P. L. LAKHANPAL versus UNION OF INDIA & ORS.

Citation: [1967] 1 S.C.R. 433 · Decided: 21-09-1966 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: K. SUBBA RAO · Disposal: Dismissed

Cited by 2 judgment(s) · see the full citation network in Lexace

Judgment (excerpt)

-· 
A 
P. L. LAKHANPAL 
v. 
UNION OF INDIA & ORS. 
September 21, 1966. 
B 
[K:SuBBA RAO, C.J., M. HIDAYATULLAH, S. M. S!KRI, 
c 
D 
E 
F 
G 
H 
J. M. SHELAT AND G. K. MITTER, JJ.] 
Defence of India Rules 1962, rr. 30(1)(b) and 30A(9)-Scope of. 
The petitioner who was the editor of a newspaper was detained by an 
order of the Central Government under r. 30(1) (b) 
c>f the Defence of 
lndia Rules, 1962, and the detention was continued by another order of 
the Central Government passed six months later, under r. 30A(9). The 
fn'st order directed the petitioner's detention with a view to pre'l'enting 
him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the defence of India, civil 
defence, public safety and the maintenance of public order, but the order 
continuing the detention set out only the defence of India and civil defence. 
The petitioner challenged the second order. of the following groun.ds :-
(i) the detention was punitive and not preventive, because his writings in 
his paper were the grounds of bis original detention but that the paper 
bad since become defunct; (ii) the two additional grounds giyen in the 
original order and omitted in the latter order must be held to have been 
non-existent at the time of the original order, and therefore, the original 
order ba30d on such non-existent grounds was illegal, and could not be 
validly ccmtinued under .r. 30A(9); 
(iii) even if the Government was 
competent to continue the detention, the validity of the decision of the 
. Government to continue the .detenion depended uyon the existence of rele-
vant circumstances which would neces:;itate the continuation ll'Dd such 
circumstancs were demonstrable; and (iv) the Minister who passed the 
second order should have filed a counter affidavit showing that he applied 
his mind to the material before he passed the orc!er continuing the delen-
llon. 
HELD : (i) Assuming that the petitioner's writings in his paper were 
relied on for the purpose of passing the original order, they were not the 
only materials on which the original order and the order continuing the 
detention were based. 
The authorities had taken into consideration the 
over-all picture of· all his anti-Indian and pro-Pakistani activities. 
There-
fore, the fact that his paper had since become defunct would make no 
difference because the jurisdiction to detain is not in· respect of ~ mischief 
already corpmitted but in. anticipation that the person concerned may in 
future act prejudicially, 
[436 H; 437 A-B; 439 C-Dl 
(ii) The decision to continue the detention order was within the scope 
of r. 30A and was therefore sustainable. [ 446 A-BJ 
Rule 30-A provides for a review of the order of detention, the pro-
cedure· therefor~, the different i:eviewing authorities, the period within which 
such review has to be made and the obligation to decide whether 
the 
detention should be continue& or cancelled after taking into account .ti 
lhe circumstances of the case. Sub-rule (9) provides that where a detea-
tion order is passed by the Central or a State Government such order 
shall be reviewed at intervals of not more than six months by the OC>Yem-
ment which made the order and upc>n such re\iew decide whether to 
continue or cancel tile order. 
The object of the review is to decide 
whether there ;s a necessity to continue the detention order or not in 
434 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
(1967] I S.C.R. 
the light of the facts ami cin:umstwices including any development that 
has ta.Ir.en placo in the meantime. If the reviewing authority finds that 
such a development has taken place in the sense that the reasons which 
lod to the passing of the original order no longer subsist or that some 
of them do not subsist that is not to say that those reasons did not exist 
at the time of passing the original order and that the satisfaction was on 
grounds which did not then exist. There is no analogy between the pr<>-
visions of review in the Defence of India Rules and in the Preventive Deten-
tion Act, 1950 and therefore, the decisions on that Act cannot be availed 
of by the pcti1ioner. 
[438 H; 439 B; 445 F-H; 446 A-BJ 
(iii) ·me- \\·ords used in r. 30( 1) (b) and r. 30A are .w11isfac1ior1 in one 
ca~. and decision after taking into account all the circumst3nces of the 
case in the other. 
Cnhke r. 30(1)(b), the power to continue the de:en-
tion after re\iew is not dependent on the saris/at:tion of the Government. 
Under r. JOA the Government is enjoined upon to decide whethe

Excerpt shown. Read the full judgment & AI analysis in Lexace.