PANKAJ BHARGAVA AND ANR. versus MOHINDER NATH AND ANR.

Citation: [1990] SUPP. 3 S.C.R. 508 · Decided: 11-12-1990 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: M.N. VENKATACHALIAH · Disposal: Appeal(s) allowed

cites 3 · see the full citation network in Lexace

Judgment (excerpt)

A 
B 
c 
D 
E 
F 
G 
H 
PANKAJ BHARGAVA AND ANR. 
v. 
MOHINDER NATH AND ANR. 
DECEMBER 11. 1990 
[M.N. VENKATACHALIAH, N.D. OJHA AND 
. 
J.S. VERMA,D.] 
Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958: Sections 21 and 39-Tenancy for 
limited period-Rent Controller on basis of admissions of parties grant-
ing permission-Whether can be challenged in collateral proceedings. 
Appeal-'Substantial question of law'-What is. 
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908: Section 9-Civil Court-Jurisdic-
tion of-Competence to take decision-The test. 
Indian Contract Act, 1872: Section 8-Stipulation for payment of 
rent-Whether brings about a contract of tenancy. 
Transfer of Property Act, 1882: Section 105-Lease-Yearly rent 
paid by cheque-Cheque returned-Effect on lease-What is. 
Words & Phrases: 'Substantial question of law'-Meaning of. 
The appellants and the respondents by their joint application to 
the Rent Controller sought for and obtained permission for a limited-
tenancy, under Section 21 of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958. The 
Respondents not having snrrendered possession upon the expiry of the 
said period of five years, tbe appellants commenced proceedings for 
re-delivery, Respondents resisted the proceedings raising several con-
tentions. They urged that the appellants were not the owners of the 
premises at all; that the permission under Section 21 was vitiated by 
fraud resulting from a suppression by the appellants of the material fact 
that at the relevant time the premises was not available for letting at all; 
that respondents having been inducted into possession as tenant from 
March 5, 1978 itself, one of the basic jurisdictional requirements for the 
grant of permission under Section 21 was absent, and that at all events a 
fresh contractual tenancy had been created with effect from April 6, 
1983 immediately upon the expiry of the five year term of the limited-
tenancy. 
508 
PANKAJ v. MOHINDER 
509 
The Rent Controller rejected all the aforesaid contentions and 
made an order granting possession. 
The respondents' appeal before the Rent Control Tribunal was 
unsuccessful, but the second appeal under Section 39 of the Act was 
allowed by the High Court which held that even prior to the limited 
tenancy the respondents had been inducted into possession as tenants; 
that the subsequent permission for the limited tenancy was a mere 
pretence and the result of a fraud on the statute and therefore a nullity, 
and relying on this Court's decision in Subhash Kumar Lata v. R.C. 
Chhiba, [1988] 4 sec 709 held that such a nullity could be pleaded in 
and against execution as well. It accordingly reversed the orders of the 
authorities beii>w, and dismissed the appellants' claim for possession. 
In the landlords' appeal to this Court it was contended that: (1) 
both the Rent Controller and the Appellate Tribunal having concur-
rently held that with the respondents' occupation of the premises from 
' -
March 5, 1978 to April 5, 1978 even if true, did not constitute a tenancy 
A 
B 
c 
in that the other requisite indicia of such tenancy, namely, the stipula-
D 
lion of a consideration was absent and that being a pure question of 
fact, the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 39 
which permitted only an appeal on a substantial question of law could 
not reappreciate the evidence and upset the finality of that finding of 
fact, (2) that even if the limited tenancy under Section 21 was obtained 
despite the subsistence of a tenancy created earlier, the respondents 
E 
were bound to assail the validity of the limited tenancy during its sub-
sistence and not as a collateral plea in the course of execution, (3) Even 
if the receipt Ex. D.W.1/3 was susceptible of an inference that the 
transaction envisaged by it was one of lease could be said to be a ques-
tion of law, by no standards it could be said to be a substantial question 
of law within the meaning and for the purposes of Section 39 of the Act. 
F 
On behalf of the tenants it was urged that Section 21 to the extent 
it runs counter and forms an exception to the general scheme of the 
statute its operation was required to be restricted severely to the expres-
sed conditions and limitations contained in that section and that where-
ver permission for a limited tenancy was sought and obtained suppres-
G 
sing any jurisdictional fact such as that the· prospective limited tenant 
was already in occupation as a regular tenant, the transaction 
amounted to a fraud on the statute r

Excerpt shown. Read the full judgment & AI analysis in Lexace.