P. RADHA BAI AND ORS. versus P. ASHOK KUMAR AND ANR.
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A B C D E F G H 143 P. RADHA BAI AND ORS. v. P. ASHOK KUMAR AND ANR. (Civil Appeal Nos. 7710-7713 of 2013) SEPTEMBER 26, 2018 [N. V. RAMANA AND S. ABDUL NAZEER, JJ.] Limitation Act, 1963– s.17– Application of– If excluded while determining the limitation period u/s.34(3) of the 1996 Act – Disputes between the appellants and respondents over division of properties left behind by their predecessor-in-interest – Arbitration – Arbitral award – Thereafter, the appellants, allegedly in bad faith, entered into a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with the respondents agreeing to give certain additional properties to respondent no.1 – MoU contemplated for execution of Gift Deeds and Release Deeds by appellants in favour of respondent no.1 – However, the appellants delayed the execution of the Deeds and in the meanwhile, the three- month period and the extended period of 30 days for challenging the Award u/s.34(3) of the 1996 Act expired – Respondents filed application u/s.34(3) of the 1996 Act for setting aside the Award alongwith application seeking condonation of delay caused on account of alleged fraud played on them – Application for condonation of delay dismissed– In revision petitions filed by the respondents, High Court remanded the matter to the trial court concerning the applicability of s.17, Limitation Act in an application u/s.34 of the 1996 Act – Held: Once the party has received the Award, the limitation period u/s.34(3), 1996 Act commences – s.17 of the Limitation Act would not come to the rescue of such objecting party – In the present case, the respondents had a right to challenge the Award u/s. 34 the moment they received it – Respondents received the Award on 21.02.2010 – Once the respondents received the Award, the time u/s.34(3) commenced – Merely because the appellants had committed some fraud, it would not affect the respondents right to challenge the Award if the facts entitling the filing of s.34 Application was within their knowledge – It was incumbent on the respondents to have instituted an application u/s.34 challenging an award – Judgment of the High Court set aside – Order condoning the delay [2018] 12 S.C.R. 143 143 A B C D E F G H 144 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2018] 12 S.C.R. in filing the objections set aside – Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 – ss.29, 33, 34(3) and 36. Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 – s.29 – Purport of – Discussed. Words & Phrases – “the period of limitation shall not begin to run”, “may not be made”, “express exclusion” in context of s.17, Limitation Act and ss.34(3) and 29(2) of the 1996 Act – Meaning of – Limitation Act, 1963 – s.17 – Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 – s.34(3) & 29(2). Allowing the appeals, the Court HELD: 1.1 Section 29(2), Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 is divided into 2 limbs. This is evident from the conjunctive “and” in the said provision. The first part stipulates that the limitation period prescribed by the special law or local law will prevail over the limitation period prescribed in the Schedule to the Limitation Act. In this case, the Arbitration Act is a “special law” which prescribes a specific period of limitation in Section 34(3) for filing objections to an arbitral award passed under the 1996 Act and consequently the provisions of 1996 Act would apply. There is no provision under the Limitation Act, 1963 dealing with challenging an Award passed under the Arbitration Act. The second part mandates that Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act will apply for determining the period of limitation “only in so far as, and to the extent to which, they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law.” Thus the extent of the application of Sections 4 to 24 of Limitation Act will apply for determining the limitation period under the Arbitration Act only if they are not expressly excluded by Arbitration Act. [Paras 20, 21 and 22] [157-A-D] 1.2 Section 17, Limitation Act, 1963 does not extend or break the limitation period. It only postpones or defers the commencement of the limitation period. This is evident from the phrase “the period of limitation shall not begin to run”. [Para 32] [160-G] 1.3 Characteristics of Section 34(3) are: (a) Section 34 is the only remedy for challenging an award passed under Part I of the Arbitration Act. Section 34(3) is a A B C D E F G H 145 limitation provision, which is inbuilt into the remedy provision. One does not have to look at the Limitation Act or any other provision for iden
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