NEW OKHLA INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY versus HARKISHAN (DEAD) THROUGH LRS. & ORS.

Citation: [2017] 1 S.C.R. 572 · Decided: 27-01-2017 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: A.K. SIKRI · Disposal: Appeal(s) allowed

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Judgment (excerpt)

[2017] I S.C.R. 572 
A 
NEW OKHLA INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY 
B 
c 
D 
E 
F 
G 
H 
v. 
HARKISHAN (DEAD) THROUGH LRS. & ORS. 
(Civil Appeal No. 5170 of 2010) 
JANUARY 27, 2017 
[A. K. SIKRI AND R. K. AGRAWAL, JJ.) 
Land Acquisition Act, 1894 - s. llA - Land acquisition 
proceedings - Notification uls. 4 rlw. s. 17 issued in January 
1991 - Declaration u/s. 6 rlw. s. 17 in January 1992 - Land-owners 
(respondents) challenged emergency provision - During pendency 
of the litigation possession of the land was taken over by the State 
and award (dated August 17, 1996) was passed - Finally the 
acquisition was upheld by Supreme Court - However, liberty was 
granted to file representation - Land-owners filed representation 
for release of Land u!.~. 48(1) which was rejected by State by order 
dated December 3, 1999 - Land-owners again challenged the order 
dated December 3, 1999 - This challenge also failed as the cases 
were dismissed by Supreme court in the year 2003 - Thereafter, in 
2004, land-lords challenged the award dated August 7, 1996 on 
the ground that it was passed beyond the period of limitation as 
prescribed u/s. llA - High Court agreed to the plea and directed to 
issue fresh notifications u/ss. 4 and 6 and thereafter to make award 
uls. II in order to cure the defect - On appeal, held: The land-lords 
having failed to challenge the award in the 1st and llnd round of 
litigation, the petition filed in the year 2004 challenging the mvard, 
is barred by the doctrine of /aches and delays as also by the 
provisions under Or. JI, r. 2 CFC - Also as the urgency provision 
u/s. 17 was upheld by Supreme court and possession of the land 
was taken u/s. 17(1), s. JJA would not get attracted- Code of Civil 
Procedure, 1908 - Or. JI, r. 2 - Delay/Laches. 
Allowing the appeal, the Court 
HELD: 1. In the first round of litigation, when acquisition 
was challenged by the respondents, they failed in their attempt. 
At that time, not only declaration under Section 6 of the Act had 
been passed, the writ petitions were also dismissed by the High 
Court on August 24, 1995. Thereafter, possession of the land 
572 
NEW OKHLA INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. 
HARKISHAN (DEAD) THROUGH LRS. 
was taken on November 18, 1995. Subsequently, the award was 
also passed on August 17, 1996. This Court passed the judgment 
dated July 15, 1998 thereby affirming the judgment of the High 
Court. No doubt, event of the passing of the award dated August 
17, 1996 had taken place during pendency of the appeals in this 
Court. Fact remains that this was not questioned at the time of 
arguments advanced by the parties. The entire gamut of 
controversy was gone into by the court and the only permission 
which was given to the respondents was to make a suitable 
representation before the appropriate State authorities under 
Section 48(1) of the Act. [Para 10] [581-E-G] 
2. When the respondents made the representation, it was 
dealt with and rejected by the State Government vide order dated 
December 03, 1999. At tl)at time, award had been passed. 
However, in the second round of writ petitions preferred by the 
respondents, they chose to challenge only Office Order dated 
December 03, 1999 vide which their representation under Section 
48 of the Act had been rejected and it never dawned on them to 
challenge the validity of the award on the ground that the same 
was not passed within the prescribed period of limitation. Tlhus, 
in the second round of litigation also, the respondents· failed in , 
their attempt, inasmuch as, this Court put its imprimatur to the 
rejection order dated December 03, 1999 vide its judgment dated 
March 12, 2003. At that time, even the possession of land had 
been taken. If the respondents wanted to challenge the validity 
of the award on the ground that it was passed beyond the period 
of limitation, they should have done so immediately and, in any 
case, in the second round of writ petitions filed by them. Filing 
fresh writ petition challenging the validity of the award for the 
first time in the year 2004 would, therefore, not only be barred 
by the provisions of Order II Rule 2 of the Code of Civil 
Procedure, 1908, but would also be barred on the doctrine of 
!aches and delays as well. [Para 11] (581-H; 582-A-D] 
3. There is yet another serious infirmity in the impugned 
judgment. In the instant case, the land was acquired by invoking 
urgency clause under Section 17 of the Act and dispensing with 
the requ

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