P. VAJRA VELU MUDALIAR versus SPECIAL DEPUTY COLLECTOR, MADRAS & ANR.
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614 P. VAJRA VELU MUDALIAR A .... SPECIAL DEPUTY COLLECTOR, MADRAS & ANR. October 5, 1964 (K. SuBBA RAo, K. N. WANCHOO, M. HmAYATULLAH, B RAGllUBAR DAYAL AND S. M. SIKRI JJ.) Constitution of India, A.rt. 31-A.-Wherf.er after amtndment applied only ro ucquisition of "estates" for agrarian reform.-Article 31 (2)-Whether after amendment compensation required to be "Just tquiva/ent"-WhctlJC a lmv not providing for "} ust equivalent" a111ounted to fraud on power- Whether issue justiciable-Land Acquij·i1io1J (Madras An1end111e111) Act, 1961-Whether vio/alil'c of Art. 31 (2) or of Art. 14. The petitioners' lands were notified for acquisition for the purpo:ie of housing schemes and proceedings in respect of compensation payab1e !o them in accordance with the provisions of the Land Acquisition ( Madnu Amendment) Act, 1961. were pending.· The constitutional validity of 1his Act v. 1as challenged by them on the grounJ that it infrin£C<,l Arts. 14, 19 and 31 (2) oJ the Con>1i1u1ion. It was contended on behalf of the respondents that the Ameoding Act was protected by Art. 31-A and therefore its validity could not be queslioned on the ground that it was hit by Arts. 14. 19 and 31; that after the Constitution (Fourth Amendment) Act, 1955, tt.e expression "compciua- tion" carried a meaning different from that given to it in M"s. B~la Banerjee's ca'ic; and th:it after the said amendment the adequacy of com- peno;ation for land :1cquired ceased to be ju-;ticiable. HELD: (i) Article 31-A applied only to a law made for acquisition hy the State of any "estate" or any rights therein or for extinguishment or · modification of such righlS, if such acquisition, etc., was connected with agrarian reform. This continued to be the position even after the amend- ment of Art. 31-A by the Conslitution (Se-venteenth Amendment) Act 1964. Under Art. 31 (2) and (2A) of the Constitution, the State was prohibited from making a law for acquiring land unless it was for a public purpose and unless it fixed the amount of compensation or specified principles for determining the amount of compen."'1tion. But Art. 3 !A lifled the bal> to enable the State to implement pressing agrarian reforms and this objecl l!; implicit in Art. 3 lA. This was a restricted excep1ion, as otherwise. the State would be in a position to acquire the land of citizens without refer- ence to any agrarian reform in derogation of their fundamental rights and without payment of cpmpensation and thus deprive Art. 31 (2) practically of its content. (621 H; 622 A-DJ. The object of slum clearance for which the land was stated to have ~ acquired under the Amending Act could not be related to ~grarian reform in its limited or wider sense. '[622 ~F]. K. K. Koch1mi v. Stare of Madras, [1960] 3 S.C.R. 887 and Ranjit Singh v. Stat• of Punjab, [ 1965) 1 S.C.R. 82, considered and followed. c D E F G (ii) It was well-sellled before Art. 31(2) was amended in 1955 that a pcnon whose land was acquired was entitled to compensation i;t., a "just H equivalent" of the land of which he w .. deprived. The amended Art. 31 (2) .also contains the expressions "compensauon" and "principles .. and ther~ fore the legislature must be taken to have accepted the meaning givea to A B c D E F G H P. V. MUDALIAR. V. DY. COLLECTOR 615 these expressions in Mrs. Bela Banerjee's case. It follows therefore that by vitrue of Art. 31(2), a legislature in making a Jaw of acquistion or requisition must provide for a "just equivalent" of what the owner has been deprived of or specify the principles for the purpose of ascertaining such "just equivalent". [625 E-F, H; 626 A, D-F] . . State of West Bengal v. Mrs. Bela Banerjee, [1954] S.C.R. 558 and State of Madras v. Namasivaya Mudaliar, [1964] 6 S.C.R. 936, followed. The effect of the amended Art. 31 (2) is that a question which pertains to the adequacy of compensation is not justiciable. For determining com- pensation in respect of any property acquired, there may be many possible modes or principles of valuation; where the adoption of one principle may give a higher and of another, a lesser value, the Court cannot say thal the law should have adopted one principle and not the other, for this would relate only to the question of adequacy. On the other hand, if a law lays down principles which are not relevant to the' property acquired or to the value of the property at or about the time it is acqui
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