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P. J. IRANI versus THE STATE OF MADRAS

Citation: [1962] 2 S.C.R. 169 · Decided: 21-04-1961 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: BHUVNESHWAR PRASAD SINHA · Disposal: Dismissed

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Judgment (excerpt)

2 s.c.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
169 
is limited to suits filed after the Act comes into force· 
z96z 
in a particular area cannot be accepted. The conclu-
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s10n must follow that the present smt cu.nnot 
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creed in favour of the respondent. The decisions of & Giuniug Facto>y 
the High Court and the Court of First Instance u,re 
v. 
thus erroneous, and must be set aside. 
Subbasl• CJiandrn 
In the result, the appeal is allowed, and the two 
Yograj Sinha 
preliminary Issues are answered in favonr of the Hidayatullah J. 
appellants. Under the orders of this Court, the judg-
ment of the Civil Judge was stayed. The suit will 
now be decided in conformity with our judgment. 
The respondent shall pay the costs of this Court and 
of the High Court. 
Appeal allowed. 
P. J. IRANI 
v. 
THE STATE OF MADRAS 
(B. P. SINHA, c. J., s. K. DAS, A. K. SARKAR, 
N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR and J. R. MUDHOLKAR, JJ.) 
Rent Control-Restrictions on evictio'tl--Statute empJwering 
Government to exemp# any premises from restrictions -C onstitutiona~ 
lily-Order exempting premises-Validity-When can be challen-
ged-Practice, whether respondent can raise question decided against 
him-Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, r949 
(Mad. XXV of r949), s. r3-Constitulion of India, Art. r4. 
One Chad obtained a lease of a cinema house which \\'as to 
expire in l\fci.y i942. In the ml::antime litigation ensuerl between 
the owners of the cinema house, and the High Court appointed 
receivers to administer the property. 
In 1940 one I offered to 
take a lease of the cinema house for zr years. 
The High Court 
offered C the option of taking the lease for 21 years but C was 
willing to take it only for 7 years upto May 1947. Thereupon 
the High Court ordered that a lease be given to C upto May 
1947, and thereafter the lease be given to I upto May 196r. 
In 
accordance with this order t11e receivers executed t\.VO leases, one 
in favour of C and a reversionary lease in favour of!. Btfore 
the lease in favour of C expired the Madras (Lease & Rent 
Control) Act, 1946, came into force which protected tenants in 
2l 
April 21. 
170 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[1962) 
I96r 
possession from eviction even after the expiry of their leases. 
This Act was replaced by the Madras Buildings (Lease & Rent 
P. J. hani 
Control) Act, r949, which contained similar provisions. Sec· 
v. 
tion r3 of the r949 Act empowered the State Government to 
State of Madras "exempt any building or class of buildings from all or any of 
the provisions of this Act." On the application of I the Govern-
ment passed an order on June 4, r952, under s. 13 exempting the 
cinema house from all the provisions of the Act. Subsequently, 
the reasons for making the order were given by the Govern-
ment to be: (i) Chad deliberately, though he had been offered a 
lease for 21 years by the High Court, taken a lease for 7 years 
and he was seeking to take advantage of the Act after the 
\ 
expiry of bis lease, (ii) C was an absentee lessee and bad several 
other business and (iii) C had already been in possession for 
-
5 years more than he was legitimately entitled to be. 
C filed a 
writ petition before the High Court for quashing the order on 
the grounds that s. r3 of the Act vested in the Government an 
unguided and uncontrolled discretion and violated Art. r4 of the 
Constitution and that the order deprived C of the equal protec-
tion of the beneficial provisions of the Act. The High Court held 
that s. r3 was not unconstitutional but that the order of the 
Government was ultra vires. I appealed to the Supreme Court. 
At the bearing C sought to challenge the validity of s. r3 also. 
Held, that s. r3 of the Act did not violate Art. r4 and was 
not unconstitutional. Enough guidance was afforded by the 
preamble and the operative provisions of the Act for the exer-
cise of the discretionary power vested in the Government. The 
power under s. 13 was to be exercised in cases where the protec-
tion given by the Act caused great hardship to the landlord or 
was the subject of abuse by the tenant. 
Ram Krishna Dalmia v. Sri Justice Tendolkar, [r959] S.C.R. 
279 and Sardar Inder Singh v. State of Rajasthan, [r957] 
S.C.R. 605, followed. 
H dd, (per Sinha, C.J., Ayyangar and Mudholkar, JJ.), that 
the order passed by the Government under s. r3 was ultra vires 
and void. An order made under s. r3 was subject to judicial 
review on the grounds th

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