LexaceLexace Ask the AI ›
⚖️ Ask the AI about your situation:🚗 Car Accident💼 Work / Job🏠 Housing / Eviction👪 Family / Divorce📋 Contract Dispute💰 Money Owed

P.R. NAYAK versus UNION OF INDIA

Citation: [1972] 2 S.C.R. 695 · Decided: 07-12-1971 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: S.M. SIKRI · Disposal: Appeal(s) allowed

Cited by 1 judgment(s) · cites 3 · see the full citation network in Lexace

Open in Lexace · Ask the AI about this case

Judgment (excerpt)

A 
B 
c 
D 
E 
F 
G 
H 
P.R. NAYAK 
v. 
UNION OF INDIA 
December 7, 1971 
69s; 
[S. M. S!KRI, C.J., J. M. SHELAT, A. N. RAY, I. D. DUA 
D. G. PALEKAR AND G. K. MITTER, JJ.) 
Civil Service-Member of Indian Civil Service-Suspension of. 
All hldia iervices (Dis~ipline and Appeal) Rules, 1969 r. 3--Scope of 
-If civil servant can be sHspellded when disciplinary proceedings are i11 
contemplation. 
F11ndamental Rule5', rr. 56(!) and 56 (ff)-Scope of-If r. 
56(/f) 
ultra .vires Art. 14 of the Constitution. 
The appellant was a member of the Indian Ci\il Service, .and under 
F.R. 56(f) he was due to retire on November 25, 1970. The question 
whether a prima facie case against him was made out with respect to cer·· 
tain charges was referred to a Commission under the Commission of 
Enquiries Act, 1952, in October 1970. On November 3, 1970, he ex-
pressed his willingness to accept extension of service by 4 months and hi~ 
service was extended till March 25, 1971. The appellant submitted his 
explanation to the Commission and the Commission after considering it, 
made an interim report in January 1971, that a prima facie case had been 
made out against the appellant. On March 23, 1971, an order was madC' 
under r. 3(l)(a) of the All India Services (D & A) Rules, 1969 saying 
"whereas disciplinary proceedings against Shri P. R. Nayak, I.C.S. are 
contemplated. . . . . . the President. . . . . . hereby places the said 
Shri 
P. R. Nayak under suspension with immediate effect until further orders .. " 
The appellant filed a petition for quashing the order of suspension but 
the High Court dismissed the petition. 
In appeal to this Court, it was contended that : (I) the order was 
violative of r. 3 of the All India Services (D & A) 
Rules; (2) 
Under 
P.R. 56(f) the date of retirement was fixed as rigid and the appel-
lant.having retired on November 25, 1970 no further action could be 
taken against him as a member of the I.C.S.; (3) his retention in the 
post only amounted to b-employment; ( 4 f since he became Secrebry in 
the Ministry of Works, Housing and Urban Development in 
1969 he 
should have been retained in that post for full 5 years till 1974 under the 
proviso to F. R. 56(f), and the extension for four months only was 
11legal; (5) the order of suspension without specifically denying his request 
10 retire on March 25, 1971, was defective; and (6) P.R. 56(ff)-by 
which an officer like the appellant under orders of suspension is not to be 
permitted to retire till the enquiry against him is concluded-is ultra vires. 
HELD: 
(Per S. M. Sikri, 
C.J .. I. M. 
Sbelat, I. D. 
Dua anti 
D. G. Palekar, JJ.) : The appeal ·must ·su~ceed on the first contention. 
!709 D-E) 
(a) There is no inherent power of suspension in Government, and 
the only rule on which reliance was placed for the appellant's suspension 
is r. 3 of the All India S-ervices (D & A) Rules. (714 B-C] 
(b) An order of suspension which does not adversely affect the rights 
and privileges of a Government Servant, but merely restrains him from 
discharging his official duties may be within the general inherent compc-
696 
SUPREME COURT JlEPORTS 
[1972] 2 S.C.R. 
lence of the Government, but the impugned order seriously affects some 
of the appellant's rights and privileaes under the conditions of his service. 
namely; (i) During the period of suspension .he is not entitled to his fuli 
salary but only to some allowances; (ii) he is not permitted to retire; (iii) 
in order to get subsistence allowance he is prohibited from engaging 
in any other employment, profession or vocation and (iv) he is prohibited 
from leaving headquarters without prior permission of Government. Since 
these prejudicial consequences automatically flow from the order of sus-
pension, the clear and explicit language of the rule must not be strained 
to the appellant's prejudice so as to authorise his 
suspension on 
mero 
cJntemplation of disciplinary proceedings. 1714 D-HJ 
Sub-rule (I) (a) of r. (3) empowers the Government which 
initiates 
any disciplinary proceeding to place under suspension a member of the 
service against who1n such proceedings are started. The language is plain 
and unambiguous and does not suggest that suspension can be ordered 
merely because discipilnary proceedings are contemplated. The language 
of sub-rr. (4) to (7) also does not authorise suspension merely because 
disciplinary pro.ceedin_gs are contemplated. The scheme underlying r. 3 
is indicative of the in

Excerpt shown. Read the full judgment & AI analysis in Lexace.