LexPANJKAJESH versus TULSI GRAMIN BANK AND ANR.
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A PANJKAJESH v. TULSI GRAMIN BANK AND ANR. MAY 7, 1977 B [K. RAMASWAMY, S. SAGHIR AHMAD AND G.B. PATTANAIK, JJ.) Service Law : c Regio11al Rural Ba11k Act, 1976. ·- Bank official--Discipli11aiy inquiry-Pu11ishme11t-Three i11crements stopped with cumulative effect-Appellate autho1ity released 011e incre- ment-High Court interpreted the order as· withholding one i11crement-Held, High Court med in i11terpreting the order of appellate authority-The words D "one increment is released" would mean that the appellate auth01ity is i11clined to confimi the penalty of withholding two increments with cumulative effect a11d thereby 011e increment was released from the pe11alty. ,. Inquiry Officer-171ough it is always desirable that an officer higher in ra11k tha11 the deli11quent officer should be directed to conduct an i11qui1y, by E mere delegating the inquiry, whether the inquily officer is of the same cadre or of higher grade than that of the delinquent, it did not cause any mate1ial i1Tegularity, nor did it result in any injustice to the delinquent. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Special Leave Petition (C) F No. 11349 of 1997. From the Judgment and Order dated 16.12.96 of the Allahabad High Court in C.M.W.P. No. 12133 of 1993. Arvind Verma and P.N. Puri for the Petitioner. G The following Order of the Court was delivered : Delay condoned. We have heard learned counsel for the petitioner. H The petitioner was charge-sheeted for dereliction of the duty under 252 -• P ANJKAJESH v. TULSI GRAMIN BANK 253 Section 3 of the Regional Rural Banks Act (21 of 1976). After inquiry, the A disciplinary authority directed with-holding of three increments with cumulative effect. On appeal, the appellate authority stated thus : "(T)herefore, in accordance with the decision taken by the Board of Directors, one increment is released and he is warned that in future no such act or irregularity will be repeated, otherwise serious disciplinary B action will be taken". When writ petition was filed by the petitioner, the High Court in the impugued order dated December 16, 1996 made in Writ Petition 12133/93 stated as under : "We do not feel inclined to quash the order passed by the appellate disciplinary authority who has disposed of the appeal of the C petitioner by setting aside the order with-holding one of the three increments and has warned the petition that in future no such act/irregularity will be repeated by him and if it is done in that event disciplinary action will be taken against him." It is contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the High Court has misunderstood the operative part of the order of the appellate authority. We find no force in the contention. The word "one increment release" would mean that the appellate autho~ity is inclined to confirm the penalty of imposing two increments with cummulative effect and thereby, D one increment was released from the penalty. The High Court, therefore, E is not right in construing that two increments have been released .and one was retained. Instead, the reverse is the ·intention. Under the circumstan- ces, while clarifying the factual position, we do not ·find that it is a case warranting interference. The only legal question sought to be raised in the SLP is whether under Rule 30(3) of the Staff Service Regulation, the enquiry officer has to be higher in rank than the delinquent officer, Regulation 30(3) of the Staff Service Regulation postulates thus : F 'The enquiry under this regulation and the procedure with the G exception of the fmal order, may be delegated in case the person against whom proceedings are taken is an officer, to any officer who is in a grade higher than such officer and in the case of an employee, to any officer. For purpose of the enquiry, the officer or employee may not engage a legal practitioner." H 254 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1997] SUPP. 1 S.C.R. A Thus an enquiry, under the Regulation may be delegated to a person higher in rank than the delinquent officer, in the case of an officer. But in this case we do not find any substantial miscarriage of justice prejudicial to the petitioner for the· reason that though it is always desirable that an officer higher in rank than the delinquent officer should be directed to B conduct an enquiry, the enquiry is conducted as a delegate of the discipli- nary authority. Therefore, the ultimate decision is to be taken by the disc
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