LexPANNEERSELVAM versus STATE OF TAMIL NADU
Open in Lexace · Ask the AI about this caseJudgment (excerpt)
[2008] 8 S.C.R. 962 ~ . A PANNEERSELVAM v. STATE OF TAMIL NADU (Criminal Appeal No. 1167 of 2006) B MAY 15, 2008 [DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, P. SATHASIVAM AND DR. MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA, JJ.] " Penal Code, 1860- ss.302 rlw 34, 348, 201and201 rlw ·c 34 - Death - Due to burn injuries - Conviction of accused- Appellants by Trial Court·- Appeal - High Court discarded statements made by the doctors, PWs. 3, 4 and 6, to the effect that the deceased voluntarily told each one of them that he had set himself on fire and upheld conviction of Appellants by D placing reliance on the dying declaration allegedly given by deceased to the Revenue Divisional Officer (PW14) four days prior to his death - Challenge to - On facts held: High Court misconstrued the dying declaration since the deceased had categorically stated therein that he did not know who set him E on fire - It also .erred in discarding the statements made by PWs 3, 4 and 6 - Conclusions were arrived at by the High Court by misreading the evidence - Appellants accordingly acquitted - Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - s.374. Evidence Act, 1872 - s.32 - Dying declaration - Prin- F ciples governing dying declaration summed up and re-iter- ated. According to the prosecution, A1 and A2 alongwith three other accused had poured petrol on the deceased and set him on fire. A1 to A4 were police officials and on G the date of the incident were on duty. The Trial Court con- ·• victed all the five accused under s.302 rlw s.34 IPC. A1 and AS were additionally convicted under s.348 IPC. A1 was further convicted under s.201 IPC while AS were fur- ther convicted under 5.201 r/w s.34 IPC. High Court up- H 962 PANNEERSELVAM v. STATE OF 963 TAMILNADU . ,. held the conviction of A1 and A5 i.e. Appellants but ac- A quitted the other accused persons. It discarded the .state- ments made by the doctors, PWs. 3, 4 and 6, to the effect that the deceased voluntarily told each one of them that he had set himself on fire and upheld conviction of the Appellants by placing reliance on the dying declaration B allegedly given by deceased to the Revenue Divisional > Officer (PW14) four days prior to his death. In support of the present appeals, the Appellants sub- ·mitted that the High Court proceeded on presumptions that because the statements of the deceased to PWs, 3, 4 c and 6 were made in the presence of a Constable, there- fore, they were not voluntary; that on the contrary at the time when the statements were made, the relatives of the deceased were present as evident from the evidence of PW1 who took the deceased to the hospital. It was fur- D ther contended that the High Court came to an errone- ous conclusion by misreading dying declaration pur- ported to be made before RDO that it was either A1 or A5 (the appellants) who had poured petrol on the deceased and set him on fire. E ·The Respondent-State, on the other hand, submit- =t ted that the High Court had rightly relied upon the dying • declaration made before the RDO and that the fact that police officials were present when the statements were made by the deceased before the doctors made the posi- F tion c'ear that the deceased was not speaking the truth. Allowing the appeals, the Court HELD: 1.1. This is a case where the basis of convic- tion of the accused is the dying declaration. The situation G • in which a person is on his deathbed, being exceedingly solemn, serene and grave, is the reason in law to accept the veracity of his statement. It is for this reason that the requirements of oath and cross-examination are dis- H 964 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2008] 8 S.C.R. )'< • A pensed with. Besides should the dying declaration be excluded it will result in miscarriage of justice because the victim being generally the only eye-witness in a seri- ous crime, the exclusion of the statement would leave the Court without a scrap of evidence. [Para 7] [969-B,C,D] B 1.2. Though a dying declaration is entitled to great weight, it is worthwhile to note that the accused has no power of cross-examination. Such a power is essential for eliciting the truth as an obligation of oath could be. This is th.e reason the Court also insists that the dyiog declara- c I . ~ tion should be of such nature as to inspire full confidence of the Court in its correctness. The Court has to be on guard that the statement of the deceased was not as a result of either tutoring or prompting or a p
Excerpt shown. Read the full judgment & AI analysis in Lexace.