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P. KUMARASWAMY versus STATE TRANSPORT APPELLATE TRIBUNAL, MADRAS AND ANR.

Citation: [1976] 2 S.C.R. 214 · Decided: 08-10-1975 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: V.R. KRISHNA IYER

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Judgment (excerpt)

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214 
P. KUMARASWAMY 
v. 
STATE TRANSPORT APPELLATE TRIBUNAL, MADRAS AND 
ANR. 
October 8, 1975 
(V. R. KRISHNA IYER AND A. C. GUPTA, JJ.] 
Moto.r Vehicles Act 1939, Sec. 47(1) Sec. 68A(a)-Rules framed by Tamil 
Nadu gdi:ernment under Motor Vehicles Act-Whether rules can be discarded 
in the name of Public interest in Sec. 47(1)-Whetheir rules to be supplemented 
by public interest-'°rder of the Tribunal excluding a relevant factor whether 
lia.ble to be qua.shed. 
Many applicants for one permit for a short route pressed their claims before 
the Regional Transport Authority under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. The 
Transport Authority evaluated the relevant merits and awarded the permit to 
the appellant. The system of marks under the Rules framed under the Act by 
the Tamil N adu Government, prescribes various qualifications for applicants 
for perinits for passenger transport under the Act. 
The rule emphasises that 
the paramount consideration of the interest of the public as enshrined in section 
47 (1) must be given full weight while awarding permits. One of the rules · 
provides that preference shail, other things being equal, be given in respect 
of the routes to persons. who have not held any permit for stage carriage. One 
of the considerations which must weigh with the authorities 
is the business 
of technical experience in the field of motor operation. The appellant secur-
ed 4 marks as against 3.1 marks secured by resJ?Ondent No. 1. In addition, 
the appellant was entitled to a preference for bemg a new entrant since the 
route was a short one. The Appellate Tribunal reversed the order of the Trans-
port Authorities and granted the permit to respondent No. 2 and set aside 
the permit granted in favour of the appellant on the ground of. public interest 
in the matter of passenger transport service and held that the appellant's ex-
perience as lorry operator cannot be equated with respondent No. 2's experi-
ence in Bus operation. This view was taken by the Tribunal following section 
47(1). 
The appellant filed a Writ Petition in the High ·court which was rejected. 
On appeal byl Special Leave, 
HELD : (1) The rules or guidelines could not be discarded in the name 
of section 4 7 (1). The Rules made are really in implementation of section 
47(1) but is not exhaustive of all the considerations that would prevail in a 
given . situation. The jurisdiction is given to the Tribunal to take note of 
other considerations in public interest flowing out of section 47(1). The Rules, 
are, however, not to be discarded but they can be supplemented or outweighed. 
In ilie name of public interest something opposed to the Rules cannot 
be 
done. The Appellate Tribunal has actually contravened rule 155 (3) which 
accords 2 marks for applicants who have a certain experience in road trans-
port service. Road Transport Service is defined by secton 68A (a) and it makes 
no distinction between the type of transport vehicles in which experience has 
been gained whether it be of passenger transport or a lorry transport. The 
distinction made between passe_nger transport and lorry service experience by 
the Tribunal is illegal. A relevant factor has thus been wrongly excluded. 
The order of the Appellate Tribunal is liable to be quashed on the well-worn 
ground that material consideration if ignored makes the order vulnerable. More• 
over there is an apparent mis-construction of the relevant rule. The respon· 
dent' No. 1 stated that there were many other grounds which he could have 
urged before the Tribunal but which have not been adverted to by the Tribu-
nal because he could have urged before the Tribunal but which have not been 
adverted to by the Tribunal because respondent No. 2 succeeded on one ground. 
It is, therefore, fair that the case should be remanded to the Appellate Tribunal 
for being heard de novo. 
[216-E-H, 217A-E] 
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P. KUMARASWAMY v. S.T.A.T. (Krishna Iyer, J.) 
215 
CIVIL ArPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 1266 of 1975. 
Appeal by special leave from the Jud,gment. and ~rder dated 3rd 
March, 1971 of the Madras High Court m Wnt Pet;twn "No. 583 of 
1971. 
K. S. Ramamurthi, A. T. M. Sampath and E. C. Agarw(l/a, for the 
A 
Appellant. 
B 
B. Sen and Vineet Kumar for Respondent No. 2. 
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by 
KRrs1-iNA IYER, J. 
A single fundamental flaw in the order of 
the Appellate Tribunal (under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939), cons-
trains us to allow thi

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