OIL AND NATURAL GAS CORPORATION LTD. versus M/S. NIPPON STEEL CORPORATION LTD.

Citation: [2006] SUPP. 8 S.C.R. 596 · Decided: 07-11-2006 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: AR. LAKSHMANAN · Disposal: Appeal(s) allowed

Judgment (excerpt)

A 
OIL AND NATURAL GAS CORPORATION LTD. 
v. 
M/S. NIPPON STEEL CORPORATION LTD. 
NOVEMBER 7, 2006 
B 
[DR. AR. LAKSHMANAN AND TARUN CHATTERJEE, JJ.] 
Indian Arbitration Act, 1940; Section 14: 
Arbitration-Filing of an award in Court-Notice to parties-Held: 
C Award filed at the instance of the Arbitrator by an advocate-He was not 
standing counsel for the appellant at the time of filing of award-Merely 
because he is on the panel of the Advocates of the appellants, it does not 
determine his representative capacity-Besides, the award was filed by the 
counsel acting as an agent of the arbitrator-Mere, knowledge of.filing of 
D the award to the counsel cannot be construed as actual/constructive notice 
to the client-Doctrine of constructive notice cannot be extended to acts 
performed at the instance of third party-Since the counsel/advocate did not 
act on behalf of the appellant, principle of agency cannot be exten4ed to 
such situation-Hence provisions under O.Ill R.5 CPC not attracted-Code 
of Civil Procedure, 1908-0rder III Rule 5. 
E 
Limitation Act, 1963; Article l 19(b): 
Arbitration-Award-Limitation-Commencement of-Effective date-
Held: limitation cannot be computed from the date of knowledge of the 
award-Moreover, appellant did not have any knowledge of filing of the 
F award-Notice regarding filing of award must be given to the appellant by 
some act· of Court-Mere intimation from one party to other about filing of 
the award cannot be construed as notice in terms of Section 14(2) of 1940 
Act-Objection filed by the appellant not barred by time, hence, order 
dismissing the arbitration petition on the ground of limitation is set aside. 
G 
Doctrines: 
Doctrine of constructive Notice-Applicability of 
The questions that arose for determination in this appeal were as to 
H 
596 
OIL AND NI\ TURAL GAS CORPN. LTD. "· NIPPON STEEL CORPN. LTD. 
597 
whether the filing of an award in the Court by an advocate acting as an agent A 
of the arbitrator is deemed notice to tbe appellant, one of the parties to the 
Award under Section 14(2) of the Arbitration Act, 1940 and as to whether 
the limitation for setting aside the said award at the instance of the appellant, 
shall commence from that date. 
Thus, the substantial questions oflaw arose for determination by this B 
Court were: 
(i) as to whether the High Court was justified in extending the principle 
of constructive notice to the facts of the present case ignoring the express 
stipmations of Section 14(2) of the Arbitration Act, 1940; 
(ii) as to whether the High Court was justified in ignoring the 
fundamental difference between the two expressions i.e. date of service of notice 
and date of knowledge of award; 
c 
(iii) as to whether the High Court was justified in overlooking the 
legislative intent in framing Article 119(b) of the Limitation Act by D. 
incorporating the expression "the date of service of notice"; 
(iv) as to whether in view of the exhaustive nature of Article 119(b) of 
the Limitation Act, the High Court was justified in importing the principle 
embodied in Order Ill Rule 5 of the Code of Civil Procedure; 
E , 
(v) as to whether the High Court has failed to appreciate the significance 
of the expression "the Court shall thereupon give notice to the parties of filing 
of the award" occurring in Secti.on 14(2) of the Arbitration Act, 1940; and 
(vi) as to whether the High Court was justified in overlooking that the F 
presumption of constructive notice can Le drawn only against the party whom 
the counsel is representing at the time of performing the said act. 
The appellant contended that the award was filed on behalf of the 
arbitrator, the doctrine of constructive notice cannot be stretched to the extent 
of imputing knowledge on the appellant of filing of the award; that as per G 
Section 14(2) of the Arbitration Act, the arbitrator causes the award to be 
filed on request of either of the party or on the express direction of the Court; 
that the appellant has not filed any application requesting the arbitrator to 
file the award in Court. In the absence of such an application, the award filed 
by the arbitrator, cannot be construed as an award filed at the instance of the H 
598 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2006] SUPP. 8 S.C.R. 
A appellant and thus doctrine of constructive notice cannot be extended to the 
facts and circumstances of the case; that the notice referred therein should 
always be given by the Court; that the words used in Article

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