LexOM PARKASH BATISH versus RANJIT @ RANBIR KAUR AND OTHERS
Open in Lexace · Ask the AI about this caseJudgment (excerpt)
A
B
[2008] 6 S.C.R. 938
OM PARKASH BATISH
II.
RANJIT @ RANBIR KAUR AND OTHERS
(Civil Appeal No. 2943 of 2008)
APRIL 24, 2008
[S.B. SINHA AND P.P. NAOLEKAR, JJ.]
Workmen Compensation Act, 1923 - s. 2{n) - Casual
employee appointed for limited period to carry out repairing
c job in a residential building - Held: Is not a 'workman' under
the Act since the requirements of law not satisfied - Schedule
II appended to the Act also not applicable - Only because the
employee was working in connection with a building activity,
he would not be included in the definition of term 'workman' -
High Court in appeal uls 30 erred in granting compensation
D to the employee proceeding on the basis that appreciation of
evidence would give rise to substantial question of law -
Appreciation of evidence adduced by the parties per se is out
of bound of appellate court - It is to frame substantial question
of law - Hence, order of High Court not sustainable and set
E aside.
Appellant appointed R-predecessor-in-interest of
respondents, for sometime to carry out repair work in his
residential building. When R was on the roof of the
F adjoining building, he got inflicted with the electric shock
and expired. At that time R was not working under the
appellant.
Respondents
filed
application
for
compensation under the Workmen Compensation Act,
1923. The Workmen Compensation Commissioner held
that the application was not maintainable. Respondents
G filed appeal u/s. 30 of the Act. High Court framed
substantial questions of law. However, in view of the entire
evidence it held that R was employed with the appellant
and the incident occurred in his premises, and awarded
compensation. Hence the present appeal.
H
938
•
OM PARKASH BATISH v. RANJIT@ RANBIR KAUR
939
AND OTHERS
t
The question which arose for consideration in this A
appeal was whether a casual employee who was
appointed for a limited period to carry out repairing job in
a building would be a 'workman' within the meaning of
the provisions of Section 2(n) of the Workmen
Compensation Act, 1923.
B
Allowing the appeal, the Court
HELD: 1.1 The ingredients of section 2 (n) of the Act
as it stood on the date of accident are i) the workman must
not be employed as a casual workman ;ii) his employment C
must be in connection with the employer's trade and
business. However, it is placed on records the words
beginning from "other than a person whose employment
is of a casual nature and who is employed otherwise than
for the purpose of the employer's trade or business" have
been omitted by Act 46 of 2000. The statutory provision D ·
as it then stood is considered. [Paras 21 and 22] [947-C,
G, H; 948-A, B]
1.2 The Act was amended is itself a pointer to show
that the Parliament intended to avoid a mischief which E
was prevailing. Applying the principles of mischief rule, it
must be held that prior to the amendment of the definition
of "workman", the category of workman to which
employee belonged did not come within the purview of
the provisions of the Act. [Paras 24 and 25] [948-E, F]
f
Heydon's case 1584 (3) Co. Rep. 7a - referred to.
1.3 Schedule II appended to the Act, is not applicable,
F
as it is subject to the provisions of Section 2(1 )(n) of the
Act. Therefore, if the law as it then stood would exclude
the applicability of the Act, having regard to the definition G
of the term 'workman' the same cannot be held to include
deceased, only because he was working in connection
with a building activity. Even otherwise, working in a
residential house does not satisfy the requirements of law.
In the instant case, the workman was employed for a H
940
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2008] 6 S.C.R.
A limited period for carrying out repair works in a residential
t
house. [Paras 23 and 24] [948-B, C, D]
2.1 Section 30 of the Workmen Compensation Act,
1923 provides that an appeal shall lie to the High Court
B
on a substantial question of law. A substantial question
of law, will carry the same meaning as is commonly
understood. Distinction sought to be made that a
substantial question of law for the purpose of a first appeal
and one for a second appeal would be different, cannot
be accepted. The right to file an appeal is a statutory right.
c The Parliament may not provide such a right at all. The
right to file an appeal can be hedged with conditions. A
limited right can also be conferred. A right of appeal under
the Act is Excerpt shown. Read the full judgment & AI analysis in Lexace.