OKHLA INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY versus CHIEF COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX AND ORS.
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A B C D E F G H 781 NEW OKHLA INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. CHIEF COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX AND ORS. (Civil Appeal Nos. 792-793 of 2014) JULY 02, 2018 [A. K. SIKRI AND ASHOK BHUSHAN, JJ.] Income Tax Act, 1961 – s.10(20) (as Amended by Finance Act 2002 w.e.f. 01.04.2003) – Appellant-NOIDA, a local authority or not – Appellant-NOIDA contended that it is covered by the cl(ii) of Explanation to s.10(20) of the Act, 1961, which defines the expression “local authority” as “Municipality as referred to in Art.243P(e)” – Held: Special features of the Municipality as was contemplated by the Constitutional provisions contained in Part IXA cannot be said to be present in Authority (NOIDA) as delineated by statutory scheme of the U.P. Industrial Area Development Act, 1976 under which the said authority was constituted – Though various municipal functions are also being performed by the Authority as per Act of 1976, but merely because certain municipal functions were also performed by the authority, it cannot acquire the essential features of the Municipality which are contemplated by Part IXA of the Constitution – Appellant is not covered by the word/expression of “Municipality” in cl(e) of Art.243P – Thus, appellant is not covered by the definition of local authority as contained in Explanation to s.10(20) of the Act of 1961 – U.P. Industrial Area Development Act, 1976 – s.3 – Constitution of India – Part IXA, Art.243P(e) – Finance Act, 2002. Constitution of India – Arts.243Q and 243P(e) – In exercise of powers under the proviso to cl(i) of Art.243Q, the Governor specified NOIDA to be an “industrial township” vide notification dated 24.12.2001 – Whether industrial township can be equated with Municipality as defined u/Art.243P(e) – Held: No – The object of issuance of notification is to relieve the mandatory requirement of constitution of a Municipality in a State in the circumstances as mentioned in proviso but exemption from constituting Municipality does not lead to mean that the industrial establishment which is [2018] 7 S.C.R. 781 781 A B C D E F G H 782 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2018] 7 S.C.R. providing municipal services to an industrial township is same as Municipality as defined in Art. 243P(e). General Clauses Act, 1897 – s.3(31) – Applicability of the Act, 1897 in defining the term ‘local authority’ post amendment (Finance Act 2002) to the I.T. Act, 1961 – Held: Prior to Finance Act, 2002 there being no definition of ‘local authority’ under the I.T. Act, the provisions of s.3(31) of the Act, 1897 were pressed into service while interpreting the extent and meaning of ‘local authority’ – The Explanation to s.10(20) now contain the exhaustive definition of local authority, thus, definition of local authority as contained in s.3(31) of the Act, 1897 no more applicable – Income Tax Act, 1961 – cl(ii) of Explanation to s.10(20) (as Amended by Finance Act 2002) Interpretation of Statutes – Interpretation of a proviso – Principles discussed. Dismissing the appeals, the Court HELD: 1. The appellant-New Okhla Industrial Development Authority has been constituted under section 3 of the U.P. Industrial Area Development Act, 1976. The only issue which needs to be considered in these appeals is as to whether the appellant is a “local authority” within the meaning of section 10(20) as amended by Finance Act, 2002 w.e.f. 01.04.2003. The cl(ii) of Explanation to s.10(20) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, provides that the expression “local authority” means “Municipality as referred to in clause (e) of Article 243P of the Constitution”. The constitutional provisions as contained in Part IXA delineate that the Constitution itself provided for constitution of Municipalities, duration of Municipalities, powers of Authorities and responsibilities of the Municipalities. The Municipalities are created as vibrant democratic units of self-government. The special features of the Municipality as was contemplated by the constitutional provisions contained in Part IXA cannot be said to be present in Authority as delineated by statutory scheme of Act, 1976. It is true that various municipal functions are also being performed by the Authority as per Act, 1976 but the mere facts that certain municipal functions were also performed by the authority it cannot acquire the essential features of the A B C D E F G H 783 Municipality which are contemplated by Part IXA of the Constitution. The appellant is not covered by the word/expression of “Municipality”
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