PANDURANG DATTATREYA KHANDEKAR versus THE BAR COUNCIL OF MAHARASHTRA BOMBAY & ORS.

Citation: [1984] 1 S.C.R. 414 · Decided: 20-10-1983 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: A.P. SEN · Disposal: Appeal(s) allowed

Cited by 1 judgment(s) · see the full citation network in Lexace

Judgment (excerpt)

A 
• 
B 
• 
c 
D 
E: 
F 
G 
H 
... 
414 
PANDURANG DATTATREYA KHANDEKAR 
v • 
THE BAR COUNCIL OF MAHARASHTRA 
. 
. 
BOMBAY & ORS. 
October 20, 1983 · 
(A.P. SEN, E.S. VENKATARAMIAH AND R.B. MISRA JJ,j 
Appellate Jurisdiction-Appeal under Section 38 of the Advocates Act, 
1961-Interference by the conc.urrent finding of fact by the Disciplin"ary Commitlee 
of the Bar Council-Degree of proof required .Jor a_ Disciplinary Proceeding, 
explained. 
Advocates Act, 1961, Section 35 (!)-Professional MrsconduCt, meaning 
of-Distinction between giving of wrong advice and improper legal advice--The 
giving of improper legal advice may amount to professional misconduct. 
The appellant and a_nothe.r advocate were found- guilty Of professional 
misconduct by the Disciplinary _Committee of the Bar Council of India by its 
order dated April 23, 1~7 ·. The gravamen of the charge against them related 
to the giving of improper legal advice on two .specific counts. The Disciplin~ry 
Committee held them guilty on both counts and ordered the suspensian of 
the appellant from practice for a period of four months and the other advoc3te 
for a period of two months. 
· ~ ·Allowing the appeal in part, the Court 
HELD: 1.1 This Court would not_. as a general rule, in an appeal 
. under s. 38 of ihe Advocates ACt, 1961, interfere with the concurrent findings 
of fact reached 'by the Disciplinary c"omrnittee of the B3r Council of India and 
of the .State Bar Couilcil unless they are based on no evidence or proceed on 
mere conjectures and surmises. Finding in such disciplinary proceedings must 
b~ sustained by higher degree of proof than that required in civil suits, yet 
falling short of the proof required to sustain a conviction in criminal · prosecu· 
tion. 
~here should be convincing preponderailce of evidence 
[419 B·Cj 
2.1 The test of what constitutes "grossly improper conduct in the 
diScharge of professional duties" has· been laid down in many cases. The test 
to be applied is whether an advocate, in the purs_uit of his profession, has. done 
something with regard to it which woUld be reasonably regarded as disgraceful 
or dishonourable by his professional brethren: That is to say, whether -the 
proved ·misconduct of the advoc<\;te is such that he must be regarded as 
unworthy to remain as member o[ the honourable profession to which he has 
been admitted and unfit to be ·entrusted with the responsible duties that an 
advocate is called upon to ~erform. [419 E; ~ 
B·CJ 
-
-...,, 
r' --
•• 
P.D. KHANDEKAR V. BAR COUNCIL 
415 
In re: A. Solicitor Exparte the law society [1912] 1 K.B. 302; Allinson v. 
General Council. of Medical Education and Registration (1984] 1 Q.B. 750; Georie 
Friar Grahame v. Attorney General, Fiji AIR 1936 P.C. 224 quoted with 
approval. 
2.l Charges of professional misconduct must be clearly proved and 
should not be inferred from mere ground for suspicion, however reasonable, or 
what may be error or judgment Or indiscretion.. r 420 CJ 
.. 
' 
A pleader v. The Judges of the Riih Court of Madras, AIR 1930 P.C. 144; 
referred to. 
A. 
B 
2.3 There is•~ distinction fetwe~n the giving of improper IeSal advice 
and the giving of wrong legal advice. Mere negligence unacCompained by any 
moral delinquency on the part of an advocate in the exercise of hiS profession 
C 
does noramount to professional misconduct. There must be proved that the 
advocate was guilty _of moral turpitude or that ~here was any moral delinquency 
on his part. [420 D-E] 
. In re : G. Mayor Cooke [1S89] 33 Sol. Journal 397, quoted with approval. 
In re: A Vakil !LR [1925] 49 Mad 523, ln re, An Advocate, !LR (1935] 
62.Cal 158; In the matter of an Advocate of Agra ILR [1940] A!l 386 approved . 
• 
. In the mallet of Pan Advocate (1964] 1 S.C.R. 697 applied. 
For an advocate to act towards his client otherwise than with utmost 
good faith is u·nprofessional. When an advocate is entrusted With a brief, he 
is expected to follow the norms of professional ethics ~nd try to protect the 
interests of his Client in relation to whom be occupies a position of trust. 
Counsel's paramount duty is to the client. When a person consults a lawyer 
for his advice, he relies upon his requisite experiellce, skill and knowledge as a 
lawyer, and the lawyer is exp~cted to give proper and di~passionate legal advice 
to the client fcir the protection of his interests. An advocate stands in 3. loco 
parentis towards the litigants and therefore follows that the client is e

Excerpt shown. Read the full judgment & AI analysis in Lexace.