P.V. PAPANNA AND ORS. versus K. PADMANABHAIAH
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A P.V. PAPANNA AND ORS. .L.. v. K. PADMANABHAIAH FEBRUARY 4, 1994 B [S. MOHAN AND M.K MUKHERJEE, JJ.] Kamataka Rent Control Act, 1961: Section 21(1)--Landlord-Eviction decree against tenant on the ground of bona fide personal requirement-Death β’ of landlord-Eviction decree-Whether becomes ittexecutable-Events sub- c sequent to the filing of petition-When can be taken into account-Subseqent events whether could be taken note of during execution stage. The appellants' predecessor-in-interest, landlord, obtained a decree of possession against the respondent-tenant on the ground that the suit premises were bona fide required for his personal requirement to start a D business. The respo~dent-tenant preferred a revision before the High Court which dismissed the same but granted him 4 years time to vacate ~ the prem~seS,. The special leave petition filed by the tenant challenging the order of the High Court was dismissed. However, before the expiry of 4 years granted by the High Court the landord died leaving a will bequeath- E ing the suit premises to his brother, wife and his son, i.e., the appellants. On failure of the respondent- tenant to vacate the premises within 4 years the appellants filed an execution application which was resisted by the tenant contending that (1) the order of eviction having been made ,;_ solely on the ground of bona fide use and occupation of premises by the F deceased landlord to carry on a business, it became inexecutable on his death; (ii) the order of eviction being personal it could not be inherited by or assigned in favour of the legal representatives. The Executing Court passed an order directing issuance of a delivery G warrant holding that (i) once th, decree for eviction had become final it could not be agitated that the decree had become infructuous as the personal requirement of landlord for his own use and occupation had ,. come to an end with his death; (ii) on the death of the landlord the rights created by the decree stood transfered in favour of the legal representatives and the same could not be defeated on the ground that the decree holder H had died. On revision, the High Court set aside the order of the Executing 642 PAP ANNA v. P ADMANABHAIAH 643 Court and dismissed the eviction petition on the grounds that (i) the cause A of action did not survive on the death of the landlord and that (ii) theΒ· legatees, claiming as legal representatives of the deceased landlord, could not execute the decree for eviction which was purely personal. Against the decision of the High Court appeal was preferred in this Court. Allowing the appeal and setting aside the judgment of the High Court, this Court B HELD: 1. In a suit for eviction on the ground of bona fide require- ment of premises by landlord the subsequent events ought to be taken into account for the purpose of finding out whether the landlord still required C . the premises in possession of the tenant. However, such an enquiry can be made so long as the decree for eviction does not become final. In other words, once the matter has become final in the sense that the order of eviction bas been upheld by the highest Court in which it was sought to be challenged, it would not be open to further challenge, which necessa~ily can be in the execution stage. This conclusion inevitably follows from the D well settled principle that a Court executing the decree cannot go behind the decree for it is binding and conclusive between the parties to the suit. Therefore, the Executing Court is required to execute the decree as it finds; save in exceptional cases where the decree on the face of it may be found to be without jurisdiction. [647-H, 648-A-B] E 2. Events which take place subsequent to the filing of an eviction petition under any Rent Act can be taken into consideration for the purpose of adjudication until a decree is made by the final Court deter- mining the rights of the parties but any event that takes place after the decree becomes final cannot be made a ground for reopening the decree. F The finality to the dispute culminating in the decree cannot be reopened by the executing Court for re-adjudication on the ground that some event or the other has altered the situation. [649-E] 2.1. Once the decree became final it became a part of the estate of the landlord and therefore the appellants as legal representatives of the G deceased landlord are entitled to execu
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