PARAYYA ALLAYYA HITTALAMANI versus SRI PARAYYA GURULINGAYYA POOJARI AND ORS.

Citation: [2007] 11 S.C.R. 326 · Decided: 12-10-2007 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: S.B. SINHA · Disposal: Appeal(s) allowed

Judgment (excerpt)

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A 
PARA YY AALLA YY A HITT ALAMANI 
V. 
SRI PARA YY A GURULINGA YYA POOJARI AND ORS. 
OCTOBER 12, 2007 
_t . 
B 
[S.B. SINHA AND HARJIT SINGH BEDI, JJ.] 
;, 
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908: 
1' 
c 
Decree-Consent decree-Interpretation of-Consent decree not 
referring to entire disputes between the parties-Some vagueness 
remaining-Held: In such a case, factual background as also the 
manner in which existence of rights have been claimed by the parties 
would be relevant-Evidence Act, 1872-s.92. 
D 
Parties hereto are the hereditary 'poojaris' of the temple in 
question. They are entitled to bless the devotees, receive alms and other 
offerings made by the devotees throughout the year·. Dispute between 
the parties in regard to right of inheritance of offering 'poojas' in the 
E said temple was resolved in terms of a consent decree which was 
accepted by Court. Subsequently, there arose a dispute between the 
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parties with regard to share in the offerings made by the devotees which 
led to a civil suit. The suit was decreed. The decree was affirmed in 
appeal. Second appeal was filed before High Court which held that the 
F decree passed was liable to be set aside as it was perverse and arbitrary 
being based upon irrelevant material and being contrary to the terms 
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of said consent decree which was binding upon both the parties. Hence 
the present appeal. 
Allowing the appeal, the Court 
G 
HELD: 1.1. A consent decree is a contract between the parties 
with the seal of the Court supcradded to it. Such consent decree may 
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operate as an estoppel. [Paras 14 and 15) [334-B, C] 
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326 
1 
PARA YY A ALLA YY A HITT ALAMANI v. 
327 
1 ") r 
SRI PARA YYA GURULINGA YY A POOJARI 
.II. 
1.2. However, while construing a decree, the court can and in A 
appropriate case ought to take into consideration the pleadings as well 
as the proceedings leading upto the decree. In order to find out the 
meaning of the words employed in a decree, the Court has to ascertain 
the circumstances under which these words came to be used. In the event 
the document is vague, the same must be construed having regard to B 
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surroundings and/or attending circumstances. 
[Paras 16 and 17] [334-C, D, E] 
.,.. 
Baldevdas Shiv/al & Anr. v. Filmistan Distributors (India) P. Ltd & 
Ors., [1969) 2 SCC 201; Hindustan Motors Ltd v. Amritpal Singh Nayar c 
& Anr., 100 (2002) DLT 278; Sailendra Narayan Bhanja Deo. v. The State 
ofOrissa, AIR (1956) SC 346 and Bhavan Vaja & Ors. v. Solanki. Hanuji 
K.hodaji Mansang & Anr., AIR (1972) SC 1371, relied on. 
2.1. The nature of the document also plays an important part for 
construction thereof. The suit filed by the parties, inter alia, involved D 
the question of interpretation of the said consent decree. Parties adduced 
...I. 
evidences, inter alia, in regard to the nature of poojas and offerings made 
to the priest in their individual capacity. The dispute between the parties 
related to right of worship upon inheritance thereof from their 
predecessor. Their rights in regard to offer poojas in the temple are itself E 
not in dispute. In a case of this nature where a consent decree does not 
refer to the entire disputes between the parties and some vaguness 
remained, the factual background as also the manner in which existence 
of rights have been claimed by the parties would be relevant. The 
consent decree appears to be meant to be operative for a limited period F 
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viz.1956and1961. Section 92 of the Evidence Act in a situation of this 
nature, cannot be said to be attracted. [Para 18] [334-E, F, G; 335-A] 
2.2. The right of the parties to offer pooja had not been disputed. 
Clause 2(A) of the consent decree was not determinative of the status 
of the parties. Their rights and obligations are not clearly spelt out G 
thereby. In the aforementioned situation, the recital to the effect that 
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Pooja has to be performed as usual is significant. Clause2(C), however, 
f 
speaks of offerings of non-perishable goods were to be offered to the 
defendant No.1 in his individual capacity. The parties to the compromise 
knew as to why the said expression had been used. If any of the party H 
328 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2007] 11 S.C.R. 
A to the suit was entitled to keep with him even such non-perishable goods 
which were to be offered to the Deity, the question of using the terms 
"in his individual capacity" was not necessary. The parties, therefore, 
were allowed to lead 

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