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PADMABEN SHAMALBHAI PATEL versus STATE OF GUJARAT

Citation: [1991] 1 S.C.R. 88 · Decided: 18-01-1991 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: A.M. AHMADI, V. RAMASWAMI, M. FATHIMA BEEVI · Disposal: Dismissed

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Judgment (excerpt)

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PADMABEN SHAMALBHAI PATEL 
v. 
STATE OF GUJARAT 
JANUARY 18, 1991 
[A.M. AHMADI, V. RAMASWAMI AND 
M. FATHIMA BEEVI, JJ.] 
Indian Evidence Act, 1872: S.32-Dying declarations-Recor-
ded by- medical~men-Not in question-and-answer form-Probative 
y~lue of-Whether conviction can be based on. 
Indian Penal Code, 1860: S. 302-Homicidal death-Deceased 
~~t aflame by pouring kerosene-Suffered 90% burns-Dying declara-
tions made to medical-men-Accused named as tormentor-Acquittal 
by Sessions Court on benefit of doubt-:-Appeal against-Conviction-
Sentence of life imprisonment awarded-Validity of 
':fhe wife of appellant's brother was found aflame in the early 
h~urs of 11.6.1975 in the kitchen of her husband's house. She was taken 
to h0,spita~ a11d ad~itted to Burns-ward whe~e the doctor in charge (PW 
5) examined her and while taking her case history enquired of the 
injured as to what happened, to which she replied, "my nanad (sister-
in-i~w) burnt ~e". She had suffered 90% of bums. The nurse (PW 4) 
~as instructed to give treatment. Later another doctor (PW 2) attended 
011 her. Whe~ }le ask~ her as to bow she had received the burns, she 
told. him that her husband's sister had burnt her. In reply to his further 
ciu~ry, she namect ~he appellant as her tormentor. He made a note of 
this fuformation by the victim on the police 'yadi' which was sent to him to 
ascertain if the victim was in a fit condition to make a dying declaration. 
As'her condition deteriorateci, the victim was not in a position to make 
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any staten;i.~nt t~ the police. The investigation culminated in the appel-
la11:t '1e~g charged u11der s. 302, I.P.C. for causing the murder of her 
- t>i:~i~t:~~s. wife by poµi;ing kerosene on her person and setting her 
aflam~ • 
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On trial, the Sessions Court held that the deceased had not the 
r~q1,1tsite. ~~».tat c0n.dition so as to make an a~ptabie !lyh;g_declaration. 
and that her busband was very much near the cot, and hence possibility 
(lf.' iuto~big !th~ d~ceased could not .be ruled out. Giving the benefit of 
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doubt it acquitted the appellant. 
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P.S. PATEL v. v. STATE OF GUJARAT 
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In the State's appeal ag.tinst acquittal, a Division Bench of the A 
High Court re-appreciated the prosecution evidence and after ciosely 
~xamining the reasons given by the Sessions oourt, held them thoroughly 
untenable and not supported by the evidence on record. It set aside the 
order of acquittal, convicted the accused of murder and sentenced her 
to imprisonment for life. 
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The appellant-accused appealed to this Court challenging the 
aforesaid conviction and sentence on the ground that the High Co.Uri 
erred in law in holding the view taken by .the trial court as les8 prob~ 
able. It was contended that the deceased having suffered 90% of burns 
and her general condition being poor, she was not in a fit mental state to 
make the dying declaration; that the dying declarations were not in t 
question-and-answer fopn; and that the p0ssibility of tutoring the 
deceased could not be ruled out. 
Dismissing the appeal, this Court, 
HELD: 1. A dying declaration is admissible in evidence .. ~l'.i the 
principle of necessity and can form the basis for conviction if;f~~~ttitd 
to be reliable. While it is in the nature of an exception to t~.· ~al 
rule forbidding hearsay evidence, it is admitted on the preriliss that 
ordinarily a dying person will not falsely implicate an innocent ~rs0fi 
in the commission of a serious crime. It· is this premiss which is ron-
sidered strong enough to set off the need that the maker of the siate'ment 
should state so on oath and be cross-examined by. the person who is 
sought to be implicated. [94H; 95A•B} 
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2.1 Being an independent piece of e'Viacnce like any otlief pi~ of 
evidence-Neither extra ~trong nor weak-a dying declaration can i;e' 
acted upon without corroboration if it is found to be otherwise true and F 
reliable, and in order to form the sole basis for conviction witlfuut the 
need for independent corroboration it must be shoWb d1'at itie persoli 
making it had the opportunity of mdentifying the persc>n ifnpftcitcd ail([ 
is thoroughly reliable and free from blemish. [9Sn; 9sBJ 
2.2 If it is found that the maker of the sia1em'eiit w$ 

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