P.K. PRADHAN versus STATE OF SIKKIM REPRESENTED BY THE CENTRAL BUREAU

Citation: [2001] 3 S.C.R. 1119 · Decided: 24-07-2001 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: G.B. PATTANAIK · Disposal: Dismissed

Cited by 4 judgment(s) · cites 3 · see the full citation network in Lexace

Judgment (excerpt)

... 
P.K. PRADHAN 
v. 
STATE OF SIKKIM REPRESENTED BY THE CENTRAL BUREAU 
OF INVESTIGATION 
JULY 24, 2001 
[G.B. PATTANAIK, S.N. PHUKAN AND B.N. AGRAWAL, JJ.] 
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973: Section 197. 
A 
B 
Public servant-Prosecution of-Sanction-Requirement of-Held: C 
There has to be a reasonable connection between the act complained of and 
the discharge of official duty-If there is no such reasonable connection no 
sanction is required-Question of sanction can be raised any time after 
cognizance, at the time of conclusion of trial or even after conviction-The 
question of sanction may be left open to be decided in the main judgment- D 
. Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947, Ss. 5(2) and 5(/)(d)-Prevention of 
Corruption Act, 1988, Ss. 13(2) and 13(/)(d). 
A charge sheet was filed against the appellant-public servant under 
Section 120-B of the Penal Code, 1860 read with Sections 5(2) and S(l)(d) 
of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947. By the time the Special Judge E 
took cognizance upon the charge sheet the appellant ceased to be a public 
servant. The appellant raised a preliminary objection before the Special 
Judge to the effect that his prosecution was not warranted as sanction under 
Section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 was not obtained. The 
Special Judge held that no sanction was required. The High Court upheld F 
this order. Hence this appeal. 
On behalf of the appellant it was contended that the act of the appellant 
complained of had a reasonable connection with the discharge of official duty 
and both were so interwoven that one could not be separated from the other, 
as such for prosecuting the appellant, sanction was required under Section G 
197 of the Code. 
On behalf of the respondent-State it was contended that the acts of the 
appellant complained of had absolutely no connection with the discharge of 
official duty inasmuch as commission of offence of conspiracy could never 
1119 
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1120 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2001] 3 S.C.R. 
A be treated to be in discharge of official duty and, therefore, no sanction for 
prosecution under Section 197 of the Code was at all required. 
Dismissing the appeal, the Court 
HELD: 1. For claiming protection under Section 197 of the Code of 
B Criminal Procedure,_ 1973, it has to be shown by the accused that there is 
a reasonable connection between the act complained of and the discharge of 
official duty. An official act can be performed in the discharge of official duty 
as well as in dereliction of it. For invoking protection under Section 197 of 
the Code, the ·acts of the accused complained of must be such that the same 
cannot be separated from the discharge of official duty, but if there was no 
C reasonable connection between them and the performance of those duties, the 
official status furnishes only the occasion or opportunity for the acts, then 
no sa~ction would be required. If the case as put forward by the prosecution 
fails or the defence establishes that the act purported to be done is in 
discharge of duty, the proceedings will have to be dropped. It is well settled 
p that question of sanction under Section 197 of the Code can be raised any 
time after the cognizance; may be immediately after cognizance or framing 
of charge or even at the time of conclusion of trial and after conviction as 
well. But there may be certain cases where it may not be possible to decide 
the question effectively without giving opportunity to the defence to establish 
. 
. 
that what the accused did was in discharge of official duty. In order tO come 
E to the conclusion whether the claim of the accused, that the act that he did 
was in course of the performance of his duty was reasonable one and neither 
pretended nor fanciful, can be examined during the course of trial by giving 
opportunity to the defence to establish it. In such an eventuality, the question 
of sanction should be left open to be decided in the main judgment, which may 
F delivered upon conclusion of the trial. [1127-D-H) 
Amrik Singh v. The State of Pepsu, [1955) 1 SCR 1302; Matajog Dobey 
v. HC Bhari, (1955) 2 SCR 925; Bajinath Gupta v. The State of MP, (1966) 
1 SCR 210; Suresh Kumar Bhikamchand Jain v. Pandey Ajay Bhushan, 
[1998) 1 SCC 205; Abdul Wahab Ansari v. State of Bihar, [2000) 8 SCC 500; 
G K. Satwant Singh v. The State of Punjab, (1960} 2 SCR 89; Om Prakash 
Gupta v. State of UP., (1957) SCR 423; Shreekantiah Ramayya Munipal/i 
v. The State of Bombay, (1955)

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