgaged properties were ordered to be sold. 
The decree-holder assigned his 
interest under the decree in favour of the respondent and this was 
approved 
by the Court. 
A part-payment was made to the decree-holder. 
On the death 
of one of the judgment-debtors, his heirs and legal representatives (appellants 
in this appeal) were substituted. 
On June 17, 1953 
a consent 
order was 
passed by the Court on the basis of the terms of settlement arrived at between 
the parties. According to the will left by one of the 
judgment-debtors 
his 
daughter was the universal legatee and his son-in-law \Vas the sole executor .. 
When the decree-holder sought ex'ecution of the decree a Single Judge of 
the High Court dis1nissed the application on the grounds-( 1) that the terms 
of settlement. between the parties recorded on 
17th June, 1953 were entirely 
different from the original decree and had the effect of superseding 
it; 
(2) 
that the fact of the death of one of the judgment-debtors was 
not recorded 
and his heirs were not substituted a.nd (3) execution was barred under s. 48 
of the CoUe of Civil Procedur. 
On appal, a Division Bench 
of the 
High 
Court reversed the order of the Single Judge. 
Dismissing the appeal, 
HELD : 1. There was no bar of Iimitatiou in the execution in9tituted in 
1965. 
At no point of time the mortgag'e decree had been fully satisfied. 
It 
is not a case in which the execution v,ras barred either under s. 48 CPC or 
Art. 
183 of the Limitation Act, 1908. 
Execution was not barred under Art. 
136 of the Limitation Act, 1963. 
[159D] 
2. There is no force in the contentioo that it was already ban'ed v.rhen the 
1963 Act came into force. 
All through steps had been taken by the decree-
holder to enforce the decr'ee. 
When the order of sale of the mortgaged pro-
perties was passed in 1929 some payment~ \Vere made and finally accounts 
were settled in 1934. 
Thereafter th'e mode of execution proceeded by 
ap-
pointment of a. rece'iver. 
Some money \Vas paid in 1939. Jn 1945 the heirs 
and legal representatives 
of on'e ()f the deceased 
judgment-debtors were 
substituted. Appellant no. 1 was allowed to take steps for the satisfaction of 
the decree; but nothing was done. 
A settlement was again arrived at in 1953 
for satisfaction of th'e decree but on the judgment-debtor's failure to comply 
with the terms of the settlement the present proceedings were started well 
within 12 years. 
[!59E-HJ 
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PARBATI DEVI v. MAHADEO PRASAD (Untwalia, !.) 
157 
3. The daughter of the second judgment-debtor was competent to represent 
A 
the estate of her father. 
Even if her husband who was the sole executor of 
the will was not substituted, execution was not defective. 
[160B] 
The Andhra Bank Ltd. v. R. SriniFasan and Others [1962] 3 S.C.R 
391, 
referred to . 
4. The settlement of 17th Jm1e, 1953 was not an altogether renovation of 
B 
the old decre'e. 
All that woo done was that the amount due was quantified 
and the rnocle of satisfactioil was prescribed giving oppOrtunity to the judg~ 
ment-debtors to satisfy the decree by conveying one of the 
two mortgaged 
houses. 
The judgment-debtors did nothing. 
Though the terms of settlement 
were silent with regard to what \Vas to happen on failure to satisfy the decree, 
it is legitimate to assume that the parties. intended that the decree holders 
would be entitled to reailise the dues by execution of the original mortgage 
C 
decree. The order of 17th June, 1953 passed by the Court had not the effect 
of passing a new decree in substitution of the old one. 
It had merely the 
effect of giving facility to the judgment debtors for 
the satisfaction of 
theΒ· 
decretal du'es. 
On their failure to do so they were liable to be proceeded with 
in execution of the original n1ortgage decree. 
{l60C-F1 
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDI

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