P.R. NAYAK versus UNION OF INDIA
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A B c D E F G H P.R. NAYAK v. UNION OF INDIA December 7, 1971 69s; [S. M. S!KRI, C.J., J. M. SHELAT, A. N. RAY, I. D. DUA D. G. PALEKAR AND G. K. MITTER, JJ.) Civil Service-Member of Indian Civil Service-Suspension of. All hldia iervices (Dis~ipline and Appeal) Rules, 1969 r. 3--Scope of -If civil servant can be sHspellded when disciplinary proceedings are i11 contemplation. F11ndamental Rule5', rr. 56(!) and 56 (ff)-Scope of-If r. 56(/f) ultra .vires Art. 14 of the Constitution. The appellant was a member of the Indian Ci\il Service, .and under F.R. 56(f) he was due to retire on November 25, 1970. The question whether a prima facie case against him was made out with respect to cer·· tain charges was referred to a Commission under the Commission of Enquiries Act, 1952, in October 1970. On November 3, 1970, he ex- pressed his willingness to accept extension of service by 4 months and hi~ service was extended till March 25, 1971. The appellant submitted his explanation to the Commission and the Commission after considering it, made an interim report in January 1971, that a prima facie case had been made out against the appellant. On March 23, 1971, an order was madC' under r. 3(l)(a) of the All India Services (D & A) Rules, 1969 saying "whereas disciplinary proceedings against Shri P. R. Nayak, I.C.S. are contemplated. . . . . . the President. . . . . . hereby places the said Shri P. R. Nayak under suspension with immediate effect until further orders .. " The appellant filed a petition for quashing the order of suspension but the High Court dismissed the petition. In appeal to this Court, it was contended that : (I) the order was violative of r. 3 of the All India Services (D & A) Rules; (2) Under P.R. 56(f) the date of retirement was fixed as rigid and the appel- lant.having retired on November 25, 1970 no further action could be taken against him as a member of the I.C.S.; (3) his retention in the post only amounted to b-employment; ( 4 f since he became Secrebry in the Ministry of Works, Housing and Urban Development in 1969 he should have been retained in that post for full 5 years till 1974 under the proviso to F. R. 56(f), and the extension for four months only was 11legal; (5) the order of suspension without specifically denying his request 10 retire on March 25, 1971, was defective; and (6) P.R. 56(ff)-by which an officer like the appellant under orders of suspension is not to be permitted to retire till the enquiry against him is concluded-is ultra vires. HELD: (Per S. M. Sikri, C.J .. I. M. Sbelat, I. D. Dua anti D. G. Palekar, JJ.) : The appeal ·must ·su~ceed on the first contention. !709 D-E) (a) There is no inherent power of suspension in Government, and the only rule on which reliance was placed for the appellant's suspension is r. 3 of the All India S-ervices (D & A) Rules. (714 B-C] (b) An order of suspension which does not adversely affect the rights and privileges of a Government Servant, but merely restrains him from discharging his official duties may be within the general inherent compc- 696 SUPREME COURT JlEPORTS [1972] 2 S.C.R. lence of the Government, but the impugned order seriously affects some of the appellant's rights and privileaes under the conditions of his service. namely; (i) During the period of suspension .he is not entitled to his fuli salary but only to some allowances; (ii) he is not permitted to retire; (iii) in order to get subsistence allowance he is prohibited from engaging in any other employment, profession or vocation and (iv) he is prohibited from leaving headquarters without prior permission of Government. Since these prejudicial consequences automatically flow from the order of sus- pension, the clear and explicit language of the rule must not be strained to the appellant's prejudice so as to authorise his suspension on mero cJntemplation of disciplinary proceedings. 1714 D-HJ Sub-rule (I) (a) of r. (3) empowers the Government which initiates any disciplinary proceeding to place under suspension a member of the service against who1n such proceedings are started. The language is plain and unambiguous and does not suggest that suspension can be ordered merely because discipilnary proceedings are contemplated. The language of sub-rr. (4) to (7) also does not authorise suspension merely because disciplinary pro.ceedin_gs are contemplated. The scheme underlying r. 3 is indicative of the in
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