NEW INDIA INSURANCE CO. LTD. versus SMT. SHANTI MISRA, ADULT
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A B c D E F G H 266 NEW INDIA INSURANCE CO. LTD. v. SMT. SHANTI MISRA, ADULT October 10, 1975 (A. ALAGUUSWAMI, P. K. GOSWAMI AND N. L. UNTWALIA, JJ.J Motor Vehicle Act (4 of 1939), ss. llOA to HOF-Limitation in case o/ accidem before constitution of Tribunal and application for compensation filed beyond 2 months of the constitution of the Tribunal. Section 110,A(3) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 before its amendment in 1970, provided that no application for compensation arising out of an accident of the nature spedfied in s. 110 (1) shall be entertained by the Claims Tribunal unless it is made within 60 days of the occurrence of the accident. Under its proviso, the Claims Tribunal has power to excuse any delay in filing the application if it was satisfied that the applicant was prevented by sufficient cause. S. 11 OF bars the jurisdiction of the Civil Court, as soon as the Claims Tribunal is constituted. As a result of an accident in September, 1966, the husband cif the respondent died. The limitation for filing a suit is 2 years from the date of accident under Art. 82. Limitation Act. 1963. On 18th March, 1967, the State Government constituted the Claims Tribunail under s. 110. The respondent filed an application for compensation on July 8, 1967. The Tribunal and the High Court held that the Tribunal conld entertain the application. Dismissing the appeal to this Cou.rt, HELD : (1) The change in law effected by the introduction of ss. llOA to 110F in 1956 was only a ,change of forum, that is, a change of adjectival or procedural law and not of su1Ystantive law. Such a ,change of law operates retrospectively and the person has to go to the new forum even if his cause of action or right of action accrued prior to the change of forum, because, though he has a vested right of action, he has no vested right of forum. The expressions "arising out of an accident" occurring in s. 11 OA ( 1) and "over the area in which the accident occurred" in s. 110A(2), and the absence of express words making the new forum avaifable only to causes of action arising after the creation of the Tribunal, show that the change of forum was mcan,t to operate retrospectively irrespective of when the aceident occurred. [270E-G] (2) The underlying principle of the change of law was to enable the claimants to have a cheap remedy of approaching the Claims Tribunals on payment of a nominal court-fee instead of an ad valorem amount in the Civil Court. Pending suits are not to be affected, but the Legislature wanted the cheap remedy to be available as soon as a Tribunal was constituted by the State Governments, in all cases, irrespective of the date of the accident, provided the remedy of going to the court was not barred on the date of the constitution of' the Tribunal.. [271C-E] (3) Therefore, if the accident had occurred within 60 days prior fo the constitution of the Tribunal then it could be said that an application to the Tribunal was the only remedy. If such an application could not be made within 60 days, then the Tribunal has the power to condone the delay under the proviso. But if the accident occurred more than 60 days before the cons- titution of the Tribunal, it could be contended either, (a) that such a case will be a fit one where the Tribunal would be able to condone the delay under the proviso. But if the accident occurred more than 60 days before fhe cons- to entertain such an application and the remedy of going to the Civil Court in such a situation was not barred under s. llOF. [270H-271B] ( 4) Since the change of forum is retrospective it could not be contended that recourse to suit would still be available under the old law of limitation. [273B-CJ ( .. • ' , I NEW INDIA INSURANCE V. SI~ANTI MISRA 267 (5) But, taking recourse to the proviso to s. uqA(3) for exci.:si~g !he delay in applying to the Tribunal is not correct. Sec!lon 5 of the Lmutatton Act 1963 or the proviso to s. 110A(3) of the Act, are meant to condone the' default of the party on the ground of sufficient cause. But if a p~rty is not' able to file an application for no fault of his, but because the Tnbunal was not in existence, it will not be a case where it can be said that the applicant was prevented by sufficient cause from making t~e application in time within the me~ning of the prnviso. However, the application would not be barred under s. 110A(3), because, (a) though time had s
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