PARASA RAJU MANIKYALA RAO AND ANR. versus STATE OF A.P.

Citation: [2003] SUPP. 4 S.C.R. 756 · Decided: 15-10-2003 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: DORAISWAMY RAJU · Disposal: Dismissed

Judgment (excerpt)

A 
PARASA RAJU MANIKYALA RAO AND ANR. 
v. 
STATE OF A.P. 
OCTOBER 15, 2003 
B 
[DORAISWAMY RAJU AND ARIJIT PASAYAT, JJ.] 
Penal Code, 1860 : 
Section 34-Scope and ambit of-Common intention-Acts done in 
C furtherance of-Held : The essence of liability under S. 34 is existence of 
common intention and participation in a criminal act-Participation need 
not in all cases be by physical presence. 
D 
E 
Practice and Procedure : 
Case law-Decided cases-Precedent-Held : How a person reacts 
in a given case may be the determinative factor so far as that case is 
concerned-Application of one decided case to another case notwithstanding 
the dissimilarity in effect and distinctive features is legally impermissible. 
Words and Phrases : 
"Common intention"-Meaning of-In the context of S.34 of the 
Penal Code, 1860. 
F 
. According to the prosecution, three persons including appellants 
Nos. 2 and 3 had caused homicidal death of one person. All .the accused 
persons and the deceased who were closely related were in hostile terms 
because of property dispute. The trial court had found that the 
evidence was as cogent against appellants Nos. 2 and 3 as it was against 
appellant No. I but convicted only appellant No. I and acquitted 
G appellants Nos. 2 and 3 by giving them benefit of doubt based on the 
facts of a different case. However, the High Court convicted appellants 
Nos. 2 and 3 under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the PEmal Code, 
1860. Hence the appeal. 
H 
On behalf of appellants Nos. 2 and 3, it was contended that Section 
756 
PARAS RAJU MANIKY ALA RAO v. ST A TE 
757 
34 had no application because it had not been established by evidence A 
" that there was any common intention to commit murder. 
Dismissing the appeal, the Court 
HELD : 1.1. How a person reacts in a given case may be the B 
determinative factor so far as that case is concerned. That cannot be 
applied as a rule of universal application to all cases irrespective of the 
fact situation in that particular case. There can be no empirical 
formula as to how one reacts in a given situation and 'its effect and 
impact. It would almost like trying to put a square peg on a round hole. C 
To imprint fact situation of one decided case upon another or 
observations made in the peculiar facts of a given case to any or every 
other case notwithstanding disimilarity in effect and the distinctive 
features is legally impermissible. [763-A-C] 
1.2. Each case, more particularly a criminal case depends on its D 
own facts and a close similarity between one case and another is not 
enough to warrant like treatment because a significant detail may alter 
the entire aspect. In deciding such cases, one should avoid the temptation 
to decide cases by matching the colour of one case against the colour 
of another. To decide, therefore, on which side of the line a case falls, E 
the broad resemblance to another case is not at all decisive.The vague 
and cryptic conclusion arrived at by the trial court to treat the cases 
of A-2 and A-3 differently from the manner it dealt with that of A-1, 
despite its very observation that the evidence was as cogent agdinst 
them too as it was against A-1 lack a judicious approach and F 
determination and, therefore, rightly interfered with by the High 
Court. [763-F-H] 
2.1. Courts cannot distinguish between co-conspirators, nor can 
they inquire, even if it were possible as to the part taken by each in 
the crime. Where parties go with a common purpose to execute a G 
common object each and every person becomes responsible for the act 
of each and every other in execution and furtherance of their common 
purpose; as the purpose is common, so must be the responsibility. All 
are guilty of the principal offence, not of abetment only. In combination 
of this kind, a mortal stroke, through given by one member of the H 
758 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003] SUPP. 4 S.C.R. 
A party, is deemed in the eyes of law to have been given by every 
individual present and abetting. But .a party not cognizant .of the 
intention of his companion to commit murder is not liable, though he 
has joined his companion to do an unlawful act. Leading feature of 
Section 34 of the Penal Code, 1860 is the element of participation in 
B action. The essence of liability under this Section is the existence of a 
common intention animating the offenders and the participation in a 
criminal act in furtherance of the common intention. The c!ssence is 
simultaneous consen

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