LexP. S. L. RAMANATHAN CHETTIAR & ORS. versus O. RM. P. RM. RAMANATHAN CHETTIAR
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A P. S. L. RAMANATHAN CHE'ITIAR & ORS. v. O. RM. P. RM. RAMANATHAN CHETl'IAR March 4, 19&8 B [J. C. SHAH, V. RAMAswAMI AND G. K. MrrTBI., JJ.] M.aaras Agriculturists R•U•f Act IV of 1938, ss. 3(iii) and 19(2); If relief by way of 8Caling down of deer .. avldlable In cas• of a d•PDllt- WMl/ur 'd•pollf a 'd•bf within the ""'aning of s. 3(iil)-D•poslt in court prnding appral-Wlutlur amounts to sallsfaction of d.cre, within 1. 16(1U) of Modrm Act 23 of 1948-lf decr"-holdtr can claim lntmst c after date of deposit In court. D E The respondent's father made a deposit of Rs. 5,000 with the appellant's father ill 1926 which was repayable with interest. A demand was made fQr repayment in 1944 and a suit for recovery decreed in 1946 for RI. 11,459. The High Court cOnfumed the decree ill appeal in September 1951 and thereafter tho appellant's father deposited Rs. 11,098 to obtain a stay of execution of the dec:ree. Although the judpnent-dcbtors had made no attempt in the trial court ' or before the appeal court to take any advantage of the provisions of the Madru Aaricuftillista Relief Act IV of 1938 on execution proceedings beiq commenced they filed an application under the Act for scaling down the deaee under s. 19(2). The Subordinate Judge who heard the applica- ion rejected certain objections raised by the decree holder and modified the decree. The High Court in appeal, reversed the <tder of the Sub-Judge holding that the money entrusted to the plaintilfs' father being a d<posit with a banker was not payable until there was a demand for it : the money became payable only on 2nd October, 1944 I.e. after the coming into force of Act IV of 1938 and consequently the provisions of s. 19(2) of the Act were not applicable and the decree was not liable to be scaled down. In the appeal to this Court it was also contended on behalf of the res- pondent that the. word "debt" implied a pre-existing loan and as such it p could not apply to a deposit; and furthermore that the decl-ee bad already hem satillled and as such s. 16(3) of Madras Act XXUI of 1948 was applicable. G H HELD : The appeal must be allowed and the order of the subordinale Judge aca1ing down the decree upheld. (i) The definition of "debt" in s. 3(iii) of the Act is of a very wide import and would include any liability of an agriculturist with the excep- tiOllll specified Section 4 specifies and takes out of the ambit of the ddlnition various liabilities and impositions on the ag'riculurist. If there- fore thue is a liability of an agriculturist not ill terms excepled by sec. 3(iil) '* sec. 4 of the Act, it would be a 'debt' within the meaning of the de&ition giwn in s. 3(iil). There can be no doubt that on a deposit being made, the depositee incurred a liability although the limo fer ropay- ·mont wnuld come only when a demand was made and the cause of action for the suit would arise on such a demand. (370 H; 371 D-Bl Narayanan Chettiar v. Anrwmalai Chettiar. (1959] Supp. 1 S.C.R. 237 and K11oram Industries v. Commissioner of Wealth Tax, (1966] 2 S.C.R. 688. refdrred to. 368 SUPREME COURT llEPORTS [1968) 3 S.C.R. (ii) The definition in s. 3(iii) clearly negatives the respondent's con· tention that the word "debt" implied a pre-existing loan and could not apply to a deposit. If loans alone were meant to be covered by the uae of the word 1debt', there was no rea$00 to exclude i'elit from the purview of the expression. In that case there would have been no need 'to IDc:onon expressly revenue, tax or cess or liability arising out of a breach of !rust or in respect of "Maintenance under a decree of court or otherwise" in s. 4. [371 E·F] (iii) The fact of a judgment-debtor's depositing a sum in court to purchase peace by way of stay of execution of the decree on terms that the decree-holder can draw it out on furnishing security, does not pass title to the money to the decree-ohlder. He can if he likes take the money ollt in terms of the o<der; but so long as he does not do so, there is nothing to prevent the judgment debtor from taking if out by furnishing other security, say, of immovable property, if the court allows it and on his losing 1he appeal putting the decretal amount in court in terms of Order 21 rule 1 C.P.C. in satisfaction of the decree. [373 A, BJ The real effect of the deposit of money in court as was done in thi! case was to put the money beyond the reach of the parties pending the dis
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