P. CHINNANNA AND ORS. versus STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH AND ORS.

Citation: [1994] SUPP. 2 S.C.R. 426 · Decided: 08-08-1994 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: K. RAMASWAMY, N. VENKATACHALA

Judgment (excerpt)

A 
P. CHINNANNA AND ORS. 
v. 
STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH AND ORS. 
AUGUST 8, 1994 
B 
[K. RAMASWAMY AND N. VENKATACHALA, JJ.] 
Constition of India, 1950 : Articles 136 and 226. 
Acquisition of land-Public purposes-Challenge of-Involves purely 
C question of law-Laches or delay-Bar to entertainment of writ petition. 
D 
Land Acquisition Act, 1894. 
Sections 4 and 6-Acquisition of land--Publication of notiftcation-
Dec/aratiott-Not made within time specified-Held : liable to be quashed. 
On 23.4.1976 Bhainsa Regulated Market Samiti requested the State 
Government to acquire 6 acres and 29 guntas of land for extension of its 
existing cotton Market Yard. On 6.7.1977 the State Government made an 
order under Section 17(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 dispensing 
with enquiry under Section S(A) of the L.A. Act in view of the urgency. On 
E 2L7.1977 the State Government published a notification and a declaration 
in respect of the said land under Sections 4(1) and 6(1) as was required 
under Section 16(4) of the L.A. Act. Thereafter, the District Collector took 
possession of the acquired land on 10.7.78. Thereupon, he gave possession 
of the said acquired land to the Bhainsa Regulated Market Samiti.' 
F 
G 
H 
The appellants filed writ petitions in the High Court and sought the 
quashing of Section 4(1) Notification and 6(1) declaration in so far as they 
related to 1 acre 29 guntas of land. The High Court allowed the petitions 
on 23.8.1982, without quashing the Notification and declaration, and 
directed the respondents to hold enquiry under Section SA of the L.A. Act. 
Pursuant to the said judgment of the High Court, the respondents 
held an enquiry and concluded that the land concerned shall be acquired. 
Thereafter, on 29.11.1984 a declaration was made under Section 6(1) of the 
L.A. Act in respect of the said land. 
The appellants then filed writ appeals before the Division Bench of 
426 
P. CHINNANNA v. STATE OF AP." 
427 
the High Court in which a fresh ground was raised. The fresh ground was A 
that Section 6(1) declaration, made on 24.11.1984, had not been made 
within the period allowed by the first proviso to Section 6(1) of the L.A. 
Act and was liable to be quashed. The High Court dismissed the appeals 
rejecting the fresh ground. Aggrieved by the High Court's judgment, the 
appellants preferred the present appeals. 
On behalf of the appellants it was contended that Section 6(1) 
declaration was made on 24.11.1984 while notification under Section 4(1) 
B 
was published on 21. 7.1977, the declaration was void and liable to be 
quashed as it was made beyond the period allowed by the first proviso to 
Section 6(1); and that the High Court erred in not accepting the fresh 
C 
ground urged before it. 
Dismissing the appeals, this Court 
HELD : 1. The fresh ground urged In support of the present appeals 
would merit acceptance, if the High Court's judgment dated 23.8.1982 had D 
the effect of restoring ownership of the said land to the appellants and 
reviving the notification published on 21.7.1977 in respect of the said land 
under Section 6(1) of the Land Acquisition Act 1894. [431-F, G] 
2. The previous acquisition of the said land of the appellants made E 
under Section 17 of the Act never stood affected. Section SA enquiry held 
and subsequent declaration made were superfluous proceedings which 
were inconsequential. Hence there is no n~ed to set aside the impugned 
declaration since the earlier acquisition was complete and there was no 
land available for acquisition by following the procedure under Sections 
5-A, 6, 11 and 16 of the Act. [436-C, D, 435-G] 
F 
3. Though tile fresh ground of challenge in respect of Section 6(1) 
declaration raised after seven years has been examined, the same has been 
done solely to decide on the scope and applicability of the first proviso to 
Section 6(1) of the L.A. Act. Such examination cannot be understood that . G 
there is an obligation on the part of the Court to examine such fresh 
ground after the lapse of time or laches, in a proceeding under Articles 
226 or 136 of the Constitution. [ 436-F, G] 
4. The Court must be averse to entertain writ petitions challenging 
acquisition of land for pnblic purposes where there is avoidable delay or H 
428 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1994] SUPP. 2 S.C.R. 
A 
laches since such acquisition if set aside, would involve not only enormous 
loss of public money but also would cause delay in carrying out projects 
meant for general pub

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