LexP. V. SIVARAJAN versus THE UNION OF INDIA AND ANOTHER
Open in Lexace · Ask the AI about this caseJudgment (excerpt)
(1) S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 779 P. V. SIVARAJAN v. THE UNION OF INDIA AND ANOTH]}R (S. R. DAS, c. J., s. K. DAS, P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, K. N. W ANCHOO and M. HIDAYATULLAH, JJ.) Coir Industry, Regulation and Control of-Registration of exporter and licensee-Quantitative test-Constitutional validity-Coir Industry Act, z953 (45 of z953), s. 26, rr. z8, z9, zo(z)(a), ZI, zz(a) -Con$titution of India, Arts. z9, z4. , The petitioner, an unsuccessful applicant for registration as. an exporter and licensee for exporting coir products, challenged the vires of the rr. 18, 19, 20(1)(a), 21 and 22(a) mad~ by the Central Government in exercise of its powers under sJ 26(1) of the Coir ·Industry Act, 1953 (45 of 1953). The Act had for its object the regulation and control of the Coir industry ih public interest. It was contended on his behalf that the iiµpugned rules, which prescribed the quantitative, and not the qualitative, test for registration of established exporters, were inc<ilnsistent with the provisions of the Act and as such, ultra vires the Act and that they tended to create a monopoly in the expqrt trade of coir commodities and thereby destroy the business of small dealers and discriminated between those who carried on large scale business and those who carried on small scale business and thus impugned Art(>. 19 and l4 of the Constitution. Held, that the contentions.were without substance an'1 must be negatived. There was no provision in the Coir Industry Act, 19$3· that excluded or prohibited the application of the quantitative test and the rules were in no way inconsistent with the A¢t nor in excess of the powers conferred on the Central Government by s. 26 of the Act. ' Where an Act sought to control an industry i!l public interest it would obviously be for the rule making authority to decide which rules and regulations would meet the reqqirement of public interest. Such rules and regulations, though reasonable within the meaning of Art. 19(6), might cause hardship to those who failed to comply with them. But once it was conceded that the regulation and control of the trade were justified im public interest, Art. l9(1)(g) could not be invoked to challenge the vali- dity of the rules. Nor did the impugned rules violate Art. 14 of the Gonstitu- tion. The classification of traders under rr. 18 and' 19 was clearly founded on an intelligible differentia that had a ,rational relation to the object of the Act. The exemption made by the rules in favour of co-operative societies from some of the relevant tests indicated that the Legislature intended to encourage small Dacemb1r rz. 780 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1959] Supp. traders. It was not, therefore, correct to say that the rules would lead to a monopoly in the trade. P. V. Siv<Jrajan ORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Petition No. 121 of 1958. v. Th• Union of India Petition under Article 32 of the Constitution for and Another enforcement of Fundamental rights. G. B. Pai and Sardar Bahadur, for the petitioner. M. G. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India, B. Sen and T. M. Sen, for t'he respondents. 1958. December II. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by GajendfagadAa, J GAJENDRAGADKAR, J.-The petitioner has been do- - ing business as an exporter of coir product.a to foreign countries for the last twenty years. On July 4, 1958, he applied to respondent 2, the Chairman, Coir Board, Ernakulam, requesting that he should be registered as an established exporter. This application was accom- panied by an income-tax clearance certificate and attested copies of bills of lading. Respondent 2 declined to register the petitioner on the ground that his application was defective inasmuch as the requisite certificate regarding his financial status had not been produced and no evidence had been given to show that he had exported the minimum quantity required (500 Cwts.). The petitioner was told that unless he complied with the requirements asked for within seven days his application would be rejected without further notice. The petitioner found that he could not com- ply with the directions issued by respondent 2 and so it became impossible for the petitioner to get registra- tion and licence applied for by him. That is why he filed the present petition under Art. 32 of the Const.i- tution and prayed for the issue of a writ or order in the nature of mandamus to direct the second respon- dent to grant the petiti
Excerpt shown. Read the full judgment & AI analysis in Lexace.