LexP. PHILIP versus THE DIRECTOR OF ENFORCEMENT, NEW DELHI & ANOTHER
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B E .F H 532 P. PHILIP v. THE DIRECTOR OF ENFORCEMENT. NEW DELHI & \ ANOTHER .,. March 3, 1976 [R. S. SARKAR!A AND N. L. UNTWAL!A, JJ.] Interpretation of statutes-Saving provision-Words and Plzrases-Mea11i11f.: of Petition-Criminal Procedure Code 1973 Sec. 484(2)-(a) Revision applica- tion pending before Sessions Court under Cr. P. Code 1898, whether petition. In February, 1971, the Director of Enforcen1ent n1ade a complaint against 4 accused for violation of certain provisions of the Foreign Exchange Regula 4 tions Act, read with section 120-B of the Indian Penal Code. The appellant herein who was accused No. 2 made an application before the T'rial Court raising two preliminary objections to the maintainability of the con1plaint and prayed for its dismissa1. The Trial Court by its judgment dated 5-9-1973 disn1issed the application holding that the points raised should be considered after recording the evidence. The appeliant filed a Revision Applica- tion to the Sessions Court under section 435 of the Code of Cr. Procedure 1898, which \Vas dismissed in August, 1974. The ttppellant filed a Revision Application to the High Court which was dismissed by the High Court on the ground that it was not maintainable in view of section 399(3) of the ne'v Code. Jn an appeal by Special Leave, the appe11ant contended : At the time when the Revision petition was filed before the Sessions Judge the old Code was in force and in view of section 484 of the new Code the application had to be disposed of in accordance with the old Code. l"he respon- dents on the other hand, contended that the word 'application' in section 484(2) of the new Code is a word of limited import and that it would include only those applications which could be finally disposed of by the Sessions Judge. HELD : The word 'application' in the saving provision immediately follows the term 'appeal'. It, therefore, takes some colour from the coUection of words in which it occurs. It is synonymous with the term 'petition' which 1neans a written statement of material facts, requesting the Court to grant the relief or remedy based on those facts. It is a pecu1iar mode of seeking redress recogn~ed by law. There is no doubt that the word 'application' as used in clau5e (a) of section 484 of the new Code will take in a revision application n1ade under section 43.5 of the Old Code. The Revision Application made by the appellant was pending before the Sessions Judge when the new Code came into force. Therefore, it was required to be disposed of in accordance with the provisions of the Old Code. .[5340-F, G-H] CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. 76 of 1976. T. C. Raghavan and N. Sudhakaran for the appellant. Debabrata Mookerjee and R. N. Sachthey for respondent No. I. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by SARKARIA, J. This appeal by special leave is directed against an order. dated July 1, 1975, of the High Court of Kerala, dismissing i • I _ ... .. • • P. PHILIP v. DIRECTOR OF ENFORCEMENT (Sarkaria, /.) 533 the Criminal Revision Petition filed by the appellant. It raises ques- A. tions with regard to the scope and interpretauon, inter alia, of ss. 399 (3) and 484(2) (a) of the Code of Cnmmal Procedure, 1973 (here- inafter referred to as the New Code) . The facts are these : On February 2, 1971 the Director of Enforcement, New Delhi made a complaint against four accused persons. alleging the commis- sion of offences under s. 120-B, Penal Code and s. 5(1) (aa) and B- 5(1) (c) of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947 (for short, called the Acl) in the Court of the District Magistrate, Ernakulam. The appellant herein was accused No. 2 in that complaint. By an application he raised two objections to the maintainability of the complaint and prayed for its dismissal. First, the opportunity as requi- red under the proviso to s. 23 (3) of the Act was not given to the accused c for showing that he had permission from the Reserve Bank of India for doing the alleged acts. Second, that the complainant did not comply with the conditions in the proviso to s. 23D ( 1) of the Act, in as much as there was on additional material before him to come to the conclusion that the penalty which he is empowered to impose under s. 23, would not be adequate and that consequently, it was necessary to file a complaint in Court. D· By an· order dated September 5, 1973, the trial court dismissed t
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